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1 
CHAPTER I  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Motivation 
The electricity supply industry is one of the largest and most dominant industries in a 
modern industrial economy.  However, this industry is going through major structural changes.  
Instead of the traditional reliance on state and federal regulation, market forces have acquired 
greater weight than ever before.  
Traditionally, economists argued that electric utilities were natural monopolies, and 
monopoly electric utilities provided consumers a package of services at regulated rates. These 
services may include power generation (the production of power), transmission (the movement of 
power from generation facilities over high voltage lines), distribution (reducing voltage and 
delivering power to individual customers), and customer service (communication with customers 
including metering, meter reading, ancillary, and billing and collection). Efficiency and fairness 
required that these natural monopolies be either owned and operated by state or federal 
government or regulated by them. The industry included private investor-owned utilities (IOUs); 
federal and state utilities (publicly-owned utilities, POUs), local government entities 
(municipally-owned utilities, MUNIs); and consumer-owned cooperatives (COOPs).  
The electric industry has been regulated in the United States since 1907. This corresponds 
to the period from the passage of the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) of 1935 to 
the passage of the Energy Policy Act (EPACT) of 1992, EPACT 2005 and the more recent 
industry restructuring/deregulation bills in federal and state legislation.  The passage of PUHCA 
allowed electric utilities to be involved in all phases of power generation and sale.  With the 
passage of the Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURPA) of 1978, new generating firms entered the 
2  
market selling their output not to customers but to utilities. PURPA opened the stage for limited 
competition in the generation sector. 
Beginning in 1992, electric restructuring laws were enacted in many states, and power 
supply and retail services were opened to competition.  EPACT 1992 created a new category of 
corporations, exempt wholesale generators (EWGs), which were allowed to own generators and 
sell electricity at wholesale anywhere in the world or at retail outside the United States 
(Hempling, 1995). EPACT 1992 opened the stage for a nationwide competition in the generation 
sector. 
Restructuring unbundled the services in a way that allowed many energy service 
providers to compete in the supply of electricity with the incumbent utility. These providers 
included independent power producers, power marketers, and energy service providers.  As of 
December 2002, the United States General Accounting Office (“GAO”) reported that “24 states 
and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation and/or issued regulatory orders to 
restructure their retail electricity markets. Of these, 17 states and the District of Columbia 
continue to be active in implementing retail access, thereby allowing customers to choose their 
own electricity supplier.” Electricity restructuring or deregulation in these states deregulated the 
wholesale market by lifting nearly all restrictions to how wholesale prices are set by generators 
while keeping the wires function (transmission and distribution) fully regulated and provided by 
regulated monopolies.
1
  
This industry has remained one of the most tightly regulated industries in the United 
States (White, 1996); social concerns about service reliability, affordability, and environmental 
issues drove regulatory agendas (Stevenson and Penn 1995).  Most economists agree that a 
                     
1
 While we use interchangeably the words restructuring and deregulation, these terms are not always the 
same.  Restructuring refers to attempts to reorganize the roles of the market players but not necessarily 
deregulate the market.  Full deregulation means that the deregulated industry functions without a regulator.  
The case of the U.S. electricity deregulation is different because deregulated electricity markets still use a 
regulator or a market monitor. Sioshansi (2006, p.71) 
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natural monopoly leads to deadweight social loss when a profit maximizing monopolist charges 
prices above the marginal costs. The expectation from states that opened their electric market to 
competition is that lower power supply prices will follow electric restructuring and benefit all 
consumers; new, low-cost generation companies will enter the market, and existing generators 
will cut costs due to the increased efficiency in production brought about by competition. In 
general, it is believed that a competitive electric market will provide residential, commercial, and 
industrial consumers benefits greater than those offered by the current regulated regime. The 
primary goal of electric restructuring is to enable market forces, not regulators, to influence 
utilities‟ decisions related to cost, pricing, and power supply. However, electric restructuring has 
other effects including revenue, tax, profit and earning effects, and there are concerns that 
restructuring primarily benefits consumers in high-cost states at the expense of those in low-cost 
states.  Although deregulation is expected to lead to competition with the right price signals to 
consumers and better consumer choice, at market prices and higher quality of service, it is built 
on the promise of higher cost efficiencies (lower marginal and average costs) and lower retail 
prices.  Lower prices in turn result in lower utility revenues, lower state and local government 
taxes and potentially lower utility profits if proper cost adjustments are not undertaken or if new 
entrants operate at lower cost or can sell only to the most profitable customers. 
Most states developed rules that dictated a slow transition to competition, and only in a 
handful of states have customers switched to competing electric providers.  Brown (2000, p.28) 
reports that in Massachusetts, only 15.8 percent of customers switched to a different provider.  
The number is 19.6 percent in California, 60 percent of industrial customers in Pennsylvania‟s 
PECO Energy service territory and 455 large customers (about 17 percent of the kilowatt-hours 
sold to that class of industrial customers) in Maine.   
However, there are signs that restructuring/ deregulation may produce unintended results 
for the industry.  First, in 1999, electric utility share prices declined sharply.  The Dow-Jones 
4  
Utility Average index tracking 15 stocks declined in the last six months of 1999 by 14.7%.  
According to the Dow Theory Forecasts (May 4, 2000) “[T]he [electric utility] sector ranks 
among the worst for 12-month performance, and few utility stocks have escaped the carnage. For 
the 77 electric-utility stocks rated on the electric-utilities table, the average 12-month total return 
is negative 13.5%.  Excluding takeover beneficiaries, only two of the 77 stocks have gained at 
least 9%.  Ten of the stocks have lost at least 30%, and 36 have lost at least 20%.”  This online 
report claimed that three factors explain this decline in the value of electric utility stocks:  (1) 
interest rates moved sharply higher after October 1998 and utility stock prices are strongly 
correlated with bond prices; (2) uncertainty vis-à-vis deregulation and mergers of electric utilities; 
and (3) the flow of money out of utilities into technology industries. 
Second, for the period 1992 through 1998, the number of IOUs decreased by 8 percent 
(261 in 1992 to. 239 in 1998) while the number of nonutilities generating electricity increased by 
9 percent (1,792 in 1992 to. 1,954 in 1998) (EIA, 2000) .  In addition, utilities added less capacity 
compared to nonutilities, a trend that is observed with deregulation.  Third, the unexpected rise in 
natural gas prices during the years 2000-01 caused increases in wholesale rates while many of the 
states where deregulation occurred froze retail electricity rates, resulting in retail prices set 
artificially below equilibrium rates.   Many state utility commissions allowed the utilities to book 
the difference between allowed revenues and those increased costs as deferred costs which 
ultimately were charged to consumers with carrying costs often calculated based on the utility 
allowed average weighted cost of capital or the long-term debt rate.  Fourth, the failure of the 
California electricity market
2
 convinced proponents of electric deregulation to question the timing 
and the efficacy of competition in electric power generation and distribution.  This created price 
disparities causing state officials and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to 
                     
2
 California‟s energy crisis was characterized by very high wholesale prices, escalating financial problems 
for utility providers and electricity consumers, as well as unprecedented rolling blackouts over an extended 
period of time. 
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intervene and fix the power market in California.  As a result, many states, including Oklahoma 
and Arkansas, decided to delay the implementation of their restructuring plans. Tables 1 and 2 
provide a comparison of retail prices in states which enacted a deregulation legislation and 
Appendix 1 through 4 provide a comparison of retail prices in regulated and deregulated states. 
   
1.2. Why Study Electric Utilities in the United States 
Electricity plays a critical role in our modern society.  Electricity is an integral part of 
life, indispensable to factories, commercial establishments, homes, and other facilities including 
sport and recreational facilities in most developed countries.  Lack of electricity can cause 
irreparable damage and economic loss from reduced industrial production, and also it 
inconveniences many homeowners.  Indeed, electricity is a vital input in the production of nearly 
all other goods and services, and it is also a final good consumed by almost all households.  
The regulatory environment of the electricity supply industry changed over the past two 
decades.  During the last five years there have been major outages
3
 and dramatic increases in 
electricity prices in the west and Midwest as a result of extremely hot summers.  The energy crisis 
in California became so alarming that it attracted national attention.  
However, in order to understand recent regulatory changes in the industry, it is important 
to understand the functional decomposition of the electricity supply industry into generation, 
transmission, and distribution.  Generation is the production of electricity using different energy 
                     
3
 On August 14, 2003, large portions of the Midwest and Northeast United States and Ontario, Canada, 
experienced an electric power blackout. The outage affected an area with an estimated 50 million people 
and 61,800 megawatts (MW) of electric load in the states of Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, New York, 
Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey and the Canadian province of Ontario. The blackout 
began a few minutes after 4:00 pm Eastern Daylight Time (16:00 EDT), and power was not restored for 4 
days in some parts of the United States. Parts of Ontario suffered rolling blackouts for more than a week 
before full power was restored. Estimates of total costs in the United States range between $4 billion and 
$10 billion (US dollars). In Canada, gross domestic product was down 0.7% in August, there was a net loss 
of 18.9 million work hours, and manufacturing shipments in Ontario were down $2.3 billion (Canadian 
dollars).  See UNITED STATES-Canada Power System Outage Task Force.  “Final Report on the August 
14, 2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations,” April 2004 
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sources and different technologies.  The main energy sources are fossil fuels (coal, petroleum, 
natural gas, and other gases), hydroelectric power, nuclear power, and renewable fuels 
(geothermal, wind turbines, solar, waste, and other sources).   Transmission involves “high-
voltage” transport of electricity.  Distribution involves “low-voltage” electricity to end-users.  
Another function of the electricity industry often confused with the distribution function is the 
supply of electricity or the sale of electricity to end-users. The supply of electricity includes 
metering, billing, and marketing, both at retail and wholesale levels. This function is also being 
opened to competition. 
Competition in electricity markets is a recent but rapidly growing phenomenon in the 
United States.  It began as an unexpected movement when utilities were required to buy power 
from qualifying facilities (QFs) at avoided costs
4
 and expanded with the requirement by EPACT 
1992 that the utilities buy power from exempt wholesale generators.  
In all states, deregulation took the form of functional separation (or unbundling) of 
generation, and transmission and distribution (T&D), and supply of electricity.  Competition was 
introduced in the generation and supply of electricity.  Some states introduced wholesale and 
retail consumer choice of supplier, some phased-in consumer choice of supplier, and others 
introduced full consumer choice at the onset of deregulation.  However, transmission and 
distribution networks were nearly always viewed as natural monopolies (White, 1996). T&D are 
regulated through a “rate-of-return” regulation or cost-based pricing of T&D services.  Hence, 
since 1978, with the introduction of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) of 1978, 
the electric generation sector is no longer a natural monopoly, and some evidence indicates that 
this sector better serves consumers than the existing regulated monopoly system.  Transmission 
and distribution services on the other hand continue to be regulated services. 
                     
4
 Avoided costs are the incremental savings associated with not having to produce additional units of 
electricity while meeting demand requirements. 
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Electric restructuring is happening in almost all states. Electric competition no longer 
means generators competing to sell power to transmission companies.  It means allowing 
wholesale or retail customers to buy their power from several competing suppliers.  This implies 
that not only electric utilities need to make major changes in their organization, but also to change 
their business plan and consider many issues like the recovery of stranded costs
5 
that monopoly 
electric utilities had not considered to date. Stranded costs are above-market costs or assets with 
book values that exceeds their estimated market value.  Nunez (2007, pp. 196-197) defines three 
major categories of stranded costs: regulatory assets, i.e., expenses deferred by a state regulatory 
commission in order to stabilize electricity rates; generating plants, i.e., investment in generating 
plants such as nuclear plants depreciable over long time horizon and not recoverable in its 
entirety at the time competition is introduced in the industry; and long-term contracts to purchase 
and sell electricity from utility and nonutility generators based on energy prices that were in 
effect prior to deregulation of the wholesale market. 
 A vast literature has examined the effects of competition on market structure. However, 
most empirical studies considered the electric utility industry as a whole and ignored region, state, 
and time effects.  Not all states have moved to electric restructuring, and those which did 
experienced different levels of restructuring and competition.  On the other side, because of data 
availability, most studies compared IOUs and POUs or  
MUNIs and ignored rural electric cooperatives (COOPs) and other small electric utilities. Even 
though they are privately owned, COOPs have not received much attention in the existing related 
studies.  
A few empirical studies compared the relative efficiencies of investor-owned electric 
utilities (IOUs) and government-owned electric utilities.  For example Hausman and Neufeld 
                     
5
 Stranded costs are defined as prudent costs incurred by a regulated utility which may not be recoverable 
under market-based retail competition. Examples are undepreciated generating facilities, deferred costs, 
and long-term contract costs. See http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epav1/glossary.html#st  
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(1991) found that that MUNIs significantly lower costs compared to IOUs and that scale 
inefficiency accounted for most of the technical inefficiency observed in IOUs.  Others like 
Hollas and Stansell (1988) compared the efficiencies of IOUs and rural electric cooperatives 
(COOPs) and found that MUNIs were the least efficient, followed by COOPs and the IOUs.  
Berry (1994) also found that COOPs were less efficient than IOUs. 
White (1996) provided state-by-state evidence on the distribution of potential gains to 
consumers (and losses to utilities) from deregulatory reforms.  He affirmed that new power 
production facilities can be developed by entrants at average costs well below those of many 
incumbent utilities. 
 Stigler (1971) noted that the incentive of large firms within the industry may differ 
substantially from their smaller counterparts. Thus, conclusions from studies of large IOUs and 
POUs cannot be applied to small cooperatives and municipal utilities.  
The diversity of the United States electric power industry provides an opportunity for 
research into the efficiency and the performance of the industry under different and changing 
regimes in order to further anticipate the impact of future changes in the industry. By limiting the 
analysis to a single industry but studying multiple facets of the industry, our research explores the 
process by which the introduction of deregulation and/or competition in a network industry like 
the United States electric power industry impacts the efficiency and the profitability of the firms 
in the industry.  These firms have different ownership and size, and may or may not be open to 
competition.  As noted by Kwoka (1996), the diversity of restructuring approaches employed or 
under consideration makes it difficult to predict the final structure of the transformed industry.  
This diversity of factors makes our research even more interesting. 
In April 1994, the California Public Utilities Commission released a plan to deregulate 
the power generation business in the state.  White (1996) reported that with deregulatory reform 
proposals in California, the market value of the three investor-owned electric utilities plummeted 
9  
more than $12 billion over the ensuing six months of formal electric industry restructuring 
proceedings.  More than ten years have passed since the first States passed their deregulation 
legislation; yet, studies continue to analyze different aspects of the electricity industry without 
conclusive evidence that deregulation produced significant reductions in cost and gains in 
productive efficiency and the financial performance of electric utilities. Despite the extensive 
research many questions remain unanswered concerning the impact of deregulation on cost 
efficiency and shareholder wealth of electric utilities in the United States. 
 
1.3. Contribution 
The literature on utility deregulation leaves many unanswered questions.  Are electric 
deregulation and competition occurring in states or regions where their benefits are most likely to 
outweigh the costs or inefficiencies from regulation?  Is competition in the United States 
electricity supply industry warranted?  Do deregulated electric utilities perform better than 
regulated electric utilities in the United States? How do major deregulation events affect 
shareholder wealth? Do deregulated electric utilities face higher market, systematic risk
6
 than 
regulated utilities? 
We try to answer some of these questions in the following chapters.  Specifically, this 
dissertation addresses the following specific issues: 
(1) We describe the landscape of the United States electric industry in terms of federal and state 
jurisdictions, state restructuring and deregulation patterns, industry structure, reforms in the 
electric utility industry and their implications for utility performance, ownership, size, 
consumer access, and the future of the industry. 
                     
6 Systematic risk, also called market risk is defined as Risk which is common to an entire class of assets or 
liabilities. The value of investments may decline over a given time period simply because of economic 
changes or other events that impact large portions of the market. Asset allocation and diversification can 
protect against systematic risk because different portions of the market tend to underperform at different 
times. See http://www.investorwords.com/4857/systematic_risk.html 
10  
(2) We investigate whether or not competition in the electric supply industry is needed and 
explain how industry structure affects restructuring choice. 
(3) We determine whether the change from “rate-of-return” regulation to “managed competition” 
or “deregulation” in a more competitive market affects the efficiency, performance, and 
profitability of the industry. 
(4) We determine whether deregulation affects the diffusion of new technologies in the electric 
supply industry.  
(5) Finally, we discuss the performance implications of structure and governance differences 
among firms and examine how we can anticipate the consequences of further changes in the 
industry. 
In our analysis, we compare investor-owned utilities, publicly-owned utilities, and 
cooperative utilities, and take into account differences in policy within the states in which they 
operate, firm size, and other characteristics of the industry.  Because two groups of electric 
utilities are investigated –regulated and deregulated utilities- the structure of each group is 
described.  It is important to note a priori that there is no consensus concerning the best 
restructuring pattern to adapt.   
This dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 presents a historical view of electric 
utilities in the United States, discusses the regulatory regimes that were imposed on the industry 
throughout the past, provides an overview of the cost and price differences across states which 
justify the introduction of deregulation, discusses the issue of ownership and the contribution of 
privately and publicly owned electric utilities to the industry and the issue of deregulation in 
network industries.  Chapter 3 reviews the literature on economies of scale and vertical 
integration in the electric industry and on the effects of ownership and deregulation of electric 
utilities on efficiency and profitability in the United States and around the world.  Chapter 4 
examines the methodological approaches used to study the effects of deregulation on cost and 
11  
production efficiencies, shareholder wealth and the profitability of United States electric utilities.  
Chapter 5 describes our data and the variables used in this study.  Chapter 6 presents empirical 
results of my analyses.  Chapter 7 presents our conclusions and policy implications for our 
analysis of the electric utility industry in the United States.  
12  
CHAPTER II 
 
ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES:  
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The United States electricity industry has evolved into firms that are vertically integrated 
into generation, transmission, distribution, and retailing.  Those firms have exclusive rights to 
serve retail customers within a franchised geographic area. They were generally subject to “cost 
of service” or “rate of return” regulation by state public service commissions. A more detailed 
description of the structure of the industry, its regulation and deregulation can be found in Joskow 
and Schmalensee (1983), Joskow (1997), and Kwoka (1996).  
The United States electricity supply industry has been regulated by state and federal 
governments for decades.  Competition was introduced in the wholesale electricity market along 
with the introduction of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) of 1978. PURPA 
was meant to promote energy conservation in the wake of the second energy crisis of the 1970s.  
Even though limited competition arose between generation utilities and non-utility generators 
such as the Qualifying Facilities (QFs) and other Independent Power Producers (IPPs), high 
electricity prices due to an excessive amount of investment in power generation, transmission, 
and distribution prevailed in most high-cost states.  After the introduction of the Energy Policy 
Act (EPACT) of 1992 and Order 888 and 889 of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) in 1996, the power generation sector of the industry progressed toward a complete 
deregulation. While only 367 billion kilowatthours (kWh) or only 11 percent of the total net 
generation in the United States was produced by non-utility power producers in 1996, the figure 
rose to 787 billion kWh or 21 percent in 2000 and to 1,581 billion kWh in 2006.
7
   Annual sales 
                     
7
 Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2006.  Electric Power Annual 2006. 
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of electric power at retail were $213 billion in 1996, $233 billion in 2000, and $327 billion in 
2006, and the electric power industry accounted for approximately 2.5 per cent share of the 
United States GDP during that period.  
Although the US electric system is probably the most reliable system among developed 
countries, high electricity prices continue to prevail in many states due in part to excessive 
amounts of stranded investments which the stock market often values negatively (Nunez, 2007) 
combined with low productivity and to other factors that may be less obvious to outside 
observers.  As can be seen in the following section, states that historically had higher than 
average electricity prices have been the first to open their retail electricity markets to competition.  
 
2.2. Comparison of Electric Utilities' Costs, Prices, and Markets 
Many factors may explain the move toward competition. First, competition is believed to 
improve efficiency. Critics argue that regulation lacks the proper incentives for effective cost 
control and efficiency (Averch and Johnson 1962; Sherman 1989).    
The second factor driving deregulation is the difference between electricity rates across 
the United States. It is not surprising that most States in the forefront of electric restructuring are 
high-cost/high-price states (see Table 1).  Only a few low-cost states began the process of 
restructuring their power industry.  Baum et al. (1996, p. 3) maintain that the single largest factor 
driving the move to increase competition is the difference between today‟s low marginal cost of 
electric power production and existing rates which are set to recover costs incurred in the past. 
While past costs include stranded costs put in place to address the rapid growth in energy demand 
in the 1970s, marginal costs are lower than average costs during the study period due also to 
decreasing cost of fossil fuel like natural gas, reduced capital cost and excess capacity. 
Technological improvements in gas turbines and in renewable sources of electricity 
constitute the third factor. This and the previous factors are linked because new power generators 
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have significantly lower marginal costs due to the lower cost of fossil fuel
8
, reduced capital cost, 
and improved efficiency and reliability of gas-fired combustion turbine and combined cycle 
power plants.  In addition, the deregulation of other network activities in the United States made 
it possible to think about the need for regulated electric utilities. Studies reported successful 
market deregulation in the airline, banking, natural gas, transportation, and long distance 
telephone industries.
9
  
 
                     
8
 This was especially true during most of the study period from 1997 to 2003.  The cost of fuel has 
increased due to many factors such as hurricanes Katrina and Rita, global economic uncertainty, wars, 
federal and state environmental requirements and the recent increase in oil prices. 
  
9
 Peltzman and Winston (2000) discuss deregulation of the Airline, Railroad, Telecommunications and 
Electricity Industries in the United States. 
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Table 1: Average Electricity Prices of States with Enacted Restructuring Legislation as of 
February 2001, 1999(cents/kWh)  
 
State All 
Sectors 
Residential Commercial Industrial 
Oregon  4.87 5.75 4.94 3.55 
Montana  5.01 6.78 6.35 2.84 
West Virginia  5.09 6.27 5.53 3.80 
Oklahoma  5.37 6.60 5.58 3.60 
Arkansas  5.68 7.43 5.82 4.12 
Virginia  5.86 7.48 5.55 3.84 
Nevada  5.93 7.13 6.66 4.77 
Texas  6.04 7.55 6.52 3.97 
Ohio  6.40 8.68 7.67 4.33 
New Mexico  6.58 8.62 7.53 4.25 
US Average 6.66 8.16 7.26 4.43 
Illinois  6.98 8.83 7.39 5.02 
Maryland  7.04 8.39 6.82 4.26 
Delaware  7.12 9.17 7.39 4.73 
Michigan  7.14 8.73 7.86 5.05 
Arizona  7.23 8.53 7.51 5.04 
District of Columbia 7.45 8.00 7.47 4.59 
Pennsylvania  7.67 9.19 7.90 5.22 
Rhode Island  9.02 10.13 8.49 7.39 
Massachusetts  9.16 10.09 8.90 7.75 
California  9.34 10.71 10.05 7.16 
Maine  9.77 13.07 10.51 6.42 
Connecticut  9.96 11.46 9.69 7.42 
New Jersey  9.99 11.40 9.74 7.69 
New York  10.40 13.32 11.19 4.77 
New Hampshire  11.75 13.84 11.39 9.21 
Source: Energy Information Administration, Electric Sales and Revenue 1999, 24-27. 
Data sorted by “All Sectors.”  
 
 
Almost all high-cost/high-price states have enacted electric restructuring legislation with 
the exception of Vermont, Alaska, and Hawaii which do not report any restructuring activity.  A 
few low-cost states enacted restructuring legislation.  Those states include Arkansas, Oklahoma, 
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Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Virginia and West Virginia.
10
  The following table shows the average 
retail rates as of December 2006 for the states which enacted restructuring legislation. 
 
Table 2: Average Electricity Prices of States with Enacted Restructuring Legislation as of 
December 2006 (cents/kWh) 
State All Sectors Residential Commercial Industrial 
West Virginia  5.04 6.35 5.59 3.71 
Oregon  6.53 7.48 6.77 4.85 
Virginia  6.86 8.49 6.21 4.69 
Montana  6.91 8.28 7.44 5.12 
Arkansas  6.99 8.85 6.96 5.24 
Illinois  7.07 8.42 7.95 4.69 
Oklahoma  7.30 8.55 7.34 5.46 
New Mexico  7.37 9.06 7.61 5.57 
Ohio  7.71 9.34 8.44 5.61 
Michigan  8.14 9.77 8.51 6.05 
Arizona  8.24 9.40 8.02 5.69 
Pennsylvania  8.68 10.35 8.94 6.63 
US Average 8.90 10.40 9.46 6.16 
Nevada  9.63 11.08 10.12 8.03 
Maryland  9.95 9.71 10.56 8.14 
Delaware  10.13 11.85 10.21 7.67 
Texas  10.34 12.86 9.85 7.82 
District of Columbia 11.08 9.88 11.17 17.43 
Maine  11.80 13.80 12.42 8.83 
New Jersey  11.88 12.84 11.62 10.42 
California  12.82 14.33 12.90 10.09 
New Hampshire  13.84 14.68 14.07 11.62 
Rhode Island  13.98 15.12 13.51 12.51 
Connecticut  14.83 16.86 14.03 11.71 
New York  15.27 16.89 15.51 9.39 
Massachusetts  15.45 16.60 15.54 13.04 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration, Electric Sales and Revenue 2006.  Available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/esr/esr_sum.html 
Data sorted by “All Sectors.” 
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 Arkansas and Oklahoma have taken steps to delay the process. 
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Appendix 1, 2, 3 and 4 at the end of this study show that from 1996 to 2003, average 
residential electricity rates in deregulated states decreased by 2.3% while at the same time 
average residential electricity rates in regulated states increased by 9%.  During the same period, 
commercial, industrial and average electricity rates increased in both deregulated and regulated 
states, but at a much slower pace in deregulated states.  A t-test statistics shows that in 2003, 
residential prices, commercial prices and retail prices of all sectors combined were significantly 
higher in regulated states than in deregulated states respectively at the 1%, 10% and 1% levels. 
There was no significant difference in industrial prices between regulated and deregulated states 
in 2003, probably due to deliberate state policies to meet economic development goals such as 
employment by providing incentives to industrial customers.  The same test statistic reveals no 
significant differences between prices in regulated and deregulated states. For example average 
retail rates for all sectors from 1996 to 2003 increased in deregulated states by only 1.9% while 
they increased by 10.6% in regulated states.   
These results suggest that deregulation may have improved the cost efficiencies of 
electric utilities in deregulated states compared to regulated electric utilities.  Because of changes 
in the industry that occurred post-2003, especially as a direct consequence of the Enron implosion 
and the California electricity market restructuring debacle, the changes in average prices in 
deregulated and regulated states converge to the average of the industry. 
 
2.3. Ownership and State Regulation of Electric Utilities in the United States 
A crucial question is why the electricity industry in the United States is heavily regulated 
by states.  An even deeper question is why the US electricity industry switched from a system of 
municipal regulation to state regulation.  Knittel (1999, p. 2 and 16) studied the origins of state 
electricity regulation and found that “it was corruptibleness of the municipal regulators that led 
some industry officials to favor state regulation… State regulation gave the industry relief from 
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the corruptive nature of municipal regulation while keeping regulation decentralized enough to 
provide ample opportunity for the influencing of its decisions in the future.”  Our analysis of the 
effects of regulation of public utilities in a later section tries to provide answers to these 
questions. 
In 1877 the United States Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in United States 
constitutional history.  The case of Munn vs. Illinois, 94 US 113 (1877), instituted the rights of 
governments to regulate and set rates for companies that provide vital public services in a 
monopolistic business environment.  Because the services provided were vital to the welfare of 
those being served, and the providers of such services operated without direct competition; the 
“public utility” status was attributed to these companies. In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled that “when private property is devoted to a public use, it is subject to public regulation.”11 
As early as 1885, electricity regulation began with municipal authorities offering 
franchise licenses to control rates and right-of-way, which gave municipal utilities exclusive 
access to serve a territory to the practical exclusion of all others and to charge for the service 
without any price regulation.  Municipal regulation promoted competition at the same time it 
promoted a loss of efficiency because of the possibilities of duplicate capacity as each franchise 
laid down its own power lines. 
                     
11
 Defendants charged with operating a public warehouse in Chicago in which they unlawfully transacted 
business without procuring a license under An Act to Regulate Public Warehouses and the Warehousing 
and Inspection of Grain, and to Give Effect to Ill. Const. art. XIII (Grain Act). The lower court held that 
defendants had complied except in two respects: first, they had not complied with licensing requirements; 
second, they had charged rates higher than those fixed by § 15 of the Grain Act. Defendants appealed, and 
the state supreme court affirmed. Defendants appealed to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that the 
Grain Act was unconstitutional. The Court held that the Illinois statute in question was not unconstitutional 
because defendants were engaged in a public business to such an extent that the state was permitted to 
regulate, and the statute did not impermissibly interfere with the Commerce Clause of Constitution because 
the state's regulation of commerce was within its own boundaries. The Court held that the statute was a 
legitimate regulation of business under state law as the state was free to regulate commerce within its own 
boundaries even if it might incidentally become connected with interstate commerce. The Court affirmed 
the lower court's ruling. 
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From 1877 to 1907, electric utilities were not subject to any price regulation.  It was in 
1907 that state regulation went into effect in Wisconsin and New York, and state regulatory 
bodies were expanded to include gas and electric companies.  State regulators had the power to 
set rates and standards and control entry and exit.  Federal regulation began later in 1920 with the 
creation of the Federal Power Commission.  
EIA (2000) reports that as of December 1998, the electric industry was composed of 239 
investor-owned, 2,009 publicly owned, 912 cooperative and 10 federal electric utilities, in 
addition to 1,934 non-utility power producers and approximately 400 power marketers.
12
  In 
2006, EEI reported that the industry was composed of 203 IOUs, 2,038 publicly-owned (MUNIs, 
state projects and public power districts), 870 cooperative and 9 federal electric utilities.  There 
were a total of 1,688 non-utility generators and 143 energy service providers.  Investor-Owned 
Utilities (IOUs) accounted for about 75 percent of all utility generation and capacity. IOUs are 
generally vertically integrated taxable corporations owned by shareholders who earn a return on 
their investment.  The rates that investor-owned electric utilities charge for electric service are 
regulated on a cost-of-service basis by federal or state and local regulatory agencies.  
Traditionally, IOUs are granted service monopolies in specified geographic areas, and they have 
an obligation to provide reliable electric power at reasonable rates to customers in those areas.   
Publicly Owned Utilities (POUs) are owned by state and local governments and include 
municipal utilities, public power districts, state authorities, and irrigation districts. They are non-
profit agencies and serve at cost.  Any excess funds are returned to consumers in the form of 
community contributions and reduced rates.  Generally, POUs are not subject to federal, state and 
local taxes, though they may collect gross receipts taxes. Most POUs are in the distribution 
business exclusively, although a few produce and transmit electricity. 
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 http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_stru_update/chapter3_2.html 
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Rural Electric Cooperatives (COOPs) are owned by member-customers (rural farmers 
and communities).  There are over 900 rural electric cooperatives.  Most COOPs do not own 
generation facilities.  An elected board of directors and appointed manager manage rural electric 
cooperatives.  COOPs are subject to state regulation in some jurisdictions. The Rural Utilities 
Service (formerly the Rural Electrification Administration) is under the United States Department 
of Agriculture. It was established under the Rural Electrification Act of 1936, which intended to 
extend credit at discounted interest rates to cooperatives to provide electric service to small rural 
communities and farms where it was expensive to provide the service. However, some 
cooperatives operate in urban areas.  COOPs are usually exempt from federal and state income 
taxes, but do pay other types of state and local taxes.  
Federally Owned Utilities (FOUs) produce not-for-profit power and give preference in 
wholesale supply to POUs, COOPs, and other nonprofit entities. Ten such FOUs operate in the 
United States and include the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), the Bonneville Power 
Administration and other Power Marketing Administrations (PMAs).  TVA is the largest power 
producer in this group and markets at wholesale and retail levels.  Most of the electricity 
produced by these entities is sold for resale. These utilities are generally exempt from federal, 
state and local taxes.  
Non-utilities or independent power producers generate power for their own use and/or for 
sale in wholesale power markets.  These are qualifying facilities under PURPA, exempt 
wholesale generators (EWG)
13
 under EPACT, co-generators, non-QF co-generators, QF small 
power producers, and /or non-QF other.  Power marketers are independent marketers who buy 
and sell electricity without owning or operating generation, transmission, or distribution facilities.  
Power marketers may or may not be affiliated with a utility (an example would be Enron). 
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 EWG are wholesale generators created under the 1992 Energy Policy Act that are exempt from certain 
financial and legal restrictions stipulated in the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935. 
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Apparently, social concerns about service reliability, affordability, and environmental 
issues drove regulatory agendas (Stevenson and Penn, 1995).  There are different types of 
regulation of natural monopolies (Laffont, 1994).  The most common are the “cost of service 
regulation” and the “Ramsey-Boiteux regulation”.  Under the cost of service regulation, 
regulators wanted to make sure that the industry was earning a fair “rate-of-return”, a rate of 
return necessary to attract capital to utilities while at the same time avoid excessive exercise of 
monopoly power.  The main features of the cost of service regulation are: (a) a fair rate of return 
on investment above the market rate; (b) prices are determined to equal average costs with this 
imputed charge for capital; (c) prices remain fixed during the regulatory lag until some party, the 
regulatory commission, the firm, or the consumers, initiates a new regulatory review leading to 
new prices; (d) the regulatory review is a process of checks and balances in which the conflicts 
between the firm which wishes high prices and the consumers who wish low prices are arbitrated 
by the regulatory commission. 
The Ramsey-Boiteux regulation is based on the principle that the regulator maximizes 
social welfare by choosing tariffs under a budget constraint.  When fixed and joint costs are 
present (reflecting economies of scale and scope), efficiency pricing or marginal cost pricing 
results in losses to the suppliers because they will not be able to recover fixed costs.  According 
to the “Ramsey-Boiteux” regulation also called the “Second Best” pricing, prices deviate from 
marginal costs so as to minimize deadweight loss and satisfy the budget constraint.  
The main differences are that the cost of service regulation provides incentives for firms 
to inflate costs (resulting in excessive and inefficient consumer prices) and at the same time, it 
provides a strong incentive for over-investment (the “Averch-Johnson Effect”).  The prices fixed 
through the Ramsey-Boiteux regulation depend on demand and cost attributes and generally do 
not lead to a uniform mark-up over marginal costs.  According to Ross (1986), under the Ramsey 
pricing, Pareto-efficient prices result from the fact that prices are selected based on the inverse 
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elasticity rule in order to maximize consumers' surplus subject to a profit constraint, with no 
regard for the distribution of surplus between the buyers since all consumers' surpluses enter the 
optimization problem with equal weight.  
 
2.4. The Historical Role of Competition in Electric Network Industries 
There is substantial empirical evidence showing that (perfect) competition is the most 
efficient market structure.  Basic microeconomic theory suggests that competition reduces costs, 
improves quality of services, and increases efficiency of production in markets.  Thus, 
competition ensures operational and allocative efficiency.  However, network industries have 
some distinctive characteristics when compared to other industries, and these characteristics 
suggest that the traditional competitive model may not be appropriate for this industry or may 
affect the speed with which competition can be adopted.  According to Bauer (1997), those 
characteristics are the following: 
(1) They may exhibit significant and unique externalities where positive network externalities 
prevail if all subscribers to a network benefit from the addition of a new subscriber.  
According to Hogan (1992), in the case of electricity, externalities occur predominantly in the 
transmission segment of the industry as the addition or disconnection of load influences the 
transmission capacity throughout the integrated grid.  
(2) They produce “composite” goods that consist of the more or less simultaneous combination 
of different inputs. 
(3) Network industries markets are often vertically related and the degree of competition in the 
various market segments uneven. 
(4) The vertical relation of markets may cause input bottlenecks with competing entities 
providing the same input (unless a “pure utility” approach is implemented with full 
divestiture between monopoly and competitive operations).  
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In the recent past, there has been a national trend toward competition in the network 
industries.  This trend began with the financial services in the aftermath of the Great Depression.  
The next industry to move toward competition was the gas industry following the Natural Gas 
Policy Act of 1978 and FERC's orders unbundling the production and transportation of natural 
gas.  The airline industry followed thereafter. This was made possible by the Airline Deregulation 
Act of 1978 which created competitive routes and pricing in the industry.  The transportation 
industry followed in 1980 when the Congress enacted the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 aimed at the 
deregulation of the trucking industry.  During the same year, the Staggers Rail Act deregulated 
the rail industry.  Finally, in 1984, a court ordered the divestiture of AT&T, which led to the birth 
of the regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs).  In 1996, the Congress enacted the federal 
Telecommunications Act allowed greater competition in the local and long-distance telephone 
services.  The Act essentially removed the legal barriers to entry for competitors at the local level. 
 Bauer (1997) observes that one of the recurring experiences is the fact that competition is 
slower to take hold in network industries than was often expected at the time of liberalization.  
However, because electric industries produce a composite service through a more or less 
simultaneous combination of different inputs (generation, transmission, transformation, and 
distribution), the traditional competition model may not be appropriate for this industry.  
Electricity generation, transmission, and distribution are tightly connected and require far greater 
cooperation and coordination than is necessary for other goods and services.  In fact, transmission 
and distribution do not only exercise the “wires” function.  The management of the grid has to 
maintain appropriate voltage and frequency in order to avoid a system breakdown.  To achieve 
that goal, it is necessary to integrate electric generation with transmission and distribution, 
because decisions made by the many generators geographically dispersed in a grid will 
necessarily impact the success of the transmission and distribution. The coordination problem is 
exacerbated by the variability of demand by time of day, day of week and season as well as the 
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interconnection of several thousands of independent distributed generators using different 
generation technologies. 
In the pre-PURPA era, some form of competition existed in the electric supply industry.  
Kwoka (1996) reports that the most common forms of competition were franchise competition 
which is a periodic process in which one utility is chosen from a group of “bidders” for the right 
to supply a particular service territory; benchmark or “yardstick” competition which relies on the 
characteristics of other utilities as a benchmark against which to compare other utilities; 
competition for large industrial customers; and wholesale competition in the form of utilities 
purchasing power from each other in order to balance their loads.  In the post-PURPA era, the 
most significant form of competition has been wholesale competition facilitated by non-utility 
generators or independent power producers.  As of May 2001, electric utilities generated 71 
percent of total generation and nonutility power producers generated 29 percent of total 
generation (DOE, Electric Power Monthly, August 2001).  
 It is important to understand the real meaning of competition as it is used here.  In a fully 
competitive market, all resources compete to be added to an existing system to produce the next 
unit of output. Competition has only been introduced in the generation of power as wholesale 
competition. This is to be understood as purchasing electricity for resale.  Wholesale sales of 
electricity are regulated by the federal government through the FERC.  Retail competition is 
regulated by state utility commissions. 
Because deregulation is intended to provide firms stronger incentives to control their 
costs and to innovate, state commissions hope that the costs saved will be passed on to customers.  
In addition, because state commissions took different restructuring paths, the results achieved 
may be totally different.  However, it is expected that wholesale competition will offer three 
potential benefits: cost reduction; use of markets to balance reliability and cost; and a change in 
how risks are allocated between customers and electricity suppliers (Baum et al. 1996). 
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Many states have also allowed retail competition such that customers have the choice of a 
power supplier, and the traditional monopoly is no longer required to purchase power on behalf of 
all customers in the franchise territory.  Customers can now contract directly with generators or 
indirectly with aggregators, power marketers or brokers.  Because retail competition breaks the 
link between customers and the traditional regulated utility, the main benefits it offers are 
potentially lower rates and customer choice of suppliers.  Customer choice of suppliers allow 
customers to control their electricity use, react more efficiently to price signals, and make 
decisions regarding energy efficiency and the source of electricity in a manner which can help 
ensure cleaner air, reduce carbon dioxide emissions or promote the use of renewable and other 
alternative sources of power. 
 
2.5. The New Waves of Deregulation of the U.S. Electric Power Industry 
In the past, power was supplied by regulated, vertically-integrated electric companies 
which were granted monopoly franchises over specific geographic areas. These natural 
monopolies enjoyed large economies of scale in production and delivery of electricity.  In recent 
years, many countries have deregulated or restructured their electric industry. An extensive 
review of reforms in the US electric industry is provided in Joskow (1997).  The British 
experience and other countries‟ experiences are discussed in Green (1998). 
EPACT (1992) and FERC‟s Orders 888 (Open Access Transmission) and 889 required 
electric utilities to make transmission capacity available to all parties on equal terms and triggered 
competition in wholesale power markets in which producers exchange power among themselves 
and with independent power marketing firms.  With the passage of PURPA in 1978, non-utility 
generators, particularly independent power producers, began to generate power and trade with 
electric utilities.  Their contribution to the total power generated increases every year.  
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As seen in Appendix 5, California pioneered the electric restructuring movement in the 
United States.  California was soon followed by Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania and 
New York.  In all these states and in all the other states that implemented electricity restructuring, 
the move toward competition in the electricity supply industry was characterized by major 
variation across the states in the reform patterns.  In all cases, state statutes allowed a functional 
separation between generation and T&D.  The ultimate goal for all states that implemented 
electric restructuring was the introduction of consumer choice of supplier.  Most states allowed 
open access for large customers while phasing-in retail choice of suppliers for other customers. 
Only California, Massachusetts, Maine, Delaware, New Jersey, Ohio, Michigan, and the District 
of Columbia introduced full consumer choice immediately upon implementation of electricity 
restructuring program.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The structure and ownership of the electricity supply industry varies.  Historically, all 
stages of the electricity production process were vertically integrated by private or public firms 
which had a monopoly of generating, transmitting, and distributing power for their franchise 
territory.  In the previous chapter, we describe the different characteristics of major electric 
utilities in the United States including difference in production costs, sales and prices, and 
ownership of electric utilities in the United States, and we presented a summary of electric 
deregulation patterns prevailing in most states.
14
  Costs, prices, and efficiencies of production 
were also described for electric utilities in states where deregulation occurred and in non-
deregulated states.  In this chapter, we review empirical studies that examine different aspects of 
electric utilities and utility deregulation.  The main results from our review are summarized in 
section 3.8 below.   
 
3.2. Studies of Economies of Scale and Vertical Integration in the Electric Industry  
Scale economies exist when larger output quantities can be produced using less-than-
proportionally greater input quantities.  In this case, the producer is said to be more cost efficient 
than an industry comprised of more members but producing with more-than-proportionally 
greater input quantities for the same output.  In general, we must distinguish economies of 
vertical integration from economies of horizontal integration.  Economies of vertical integration 
occur when successive stages of production are performed together by a single more efficient 
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 See also the description of the data in Chapter 5. 
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producer rather than by many producers. In this case, a firm combines activities unlike those it 
currently performs but that are related to them in the sequence of marketing activities. Vertically 
integrated electric utilities are involved in electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution activities. Horizontal integration occurs when firms gain control over other firms 
performing similar activities at the same level in the marketing sequence.  Pollitt (1995) and 
Kwoka (1996) present summaries of studies of economies of scale and vertical integration in the 
US electric utility industry.   
For generation plants, Joskow and Schmalensee (1993) and Cowing and Smith (1978) 
found evidence of significant scale economies for plants of 400 MW of capacity for conventional 
steam generation and 900 to 1100 MW for nuclear units.  Kaserman and Mayo (1991) used a 
multiproduct cost function to find that, with the exception of smaller electric utilities, there are 
significant efficiencies of integration for most electric utilities, with cost savings of about 12 
percent for an average size utility.  Christensen and Greene (1976) used a translog cost function 
for steam generation of a sample of 114 electric utilities and concluded that by 1970, most firms 
were at or above minimum efficient firm scale of about 3800 MW.  Neuberg (1977), Henderson 
(1985), Roberts (1986) found evidence of economies of scale in distribution.  
Christensen and Greene (1976) first challenged the assumption of economies of scale in 
electric generation and concluded that the economies of scale present in 1955 were exhausted by 
1970.  Using firm-level data, they found a flatter U-shaped average cost function and a range of 
generation capacity with no significant economies or diseconomies of scale. Other empirical 
works (Huettner and Landon, 1974; Bopp and Costello, 1990; Kamerschen and Thompson, 1993; 
Atkinson and Halvorsen, 1986; Thompson and Wolf, 1993) have more or less corroborated these 
findings, concluding to the U shaped average cost function with ranges of scale economies.  
Pollitt (1995) reported nine papers on the nature of scale economies in the United States 
electricity supply industry.  The results suggest that MUNIs are significantly less scale efficient 
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than IOUs (Wallace and Junk, 1970).  Others found less evidence of the existence of increasing 
returns to scale (Nerlove, 1968; Christensen and Greene, 1976; Huettner and Landon, 1977).  
Roberts (1986) studied a sample of 65 vertically integrated US IOUs in 1978 and found that there 
are economies of output density but diseconomies in the number of consumers and that increasing 
consumer density has an insignificant effect on average cost.  A New Zealand Ministry of Energy 
(1989) study found that cost savings are not significant beyond 500 mkWh
15
 and that economies 
exist in sales per customer but not in number of customers.  Stewart (1979) found that capacity 
utilization has a much greater effect on average cost than unit size, and he found a minimum 
efficient scale of 250MW for a high load factor plant, which was also confirmed by Seitz (1971).  
Kerkvliet (1991) and Kaserman and Mayo (1991) present strong empirical support for integrated 
electric utilities in the United States; they found that non-integrated plants had 28% and 11.96% 
higher unit costs than comparable integrated plants. 
Yatchew (2000) analyzed scale economies in electricity distribution using a semi-
parametric analysis.  He found substantial evidence of increasing returns to scale with minimum 
efficient scale being achieved by firms with about 20,000 customers.  He found also that larger 
firms exhibit constant or decreasing returns and utilities that deliver non-electric services have 
significantly lower costs, indicating the presence of economies of scope.    
Abbott (2005) lists a number of studies that chronologically attempted to determine the 
levels of productivity and efficiency in the electricity industry.  He concluded that studies from 
the 1970s raised doubt about the existence of significant economies of scale in generation at 
higher levels, paving the way to arguments in favor of competition in power generation.   He also 
found that studies in the 1990s tended to analyze the issue of economies of scale in the 
distribution sector and there were economies of scale justifying the existence of monopolies in 
distribution.  As for the difference in efficiencies between IOUs and publicly-owned electric 
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utilities, Abbott (2005, p.68) found no conclusive evidence from previous studies; most studies 
found either no significant differences or the existence of differences in favor of IOUs or POUs.  
He concluded that “[g]iven that the main purpose of this restructuring has been to improve the 
productivity and efficiency performance of the industry it would be expected that it would have 
generated a considerable amount of research on whether this has been achieved.  Although this 
has been partially true there still appears scope for a considerable amount of work to be 
undertaken in order to confirm or reject many of the claims about the efficiency benefits of 
restructuring.” 
In summary, studies of economies of scale and vertical integration in the electric industry 
found mixed evidence of significant economies of scale, concluding that economies of scale were 
exhausted by the 1970s and that MUNIs are less scale efficient than IOUs.   Other studies 
concluded that there is doubt about the existence of significant economies of scale in generation, 
but found economies of scale in distribution, justifying the existence of monopoly in distribution.   
In general, these studies presented no conclusive evidence on economies of scale or differences in 
efficiencies by firm type.  Our study builds on this research and tries to determine whether in the 
more recent period there are efficiencies due to economies of scale in vertically integrated electric 
utilities, by ownership and over time. We found that IOUs, the most vertically integrated electric 
utilities which have higher economies of scale enjoy higher technical, allocative and cost 
efficiencies than POUs.  
 
3.3. Review of Empirical Research into the Effects of Regulation of Public Utilities 
According to Pollitt (1995), the historical purpose of electric utility regulation in the 
United States was to prevent the exploitation of monopoly power and hence to reduce prices 
below the monopoly price.  There are many competing theories to explain why regulation is 
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necessary.  The most popular reasons are explained through public interest theory, capture theory, 
and the literature on private and public monopolies. 
The proponents of the public interest theory of state regulation argued that because 
electric firms enjoyed declining average cost over the relevant output range, efficiency gains were 
achieved when one firm supplied the market (Knittel, 1999). According to Knittel (1999, p. 4),  
There are two reasons justifying the regulation of a natural monopoly. First, 
given the declining average costs of firms, competition, which lowers per firm output, has 
the effect of pushing firms up their average cost curve leading to inefficiency. By 
reducing the number of firms serving the market, each firm travels further down its 
average cost curve. Regulation can therefore be used to eliminate competition and 
increase efficiency by allowing only one firm to serve the market. However, left alone, 
the monopolist would charge the profit- maximizing price, while the regulatory 
commission would like the firm to price at marginal cost. Therefore, the second 
justification to regulate natural monopolist is to assure price is set more socially 
efficiently. 
 
Some empirical research to support the public interest theory is found in Emmons (1997).  
He found evidence in favor of the public interest theory but also in favor of competition.  He 
found that regulation, public ownership, and competition reduced prices during the years of 1930 
to 1942.  He found that competition largely served to dissipate monopoly rents and may have led 
to lower prices primarily by spurring improvements in technical efficiency.   
The proponents of capture theory claim that firms themselves sought to be regulated to 
ward off fierce competition, and that the government was subsequently “captured” by the industry 
(Stigler and Friedland, 1962; Stigler 1971; Noll 1971; Jarrell, 1978; Knittel 1999
16
).  Capture 
theory maintains thus that state regulation was passed to limit competition and increase the profits 
of electricity firms. 
The third theory is drawn from the literature on private and public monopolies.  It 
suggests that private utilities are often regulated monopolies, and, as such, they may be  
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 Knittel noted that Stigler and Friedland (1962) and Jarrell (1978) based their conclusions on erroneous 
models because they did not correct for the endogeneity of the variable used to account for regulation. 
After correcting this problem, the results appear less robust or are insignificant.  
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more inefficient than public monopolies.  Based on this theory, profit-maximizing private 
monopolies, when facing rate-of-return regulation, will employ more capital than is socially 
efficient (Averch and Johnson, 1962).  The allocative inefficiency created by private monopolies 
may require government intervention either in the form of some type of regulation of the private 
firms or by some type of government ownership. 
 Regulation is a controversial research subject.  Many believe that regulation imposes 
costs but does not yield benefits (Stigler, 1971 and Demsetz, 1968).  Stigler supports the 
introduction of competition and the elimination of regulation.    
  There seems to be less clear-cut evidence in support of public interest and capture 
theories.  Knittel (1999, p. 16) found weak evidence in favor of the public interest theory and 
concluded that the results cast doubt on the capture theory rather than overwhelmingly support 
the rival public interest theory.  Studies which reviewed the empirical effects of regulation of 
electric utilities did not provide robust evidence that benefits of competition justify elimination of 
regulation.  Our study attempts to determine whether or not deregulation of the electric industry 
yields significant benefits to justify the change from regulation to competition.  
 
3.4. Review of Empirical Research into the Effects of Ownership 
The theoretical literature on the effects of ownership on productive efficiency and 
financial performance has produced contradictory results.  An extensive review of the theories of 
ownership and productive efficiency is offered by Pollitt (1995).  The link between ownership 
and productive efficiency has at least three perspectives.   
The leading view is the property rights literature.  This view is rooted in the work of 
Pigou (1932) and Coase (1960) who were concerned that ad hoc allocation of rights based on 
established legal practice was not necessarily economically efficient (Pollitt, 1995).  According to 
Alchian (1965) who identified the difference between municipally-owned and IOUs, the inability 
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to transfer ownership rights under public ownership prevents the capitalization of gains in 
efficiency and hence reduces the incentives of the owners to seek such gains (Pollitt, 1995).  In 
contrast to this theory, many studies show also that managers of large IOUs exhibit similar 
tendencies to deviate from cost-minimization, but regulation of government-granted monopolies 
allows regulators to ensure that some incentives to control costs remain.  
The second view is the public choice theory.  Following Niskanen (1971), this theory 
claims that bureaucrats and politicians maximize their own budgets and, as a consequence, do not 
strive to minimize production costs (Pollitt, 1995).  In other words, bureaucrats and politicians 
maximize their own objectives to the detriment of cost-minimization and social welfare.   
The last view, the private monopoly theory, stipulates that regulated private monopolies 
may be more inefficient than public monopolies.  The leading defenders of this view are Averch 
and Johnson (1962).   
In general, theory suggests that privately-owned utilities are more efficient than publicly-
owned utilities.  De Fraja (1991) suggests that the main arguments put forward in favor of 
privately owned companies as compared to publicly owned companies are that (1) the profit 
motive is a more effective way of reducing inefficiencies in production than any form of 
monitoring of public managers, and, other things equal, a private firm will be more efficient than 
a public one, and that (2) a more efficient firm improves the efficiency of the industry.  
Commonly used variables to study the effects of ownership on productive efficiency include the 
degree of competition, economies of scale and size of the firm, and the degree and type of 
regulation.  
Although electric utilities were not included in both their studies of the largest 500 non-
US manufacturing firms and of the 500 largest firms in Canada, Boardman and Vining (1989 and 
1992) found that private firms were more efficient than public firms when they operate in 
competitive markets.  Picot and Kaulman (1989), using data from 15 industries and 6 countries, 
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found also that municipally-owned electric utilities have lower productivity, lower rates of return, 
and lower increases in profits for given increases in size (Pollitt, 1995).  
Regulation also affects productive efficiency.  Because different types of regulation have 
different effects on how firms strive to minimize costs, it is very important to differentiate the 
effects of ownership from the effects of regulation.  Averch and Johnson (1962) analyzed the case 
of AT&T in the telecommunications industry in the 1950s and found that rate of return regulation 
created a serious incentive to set predatory prices in competitive markets, which in turn led to 
over-investment in competitive services to meet inflated demand.  However, this finding was 
refuted by Crain and Zardkoohi (1980) in the water industry.  Moore (1970) analyzed 62 IOUs 
and 7 MUNIs in 1963 and found that MUNIs were charging prices on average 10-22% below the 
profit maximizing price level, while IOUs were charging prices on average within 5% of the 
monopoly price.  Stigler (1971) found that freight haulage rates were higher in states with 
regulation than without.  Primeaux and Nelson (1980) analyzed 80 IOUs and found no evidence 
of politically motivated rate structures.  They also found, as did Wenders (1986), evidence of 
higher unit costs than under marginal cost pricing. 
 Concerning other types of regulation, Fare et al. (1985b) studied a sample of electric 
plants in 1969 and in 1977 and found that environmental regulation had no significant negative 
effect on cost efficiency.  Eckert (1973) found evidence that bureaus were significantly more 
often associated with monopolies than commissions,
17
 which indicates that the reward structure is 
more complicated than the simple theory suggests (Pollitt, 1995). 
Using data on US electric utilities, DeAlessi (1974a,b, 1977), Peltzman (1971), Junker 
(1975), Meyer (1975), Neuberg (1977), DiLorenzo and Robinson (1982), Pescatrice and Trapani 
(1980), Atkinson and Halvorsen (1986), Cote (1989), Fare et al. (1989), Hausman and Neufeld 
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 A bureau is run by civil servants with incentives to increase its size by regulating more firms and 
bringing in more bureaucratic procedures while a commission is run by commissioners on fixed salaries 
and with terms of office fixed by statute (Pollitt, 1995). 
35  
(1991) conducted analyses of IOUs and MUNIs and found little or no evidence of the general 
view (Alchian‟s view) that IOUs are more efficient than MUNIs.  Many of the studies do indeed 
find that MUNIs are more efficient than IOUs, even though many of the studies were criticized 
for their statistical and economic shortcomings.  DeAlessi (1974a) confirmed the Averch-Johnson 
theory and found that MUNIs in general have lower prices and higher operating costs than IOUs.  
This was also confirmed by his other study in 1997 which concluded that managers of MUNIs are 
failing to make decisions which would reduce costs and raise profitability.  Peltzman (1971) also 
found that MUNIs had lower rates than IOUs.  In contrast, Junker (1975) and Neuberg (1977) 
found that there is no evidence of relative cost inefficiency in publicly owned enterprises.  Meyer 
(1975), Neuberg (1977), Pescatrice and Trapani (1980), Cote (1989), and Hausman and Neufeld 
(1991) found that MUNIs had significantly lower costs than IOUs.  However, DiLorenzo and 
Robinson (1982) found that MUNIs had insignificantly lower costs than IOUs.  Finally, Atkinson 
and Halvorsen (1986) studied 123 IOUs and 30 MUNIs and found them to be equally cost 
efficient given the internal factor prices that they faced. 
In his other paper, DeAlessi (1974b) tried to link the length of managerial tenure with 
efficiency.  He found that managers of MUNIs have longer tenure than managers of IOUs.  
However, the link between tenure and efficiency is not clear. 
Pollitt (1995, p. 48) concluded that, based on past literature, ownership is not a major 
determinant of differences in productive efficiency.  However, he observed that under the UK 
privatization of the electricity supply industry, production costs were falling and wondered 
whether costs would have fallen as much under more efficient public management.   
Multiple econometric models have been used to analyze the differences in productive 
efficiency due to ownership.  Following the review of Lovell and Schmidt (1988), Pollitt (1995) 
used four methodologies to test for the effects of ownership on efficiency using data from 14 
countries.  He used Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), the Parametric Programming Approach 
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(PPA), the Deterministic Statistical Approach (DSA), and the Stochastic Frontier Method (SFM).  
In addition to comparing productive efficiency of power generation, Pollitt also analyzed the 
efficiency in electricity T&D using the DEA method. 
Pollitt (1995) performed the following analyses to compare productive efficiencies of 
IOUs and MUNIs: 
(1) Measured the effects of ownership on the productive efficiency of an international sample of 
electric utilities, using two different methodologies applied to a common sample; 
(2) Measured the technical productive efficiency of an international sample of electric power 
plants using the four major methodologies for measuring productive efficiency as identified 
above; 
(3) Measured overall and allocative productive efficiencies in base load electric power plants 
using both historic and current cost of capital measures; and 
(4) Measured the productive efficiency in the electricity transmission and distribution system.  
Pollitt found that: (1) given scale effects, there is no significant evidence for the superior 
performance of IOUs over MUNIs after appropriate allowance has been made for differences in 
technology; (2) publicly owned and privately owned electric power plants exhibit significant 
differences in technical efficiency; (3) privately-owned plants exhibit significantly higher overall 
and allocative efficiencies than publicly-owned plants (or IOUs exhibit lower unit costs than 
MUNIS); and finally (4) privately-owned and publicly-owned electricity transmission and 
distribution systems exhibit no significant difference in technical or cost efficiency.   
In summary, Pollitt found evidence that in the long run, privately-owned generation firms 
have lower operating costs. There is no evidence that privately-owned electricity transmission 
and distribution systems have lower costs than publicly-owned electricity transmission and 
distribution systems.  His study, however, does not include cooperative and other publicly-owned 
electric utilities.  Our study compares all types of ownership.  
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Kwoka (1996) found that collectively these results suggest that public and private utilities 
have comparable advantages in different facets of the electric utility industry. Public ownership 
achieves lower costs in the end-user functions, and IOUs realize greater efficiency in power 
production and from vertical integration. The evidence shows that on balance IOUs gain more 
from integration into more local distribution than do public systems from integration into 
generation.  These results contrast with previous analyses that tended to give overall superiority 
to one type of utility over the other. 
Kwoka (1996) found also that, after subsidies are accounted for, the net effect of public 
ownership is to reduce a utility's costs (relative to IOUs) by 5.5 percent.  This percentage 
advantage comes from a greater reduction in distribution costs (about an average of 11 percent), 
offset by increases of 4.4 percent in generation, 0.5 percent in vertical integration, and 0.6 percent 
in power purchases.  After controlling for outputs, factor prices, and other variables, utility costs 
are significantly affected by vertical integration, by public ownership, and by competition
18
. 
Competition appears to increase fixed costs, but to lower variable costs by more; public 
ownership reduces the utility's total costs through efficient distribution; and vertical integration 
lowers the utility's costs as well but through efficient power generation. With competition, public 
ownership, more than private ownership, succeeds in lowering costs, and then after doing so, in 
lowering prices further.  Finally, Kwoka (1996) also found that large integrated utilities appear to 
have similar cost structures regardless of their mode of ownership.  
Kwoka (2005) analyzed the comparative advantage of public and private ownership in 
electric utilities in the United States.  Unlike most studies cited above which used DEA, SFA, or 
estimated a translog cost function, this study models utility costs using a quadratic cost function; 
this functional form has a clear advantage because it handles zero values of variables better than 
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 Kwoka considers three types of “competitive” utilities: true duopoly, new hookup regimes, and 
competition at the boundary of service territories. (p.92) 
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does the translog.   He found that while IOUs are more cost efficient in generation than POUs, the 
latter generally have an advantage in the end-user-oriented distribution function, which is 
consistent with his previous findings (Kwoka, 1996).   Kwoka also found some evidence of a 
service quality differential in favor of small electric utilities and municipal electric utilities over 
large IOUs or POUs.  
Even though these findings add important insight to the understanding of the effects of 
ownership, integration, and competition on utility costs, they leave many unanswered questions 
regarding the effect of competition which will be answered here.  Using a larger sample of 
electric utilities over an eight-year period, this study will provide results to confirm or rebut past 
findings of the effects of ownership and competition on cost efficiency.  Previous studies do not 
find conclusive evidence of superior efficiency of IOUs over POUs.  Some studies found that 
IOUs were more efficient than POUs while others found the opposite.  Most of these studies 
relied on small samples and analyzed short-term effects.  Our study uses a large sample of electric 
utilities and focuses on cost efficiency differences due to deregulation.  This study will provide 
further evidence of the effects of ownership and deregulation.  
 
3.5. Review of Empirical Research into the Effects of Deregulation and Competition 
on Profitability, Productive and Cost Efficiencies  
 
“Deregulation” of the United States electricity system is expected to bring large annual 
benefits due to expected operational improvements.  However, deregulation will inevitably have 
other effects on capital formation and efficiency.  The benefits of introducing competition in a 
regulated industry are diverse.  Free entry, lower production costs, improvements in efficiency 
and productivity are expected to lead to a better electricity production.  In addition, lower rates 
and customer choice are expected benefits from retail competition. 
Research shows efficiency gains from deregulating a monopolistic market.  Following 
McCormick, Shughart and Tollison (1984) who argued that the initial effort to establish 
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regulation dissipates the monopoly profit, limiting the gain from deregulation to the efficiency 
cost of monopoly, Poitras and Sutter (1997) analyzed the efficiency gains from deregulating 
monopolies using an equilibrium rent seeking model.  Their results support policies aimed at 
eliminating monopolies and other types of economic distortions.   
The gains from deregulation should at first equal the cost of monopoly. The gains from 
deregulation should be calculated as the deadweight loss from the monopolist.  Harberger (1954), 
Kamerschen (1966), Tullock (1967), Cowling and Mueller (1978), Jenny and Weber (1983) 
estimated the monopoly deadweight losses due to regulation.  They found different sizes of the 
deadweight losses. Tullock included sunk costs in the monopoly costs.  
 Poitras and Sutter (P&S) find that the size of the gains from deregulation is a function of 
(1) whether the monopoly franchise is subject to subsequent competition from other rent seekers 
(contestable), and (2) whether the initial rent seekers anticipate the possibility of deregulation.  
The analysis found that the potential benefits of deregulation can exceed the costs, even if rent 
seeking expenditures are upfront and sunk. However, it is possible that the cost of deregulation 
exceeds its potential benefits.  Reformers assume that deregulation will yield benefits higher than 
the costs of deregulation or the deadweight loss from a monopoly because, at the end, 
deregulation will correct existing economic distortions.  
Using a two-period model, P&S assume that a government regulates an industry to create 
a constant cost monopoly in period 1 and deregulates in period 2.  They also assume that the 
reformer (government) and the monopolist invest resources to achieve or resist deregulation. 
Thus, the probability of deregulation is endogenous and depends upon committed resources for 
deregulation or deregulation avoidance.  
Posner (1975) suggests that monopolizing activities can be deterred at low social cost.  
Tollison and Wagner (1991) claim that the cost of achieving deregulation precludes any actual 
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gains.  P&S consider deregulation of a non-contestable franchise.
19
  This case is very similar to 
the electricity industry since rent seeking expenditures are upfront and sunk.  
Although the beneficiaries of deregulation may be numerous, P&S model the reformer as 
a single player.  Following Tollison and Wagner (1991), they distinguish between a factional 
reformer who represents consumer interests and a utilitarian reformer who is only concerned with 
social welfare.  A factional reformer values the deadweight loss (H) to consumers, but a 
utilitarian reformer does not value any part of the transfer.  Denoting the benefit from 
deregulation to the reformer by X, and the monopolist profit by , X= +H for the factional 
reformer, and X=H for the utilitarian reformer.  The model is as follows. The reformer and the 
monopolist choose their expenditures to solve 
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where ],0[ HX , Mi, i=1,2, is the rent seeking expenditures for the period i, and R is the 
expenditures by the reformer.  They assume that, for the non-contestable monopoly,  -- the 
probability that rent seeking competition takes place in period 2, conditional on deregulation not 
occurring -- equals zero.  P&S also assume that all rent seekers are risk neutral, and that all rent 
seeking expenditures are social costs.   
Solving the above model for equilibrium expenditures and probability of deregulation: 
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 A monopoly is contestable if the franchise can be transferred to another rent seeker by the legislature in 
period 2.  If the franchise once awarded cannot be transferred, the monopoly is non-contestable (Poitras and 
Sutter, 1997). 
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In this case, the total first period expenditure is a function of the monopolist profit less the present 
value of expenditure to resist deregulation in the second period.  
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where <1 is the discount factor.  The total welfare gain from deregulation is 
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which is positive.  They concluded from this equation that “actual welfare gains from 
deregulation occur with the ratio success function, notwithstanding upfront rent seeking and 
costly deregulation.”  The benefits of deregulation do not depend on the type of the reformer, 
although the gain is a function of the size of X.  The derivative of (4) above with respect to X 
yields the following result: 
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         (5) 
Because ],0[ HX , (5) is positive.  Based on this finding, since the factional 
reformer has a greater value of X, he generates greater efficiency gains from deregulation, even 
though he does not seek to maximize social welfare.   
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Nwaeze (2000) studied the effects of deregulation of the electric power industry on 
earnings, risk, and returns. Using OLS, GLS, and a system of equations, he found positive shifts 
in earnings variability after the reforms.  His results reveal that even though there are significant 
increases in systematic risk and abnormal declines in returns around the events associated with 
the reforms, larger utilities experienced the largest increase in risk and the most abnormal decline 
in returns.  Further, small electric utilities had a more pronounced negative return effect.  
Although this study used a limited data set comprised using Compustat and data from the 
University of Chicago Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data, it shows that further 
reforms may produce even more undesirable results. The study does not include publicly-owned 
and cooperative electric utilities. 
Since such authors as Debreu (1951) and Koopmans (1951) introduced the analysis of 
efficiency in the economic literature, there has been a large collection of papers and articles 
devoted to the measurement of productive efficiency.  Some of the most cited references are 
Farrell (1957), Charnes and Cooper (1962), Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (CCR, 1978), and 
Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (BCC, 1984).  CCR (1978) and BCC (1984) became the foundation 
of a non-parametric analysis called the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), which has been used 
in a wide-collection of analyses of efficiencies.   
The DEA technique has been widely used to measure productivity and cost efficiency. 
Seiford (1996) gives a comprehensive survey of the evolution of the DEA technique from 1978 to 
1995.  In the first years, DEA was exclusively used to measure technical efficiency.  Over the 
past two decades, the DEA technique flourished and was applied across all disciplines. 
Studies using non-parametric analysis covered a wide range of areas from agriculture 
(Sueyoshi et al, 1998; Sueyoshi, 1999b); credit cooperatives (Fukuyama et al., 1999); banks 
(Taylor et al., 1997; Thompson et al., 1997; Chu and Lim, 1998)); telecommunications (Fuss, 
1994; Staranczak et al., 1994; Sueyoshi, 1995, 1997; Lien and Peng, 2001); electricity (Schmidt 
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and Lovell, 1979, 1980; Greene, 1990; Färe et al. ((1983, 1985(a), 1985(b), 1986, 1987, 1989); 
Thomas, 1985; Charnes et al., 1989; Hjalmarsson et al., (1992(a), 1992(b)); Miliotis, 1992; 
Olatubi and Dismukes, 2000; Pollitt, 1995; Goto and Tsutsui, 1998; Sueyoshi, 1999; Park and 
Lesourd, 2000; and Murillo-Zamorano et al., 2001; and many other sectors. 
The studies that analyzed the electric supply industry assessed the links between 
deregulation and competition on one side, and wealth, share performance, profit efficiency, 
productive efficiency and cost efficiency on the other.  While many earlier studies used 
regression analysis, the most recent studies used parametric frontier functions and non-parametric 
methods.   
Non-parametric analysis does not require the specification of any particular functional 
form to describe the efficient frontier or envelopment surface. DEA, for instance, does not 
include a statistical noise variable in the estimation while a parametric frontier function requires a 
specific functional form.  New research (Sengupta, 1999; Sueyoshi, 2000) extended the use of 
DEA to a dynamic framework by incorporating changes in productivity due to technological 
change and introduced a stochastic DEA approach.  
Non-parametric techniques like DEA allow for several alternative formulations.  The two 
versions most used in the literature make specific returns to scale assumptions.  
Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) used a single-constant-returns-to-scale model to measure 
technical efficiency.  This model, now known as the CCR model, has been used in many research 
papers.  The CCR model was joined later by the variable-returns-to-scale model of Banker, 
Charnes, and Cooper (BCC, 1984) for measuring scale efficiency, multiplicative models for 
piecewise log-linear frontiers (Charnes et al. 1982, 1983), and the nonoriented additive model 
(Charnes et al. 1985).   
Some results of DEA analyses are presented here.  Using DEA techniques, Goto and 
Tsutsui (1998) measured the overall cost efficiency and technical efficiency bilaterally between 
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nine Japanese and 14 US electric utilities for the period from 1984 to 1993.  Their main findings 
were that: (1) the overall cost efficiency of Japanese electric utilities was consistently higher than 
that of US electric utilities from 1984 to 1993; (2) Japanese utilities were more efficient than US 
utilities in terms of technical, allocative and scale efficiencies; (3) allocative inefficiency was a 
main source of overall cost inefficiency for the Japanese utilities; and (4) Japanese utilities 
overuse capital and underuse power purchase for cost-minimized production.  
Using data from the 1996 Steam Electric Generating Facility Database of the Utility 
Data Institute (UDI) and from the US Energy Information Administration (IEA) report Financial 
Statistics for Privately Owned US Electric Utilities, Olatubi and Dismukes (2000) analyzed cost 
efficiency of coal-fired electric power generation.  A sample of 313 IOUs is included in their 
study. First, a DEA approach generated efficiency scores; then, the authors estimated a Tobit 
model of the inefficiency scores using maximum likelihood techniques and assuming a logistic 
distribution for the errors.  The results are as follows: 
(1) Most coal-fired electric generation plants have almost exhausted their potential for technical 
efficiency.  Given the current regulatory environment, future gains in a competitive 
environment should be expected on allocative capabilities of a plant‟s operations. 
(2) Specific attention should be paid to the use of capital.  Among the non-fuel inputs, capital is 
the most misused. 
Olatubi and Dismukes (2000) concluded that there are potential opportunities for cost 
efficiency gains, and most of the inefficiencies arise from allocative efficiency (mean = 0.66) 
rather than in technical efficiency (mean=0.93).  
Murillo-Zamorano and Vega-Cervera (2001) presented a comparative study of the use of 
parametric and non-parametric frontier methods to measure the productive efficiency of the US 
electric power industry.  The study investigated a sample of 70 US (investor-owned) electric 
utility firms in 1990, evenly spread across the United States.  Both the CCR and the BCC were 
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used in this study.  In addition, OLS techniques were used to analyze inefficiency scores.  The 
results showed that there is no relationship between the size of firms and their inefficiencies.  The 
authors found that the choice of parametric or non-parametric techniques, deterministic or 
stochastic approaches, or between different distribution assumptions within stochastic techniques 
is irrelevant if one is interested in ranking electric utilities according to their individual efficiency 
scores.  The results show also that the parametric-deterministic approaches for the measurement 
of productive efficiency do not seem suitable for this kind of analysis.  They concluded that DEA, 
because of its flexibility, can improve the accuracy of parametric techniques. 
DEA models provide performance measures that can be communicated to managers, 
indicating by how much inputs have to be decreased (or outputs increased) in order to achieve 
cost (production) efficiency.  DEA models also provide a set of efficient peer firms which serve 
as a benchmark for improvement and to which each inefficient decision making unit (DMU) 
should compare.   For example, Barros (2008, p. 59) used DEA analysis on the hydroelectric 
generating plants of the Portugal Electricity Company (EDP) to recommend that management of 
EDP “should adopt an internal benchmark management procedure in order to evaluate the relative 
position of each hydroelectric generating plant and to adopt managerial strategies designed to 
catch up with the frontier of best practices.”  
Zhou et al. (2008) conducted a survey of 100 studies in energy and environmental studies 
which used DEA techniques.  They found that 38% of the studies dealt with issues in the 
electricity industry, primarily electricity generation (for pre-1990 studies) and efficiency of 
electricity distribution utilities (post-1990).   DEA techniques have also been used in modeling 
environmental performance, energy efficiency, and the productive efficiency of other energy 
sectors, such as district heating plants, gas industries, coal mines, and emissions permit 
allocations.   Their other major findings are that most studies assumed that inputs and outputs are 
strongly disposable, that the return to scale property of the reference technology exhibits constant 
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return to scale (CRS) even though the variable return to scale (VRS) technology might be a more 
appropriate assumption, and that input-oriented DEA models were more utilized than output-
oriented models.  They also found that the Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI)
20
 was very 
popular during the period 1999-2006, most likely due to studies of productivity over time in 
deregulated electricity utilities.  
Barros (2008) presented a number of efficiency analyses of electricity companies and 
found that the most recent papers used DEA and/or the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA).   
Most of the studies reported by Barros (2008, 66-67) found that deregulating generation increases 
efficiency (Kleit and Terrell, 2001); alternative regulatory programs provide firms with incentive 
to increase efficiency (Knittel, 2002); public firms are more efficient under cost-of-service 
regulation, compared with price-cap regulation (Arocena and Waddams Price, 2002); and 
privately-owned plants exhibit higher average efficiency than publicly-owned plants (Pollitt, 
1995). 
Nakano and Managi (2008) used the TFP of DEA to analyze the impact of regulatory 
reforms on the Japanese electricity industry and found that regulatory reforms have a positive 
effect on productivity, mainly because of technological change. 
Arocena (2008) used DEA to estimate the impact of alternative forms of unbundling on 
the cost and quality of supply and found evidence of cost and quality gains from vertical 
integration of power generation and distribution and from diversification of the sources of power 
generation.  Further findings were that the design of the regulatory reform failed to create a 
market structure sufficiently competitive that would have allowed the maximization of the 
diversification and vertical integration because of the presence of market power.   
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 A DEA technique to measure Total Factor Productivity Index change from a defined distance function 
using CRS technology and decompose TFP into technical efficiency change and technical change. 
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Or and Sarica (2007) studied the efficiency of Turkish power plants using DEA and 
found that the private sector plants perform significantly better than the public sector plants, 
natural gas fired power plants have higher investment performance efficiency than coal-fired 
plants, and wind power plants have the highest efficiency values in operational and investment 
performance models.  
Thakur et al. (2006) evaluated the efficiency of state owned electric utilities in India 
using DEA and found evidence of sub-optimal performances especially among the bigger 
utilities.  Estache et al. (2008) studied the efficiency of African electricity companies that were 
members of the Southern Africa Power Pool.  Using the MPI, they estimated the Malmquist Total 
Factor Productivity (TFP) index and found that the average efficiency level was higher when 
combined outputs were considered in comparison to each individual output separately.  
Abbott (2006) used a DEA Malmquist approach to evaluate the productivity and 
efficiency of the Australian electricity supply industry and found that although technical progress 
occurred, there is still room for improvement since its growth rate was lower than the growth rate 
of the economy.  
For the electric power industry in the United States, Vaninsky (2006) used a DEA 
analysis to study the efficiency of electric power generation   He found a relative stability in 
efficiency from 1994 to 2000 at levels of 99 – 100% but concluded that the efficiency declined to 
94 – 95% levels during the years after 2000.  
Knittel (2002) evaluated alternative regulatory methods and firm efficiency of the US 
electricity industry using the SFA methodology.  He analyzed the impact of alternative regulatory 
methods on the performance of coal electricity generation plants compared to gas-fired power 
plants.  He found that coal plants that did not operate under alternative regulatory incentives 
experienced a mean level of inefficiency of 17.57% and that gas plants operating without any 
alternative regulation programs or incentives experienced a mean level of inefficiency of only 
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5.37%.  Further findings show that the marginal impact of alternative regulatory programs was 
higher for coal plants than gas plants. 
Markiewicz et al. (2004) used a translog regression model to study how transition to 
market-oriented environments affected electric generating plants in the United States.   His results 
show that generation plants most affected by restructuring reduced labor and nonfuel expenses, 
holding output constant, by three to five percent relative to other investor-owned generation 
plants, and by six to twelve percent relative to generation plants owned by POUs  and cooperative 
electric utilities that were not affected by restructuring incentives.  
Goto and Tsutsui (2008) used a translog stochastic frontier analysis to study the impacts 
of deregulation on technical efficiency of generation, transmission/distribution, and general 
administration function and its change over time for large-scale electric power utilities in the 
United States during the period from 1992 through 2000.  They found that firms located in states 
with advanced deregulation were less efficient in generation and general administration than 
firms in states without electric restructuring, and no effects of deregulation were observed in the 
transmission/distribution network function. 
In summary, these studies generally used the data envelopment analysis (DEA) or the 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA).  Although most studies generally found evidence of efficiency 
gains in other countries, the evidence for the electric utilities in the United States is mixed.  
Olatubi and Dismukes (2000) found that most coal generation plants almost exhausted their 
potential for technical efficiency, and Goto and Tsutsui (2008) used a stochastic frontier analysis 
and found that firms located in advanced deregulation states were less efficient in generation but 
that the average degree of efficiency is higher for firms that are located in states with slower 
progress of deregulation.  Our study will determine if IOUs, COOPs and POUs in deregulated 
states are more efficient in generation and overall operations than regulated firms in a more recent 
period of time.  
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3.6. Review of Recent Empirical Research into Electricity Deregulation in the United 
States 
 
Kwoka (2006) reviewed twelve studies of the cost efficiencies and price benefits of 
deregulation of the electric power industry in the United States.  He concentrated on the strengths 
and limitations of the methodologies used in those studies and on the confidence one might place 
in their conclusions and recommendations.   Four studies compared prices before and after 
restructuring, or with and without restructuring; they represented pricing as a function of causal 
variables, estimated the relationship, and contrasted actual prices with predicted prices in the 
absence of restructuring.  Those are studies by Cambridge Economic Research Associates (2005); 
Joskow (2006); Taber, Chapman, and Mount (2006); and Fagan (2006).  Five studies simply 
compared prices (or costs) under restructuring relative to what they would have been in the 
absence of restructuring.  Those were studies by Center for the Advancement of Energy Markets 
(2003); Apt (2005); Synapse (2004); Global Energy Decisions (2005); and Energy Security 
Analysis, Inc (2005).  Finally, studies by Weaver (2004), the ISO/RTO Council (2005), and the 
N.Y. State Department of Public Service (2006) were more descriptive and evaluated the impact 
on single companies or institutions in restructured electricity markets. 
Nine of the studies found that there were retail price benefits or cost efficiencies from 
electricity restructuring while the remaining three found no benefits or even found outright 
consumer costs from restructuring.  However, Kwoka concluded that all twelve studies suffered 
from three major deficiencies: 
(1) The lack of precision about the meaning and measurement of electricity restructuring;  
(2) Overlooking the fact that the post-restructuring prices in many states were 
administratively set and not a reflection of the equilibrium market price; and  
(3) Failure to control for many other factors besides electricity restructuring that may have 
affected post-restructuring prices.   
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Without properly reflecting these factors, the price effects of electricity restructuring may not 
necessarily be the result of restructuring itself. 
In addition, Kwoka noticed three other factors that most studies failed to take into 
consideration, even though they should be included in any study of the impact of electricity 
restructuring:   
(1) the existence of market power, market manipulation, and numerous mergers among 
utilities;    
(2) the rising costs of regional transmission organizations (RTOs), inadequate RTO 
governance processes, and the failure of RTOs to deal with transmission congestion or to 
successfully encourage new investment in the grid;  and  
(3) the potentially adverse effects of restructuring on service quality and reliability effects.  
Kwoka (2006, p. vii) concluded that “the methodologies used in these studies consistently 
fall short of the standards for good economic research. In addition, most of these studies fail to 
fully address the effects of restructuring. These deficiencies call into question the conclusions 
reached by existing studies of restructuring. In particular, despite much advocacy, there is no 
reliable and convincing evidence that consumers are better off as a result of restructuring of the 
US electric power industry.”  
Other studies not included in Kwoka‟s 2006 review concluded that more and better 
assessment of the effects of electricity restructuring needed to be performed in order to have 
better results.  Blumsack et al. (2006) critiqued the studies by the Center for the Advancement of 
Energy Markets (2003), Cambridge Energy Research Associates (2005), and Joskow (2006) 
stating that, contrary to the findings in these studies, their research found no evidence that 
electricity restructuring produced any benefits. Spinner (2006) identified problems in the studies 
of the Cambridge Energy Research Associates (2005) and the Global Energy Decisions (2005) 
similar to the deficiencies found by Kwoka (2006).  
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In conclusion, these studies provide no evidence of gains in efficiency or benefits due to 
deregulation in the United States.  Kwoka (2006), Blumsack et al. (2006) and Spinner (2006) 
discussed the methodological deficiencies, including the failure to correct for selection bias in 
their samples, in many recent studies which concluded that deregulation had benefited the public.  
They all concluded that there is need for more research into the benefits of electricity 
deregulation in the United States. 
In our research, we use a cost decomposition technique first introduced by Juhn, Murphy 
and Pierce (JMP, 1993) to study the effects of deregulation on US electric utilities.  This approach 
decomposes cost differences due to deregulation into changes in observable quantities, changes in 
observable prices, and changes in unobservable residuals.  Using the JMP decomposition, our 
study decomposes the change over time in the difference in costs of regulated and deregulated 
electric utilities into changes in their characteristics over time, changes in prices over time, and 
changes in residuals (unexplained differences) over time.  This approach goes beyond the analysis 
of mean cost and mean price differences between regulated and deregulated firms.  It allows us to 
determine the cost, price and quantity differentials between the two groups at any point in their 
cost distribution.  The JMP decomposition permits us to also analyze the effects of changes in the 
residual of cost differences between the groups of regulated and deregulated electric utilities.  
Finally, using this approach is the most accurate way to analyze the effects of possible changes in 
relative costs due to unobservable characteristics.  
3.7. Review of Empirical Research into Shareholder Wealth 
The profitability of the electricity supply industry is dependent upon state and federal 
regulation for many decades.  Regulations assure that firms in the industry operate as natural 
monopolies and recover their costs plus receive a reasonable return on investment. With the 
introduction of competition in the industry, it is possible that shareholder wealth suffers due to 
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stranded assets,
21
 increased market and firm specific risk, and possible transfers of wealth from 
producers to consumers. Indeed, it is possible that a utility which loses its monopoly power due to 
deregulation will see the value to its owners decline by the present discounted value of expected 
future monopoly profits. 
The change in shareholders wealth is measured by abnormal returns and the change in 
earnings per share due to competition and restructuring (deregulation).  Financial performance is 
measured in terms of profitability or profit margin and return on assets in the year when 
deregulation and competition were introduced and in subsequent years relative to pre-competition 
and pre-deregulation years.  
Much of the literature analyzing the impact of deregulation on shareholder wealth in the 
electricity supply industry used event study techniques.  Event study methodology capitalizes on 
the Efficient Markets Hypothesis which predicts that new information is immediately reflected in 
security prices. Event history studies of regulatory change were conducted for many other 
industries including banking ( Aharony and Swary, 1981; Amoako-Adu and Smith, 1995; Cornett 
and Tehranian, 1990; Carow and Heron, 1998; Dann and James, 1982 ; Madura and Bartunek, 
1995; Liang et al., 1996; Akhigbe and Whyte, 2001), airlines (Banker et al., 1997; Vetsuypens et 
al., 1988), tobacco (Jognson et al., 1991), and electricity (Besanko et al., 2001; Berry, 2000; ).  It 
was also used to study the impact of product recall (Jarrell and  Peltzman, 1985); merger 
regulations (Schipper and Thompson, 1983), and environmental regulation (Blacconiere and 
Patten, 1994). 
All of these studies attempted to predict movements in stock returns in response to 
legislative and regulatory events.  Empirical studies provided support for the hypothesis that stock 
movements are not idiosyncratic and can, in fact, be predicted (Ferson and Harvey, 1991). Before 
                     
21 The value of stranded assets would be lost if markets were to become competitive because lower cost 
producers could compete against higher cost producers and drive them out of the market. 
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using event studies, early attempts at predicting stock returns were based on the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM). Other studies substituted the CAPM with the Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
(APT) because this theory was readily testable since it does not require the measurement of the 
market portfolio (Kumar et al., 2000). APT attempted to measure the various dimensions of 
market related risk in terms of several underlying economic factors which systematically affect 
the price of all shares (Kumar et al., 2000).  However, APT is not useful if one is unable to 
identify additional risk factors that are relevant. 
Nwaeze (2000) noted that, according to the theories of economic regulation, regulation 
reduces earnings variability and risk and enhances share value by buffering the regulated firms 
against the profit effects of cost and demand shocks and shifting the burden of inefficiencies to 
consumers. These views motivated an opposite argument that reductions in regulation would 
reverse the predicted effects of regulation. Testing whether recent reforms of the electric power 
industry reversed the predicted effects of regulation on profits, risk, and return for electric 
utilities, Nwaeze (2000) found that: (1) the buffering effect of regulation was reversed, (2) 
subsidies attributable to regulation existed, and (3) shareholder wealth was redistributed during 
the reforms.  
Using multivariate analysis, Johnson et al. (1998) investigated the effects of regulatory 
changes in the electricity utility industry on shareholder wealth. They analyzed the effects of the 
1992 Energy Policy Act and of the 1993 announcement by the FERC that forced competition in 
Florida and found that these regulatory changes and the opening of transmission lines to outsiders 
had negative and significant effects on stock values for the overall sample of firms examined.  
They found that greater competition dissipated economic rents associated with the previously 
held monopolistic situations. 
They found that (1) firms with greater levels of nuclear assets and higher earnings per 
dollar of assets prior to the regulatory actions suffered greater negative abnormal returns than 
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other firms in the sample; (2) firms in a more competitive environment prior to regulatory 
changes had less negative abnormal returns; (3) after deregulation, market risk increased by 
48.88% while firm specific risk increased by 23.66%; and (4) firms which were previously the 
most protected by receiving greater revenue relative to capital investments faced greater risk of a 
change in revenue in a competitive environment . 
Berry (2000) used event history methodology to investigate excess returns in electric 
utility mergers during the transition to competition.  He focused on the day before the 
announcement and the day of the announcement and found small but statistically significant 
effects.  He concluded that shareholders perceived few merger benefits in a highly competitive 
generation sector; that markets reacted more positively to the gas/electric mergers, indicating 
shareholder appreciation for opportunities for scope economies; and that acquirers in the United 
States suffered no significant wealth losses in mergers with British and Australian utilities. 
Besanko et al. (2001) used event history methods to analyze electric utility stock price 
reactions to events preceding the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992.  For the industry as a 
whole, the authors found that, at worst, investors had neutral reactions to events preceding 
wholesale deregulation.  However, stock price reactions varied systematically with differences in 
incumbent utilities' marginal costs, though not with differences in fixed costs or purchased power 
costs.  These results were consistent with the notion that new technologies substantially reduced 
barriers to entry into the electric power generation industry, rendering capital cost advantages of 
incumbent utilities vulnerable to new entrants.  However, marginal cost advantages were more 
sustainable because they were likely driven by inimitable locational advantages. 
The samples studied in previous research into the wealth effects varied.  Johnson et al 
(1998) investigated a sample of 68 investor-owned electric utilities with daily stock returns 
published by the University of Chicago Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).  
Blacconiere et al. (2000) collected data on all investor-owned electric utilities --933 firm/year 
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observations-- (Standard Industrial Classification codes 4910, 4911, and 4931) that were publicly 
traded four years before and four years after the passage of the 1992 EPAct and whose data were 
available from COMPUSTAT.  Their analysis was also conducted for a non-electric utility 
sample of firms from many different industries which formed the control group.   
In all the studies, firms were indistinctly combined in a sample even though many of the 
firms operated strictly in states where deregulation was not in place.  It is important not to lose 
sight of the fact that not all states have reached the same degree of competitiveness and that many 
electric utilities operate in both regulated and deregulated states at the same time.  In addition, 
many electric utilities are multiproduct firms.    Some of the inputs used by the firm may be 
divided in the production of the many outputs.  Failing to incorporate that aspect in an analysis 
biases the results.   
Previous studies failed to distinguish between short-term and long-term wealth effects. 
Short-term effects were investigated using event history analysis for individual events while long-
term effects were analyzed using a multivariate regression model for the combined effects of all 
events.  Most studies limited the time period to the short time period. 
Cornett and Tehranian (1990) noted that the use of a multivariate regression model 
incorporated heteroscedasticity across equations and contemporaneous dependence of the 
disturbances into the hypothesis tests.  In addition, because the magnitude of the unsystematic 
risk differs across firms, the variance in abnormal returns varied across firms (Fama, 1976).  
Schwert (1981) stated that individual asset returns for firms in the same industry measured over a 
common time period were contemporaneously correlated because firms reacted similarly to any 
unanticipated event.  Thus, contrary to the requirements of the standard event history 
methodology, residuals are not identically and independently distributed.  Indeed, with common 
calendar day announcements for all stocks, the error term is not independent across equations 
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which reduces the efficiency of the estimated coefficients and renders the t-statistics unreliable if 
each equation is estimated separately (Amoako-Adu and Smith, 1995).   
 Studies of wealth effects of electricity deregulation focused exclusively on the impact of 
different events on returns. Overall, these studies found that deregulation can potentially impact 
both shareholder wealth and risk.  In addition, they suggested that the impact is likely to depend 
on factors such as size, degree of competition, and other market variables.  Previous studies 
demonstrated that most deregulation events resulted in wealth effects for electric utility 
shareholders.  However, not only are there only a few studies of wealth effects, but the results 
vary significantly across studies.    Most past studies focused on general policies reforming the 
electricity industry in the United States rather than on state specific deregulation policies and their 
impact on the profitability of electric utilities. They also focused on short term effects of 
deregulation.  We use a regression analysis of the effects of cost efficiency due to state 
deregulation policies across all the states and determine whether or not electricity deregulation 
resulted in long-term benefits for shareholders and in long-term profitability of the IOUs. 
 
3.8. Summary of Main Findings and Issues Study  
Past research left many unanswered questions about the effects of ownership and 
deregulation or competition on the efficiencies and profitability of electric utilities in the United 
States.  This study addresses some of the gaps left by those studies.  Studies of economies of scale 
and vertical integration left doubt about the existence of significant economies of scale. We make 
five major contributions to the literature on electricity deregulation in the United States. 
 First, our study attempts to determine whether or not there are efficiencies due to 
economies of scale in vertically integrated electric utilities by ownership.  We also determine 
whether deregulation yields significant benefits to justify the elimination of regulation.  The 
question of benefits and costs of regulation is ancient but unresolved to date.  Past research into 
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the effects of ownership produced mixed results with some studies showing that privately owned 
utilities have greater efficiencies than publicly owned utilities and others showing the opposite. 
Second, we study a large sample of electric utilities over 8 years compared to most past 
studies which limited their analyses to smaller samples and shorter time periods.  We focus on 
cost efficiency differences among electric utilities due to deregulation for each type of ownership 
and provide further evidence of the effects of ownership and deregulation. 
Third, our study uses DEA and SFA techniques to determine if IOUs, COOPs and POUs 
in deregulated states are more efficient in generation and overall operations.  Previous studies of 
the effects of deregulation on cost efficiency used DEA and SFA techniques to show evidence of 
efficiency gains in other countries which deregulated their electricity industry.  The evidence for 
the US electricity industry is at best mixed with some studies concluding that deregulation 
generally increases efficiency,  or that deregulation has produced less efficiency in generation, 
and others concluding that the costs of deregulation outweighed the actual gains from 
deregulation.  Recent studies of the benefits of deregulation of the electric utilities in the United 
States confirmed the need for better methodological approaches in order to account for the total 
impact of deregulation on the industry.   
Fourth, we use a cost decomposition analysis to study the effects of deregulation on 
electric utilities.  This approach takes into consideration the fact that deregulation may not result 
in a random sample of all states but rather a select sample from states with high production costs 
and high electricity prices.  This study decomposes the change over time in the difference in costs 
of regulated and deregulated electric utilities into changes in their characteristics over time, 
changes in prices over time, and changes in residuals (unexplained differences) over time. 
Fifth, the final contribution of this research is an analysis of the effects of deregulation on 
the profitability of electric utilities. Although most past studies relied on event history 
methodology to investigate excess returns due to competition, this study measures the effects of 
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cost efficiencies due to deregulation of IOUs on the stock returns of IOUs and on their 
profitability. 
Overall, this provides the most recent evidence to date on the efficiency of the electricity 
industry in the United States and the impact of federal and state deregulation on production, 
generation, and transmission of electricity to consumers. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
MODEL DESCRIPTION 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter describes the economic model that will form the basis for our study of 
efficiency among electric utilities in the United States.  Efficiency estimates of deregulated 
electric utilities are compared with those of regulated electric utilities and other characteristics of 
firms are identified that are linked to observed efficiency. 
Efficiency measurement began with Farrell (1957).  He proposed that the efficiency of a 
firm consists of technical and allocative efficiency.  Technical efficiency refers to the capacity to 
produce the maximum level of output for a given quantity of inputs under the given technology; 
allocative efficiency refers to the ability of a firm to use inputs optimally given their respective 
input prices and expenditure limitations.   Figure 1 below illustrates technical efficiency while 
Figure 2 illustrates technical and allocative efficiencies of a firm. 
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Figure 1. Technical Efficiency 
 
 
Technical efficiency consists of pure technical efficiency, scale efficiency and capacity 
utilization.  Figure 1 graphs six points A, B, C, D, and E.  The curve ACD is the production 
possibility frontier.  Firms lying on the frontier (i.e., A, C and D) gain 100% pure technical 
efficiency while firms which lie under the frontier (i.e., B and E) do not. 
Firm C achieves optimal pure technical efficiency and faces constant-returns-to-scale; 
therefore, firm C is maximizing its technical efficiency.  Firms A and D reach maximal pure 
technical efficiency but do not achieve optimal scale efficiency.  Even though a firm at point B 
reaches the maximal scale efficiency, it is technically inefficient because it uses the same input, 
x2, as firm C but achieves a lower level of output. 
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  Figure 2:  Technical and Allocative Efficiencies 
 
Figure 2 above illustrates the concepts of technical and allocative efficiencies under the 
assumption of constant returns to scale and two inputs (x1 and x2) and one output (y), 
technology. An efficient firm produces along the efficient isoquant S.  A firm which produces at 
P is inefficient because it could produce the same output at Q with fewer inputs.  The distance QP 
is the amount by which all inputs could be proportionally reduced without a reduction in output.  
The technical efficiency of this firm is measured by the ratio: TE = OQ/OP = 1- QP/OP. 
A value of one means that the firm is fully technically efficient.  This firm is fully 
technically efficient at Q.  If the budget constraint is known and represented by the line AA
‟
, then 
the allocative efficiency of this firm at P is measured by the ratio: 
AE = OR/OQ. 
At point R, the firm can reduce the production costs if production were to occur at the 
allocative (and technically) efficient point Q
‟
.  The total economic efficiency is then represented 
by the ratio: EE = OR/OP = TE x AE. 
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The distance RP represents the total cost reduction that can be achieved by a firm 
operating at the allocatively efficient point.
22
 
In the sections below, methodological approaches to cost efficiency are presented.  DEA 
and SFA methods are discussed with respect to the study of efficiency gains from electricity 
deregulation.  These methods have the advantage over econometric analysis because of their 
ability to separate firm efficiencies in technical, allocative, economic efficiencies and total factor 
productivity analysis.  We further decompose the efficiency gains due to electricity deregulation 
using the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition explained below.  This methodology allows us to 
determine the sources of efficiency gains (or losses) in a manner not explored before. 
 
4.2.  Cost and Production Efficiencies 
This study investigates the effects of deregulation and competition on the efficiency and 
performance of United States electric utilities.  The review of the literature in Chapter 3 
summarized the results from many empirical models that tested the hypothesis that deregulation 
improves cost efficiency –cost minimization and profit maximization-, productivity and 
profitability in privately-owned electric utilities and improves  efficiency  in cooperative and 
publicly-owned electric utilities.  We focus on productivity and efficiency for two reasons.  First, 
firm use of accumulated resources is a major consequence of gaining competitive advantage, and 
second, efficiency of resource allocation affects the ability of a firm to grow (Majumdar., 1998).  
In addition, better financial performance implies that a firm has reached a certain level of 
productive efficiency and, in the context of deregulation, a certain level of successful adaptation 
to the new market environment. 
Earlier research efforts used linear programming methods to measure changes in 
productivity and efficiency due to increased competition.  These methods are nonstochastic and 
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 The description of efficiency in this introduction was drawn from Coelli (96/08). 
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do not allow for random error.  The most popular technique to date is the Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA).  With linear programming, one can calculate the Malmquist index which 
decomposes productivity changes into changes in efficiency, shifts in the production function, 
and changes in the scale of operations.  Other research estimated stochastic models of production 
on costs.  The most common approach was to estimate a translog cost function and use parameter 
estimates to measure the changes in efficiency and productivity over time or across firms. 
There is no way to determine whether electric utilities became more or less efficient or 
productive in an economic sense or responded more or less appropriately to deregulation and 
competition when one ignores the stochastic component of the introduction of deregulation or 
competition in the industry.  However, techniques like DEA which ignore the stochastic term are 
useful because technically, productivity changes are based on quantities of outputs and inputs 
without regard to changes in prices. 
 We use both approaches in this study, and we compare the results. .  The first method 
uses the optimization approach of DEA, and the second method decomposes average cost into 
quantity and price changes due to deregulation.  
 
4.3.  Decomposition of Cost changes due to Deregulation 
Our first econometric cost analysis determines whether there are sufficient input cost and 
output price differences between deregulated and regulated electric utilities, which would justify 
an analysis of the potential selection bias in the sample of deregulated electric utilities.    First, we 
estimate a cost function for electric utilities and use the model to determine whether firms in 
states with electric restructuring laws are more cost efficient than regulated utilities.  We assume 
a quadratic cost function for both regulated and deregulated electric utilities. We choose a 
quadratic cost function because it handles zero values of variables such as some output values and 
fixed effects variables better than the translog cost function (Kwoka, 2005).  
64  
Second, we measure the extent of inefficiency between deregulated and regulated electric 
utilities.  We decompose the regulated-deregulated cost differential into a predicted and a residual 
component, where the predicted component is divided into quantity and price components.  From 
the decomposition, one can determine the source of cost inefficiency.  While both quantity and 
price changes are important determinants of changes in costs, price changes provide the right 
signal to electric utilities to become more cost efficient. 
Third, we measure the change in cost differentials over the sample period.   
The variable cost function is given in (1) below: 
 Cit = Xit  t + eit        i = deregulated, regulated, t=time period     (1) 
where C is the average costs; X is a K by 1 vector of exogenous variables (input prices, variable 
output quantities, environmental variables, efficiency factors and other productivity related 
variables) that affect costs; β is a 1 by K vector of parameters representing the impact of these 
attributes on variable costs; and e is a random error assumed to have zero mean each period. 
 If group membership is not randomly selected; characteristics of firms, observed and 
unobserved, are systematically linked to whether firms are deregulated.  In this case, the expected 
value of the error term in (1) with non-random selection does not equal zero. 
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 Following Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), we rewrite the residual in (1) for each 
regulated and deregulated firm in terms of a standardized residual in the average cost distribution 
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 Kwoka (2006) describes how econometric models encounter a methodological problem of 
causation because some states may have restructured as a consequence of pre-restructuring unusually high 
prices or because other relevant factors existed that pushed the states to restructure.  Thus, the restructuring 
states may not be a random sample of all states, as single equation econometric modeling requires, and the 
results of the econometric models may be biased estimates of the price effect of restructuring since the 
estimates are derived from a non-random selected set of states.  If one does not correct the selection bias, 
Kwoka (2006, p. 24) concludes that “[t]he estimate at best might measure the effect of restructuring for 
high-price states. At worst, it may be entirely suspect if some characteristic of those states‟ political, social, 
or economic make-up simultaneously causes both the high prices and its effort to restructure.” The JMP 
decomposition accounts for the impact of differences in observable characteristics which explain some of 
the sample selection.  However, we do not further decompose the residuals into a component that explains 
non-random selection.  This should be a focus of future research. 
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( t) with mean zero and variance one and the within-group standard deviation of the costs of 
regulated firms in year t ( t).   
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where Cdt and C rt  are the average costs of deregulated and regulated electric utilities in year t, Xdt 
and X rt are vectors of individual characteristics, and udt  and urt are the components of average costs 
accounted for by the unobservable characteristics of firms.  As explained above, tttu for each 
firm in the deregulated and regulated samples.  The cost gap in year t can be written as 
 CDt = Xt rt + rt t                 (4) 
  t is the difference in the average standardized residual for deregulated and regulated 
firms ( dt - rt).  The actual change in the cost gap from year t to year t+k is shown in below: 
Dt+k - Dt = ( Xt+k - Xt) t + Xt+k ( t+k - t) +  [( dt+k - rt+k) - ( dt - rt)] rt   (5) 
 + ( dt+k - rt+k) ( rt+k - rt) 
Dt+k - Dt = ( Xt+k - Xt) t + Xt+k ( t+k - t) +  ( t+k - t) rt  + t+k ( rt+k - rt).   
  ( Xt+k - Xt) t is the change over time in the difference in the average costs of regulated 
and deregulated firms due to changes in their observable characteristics over time and evaluated at 
prices in period t; Xt+k ( t+k - t) is the change in the average cost difference due to changes in 
prices over time evaluated at the (t+k) difference in observed characteristics.  The third term 
captures changes in the relative positions of deregulated and regulated firms in the residual 
distribution of regulated firms.  If j.> 0, (j=t, t+k), then deregulated firms are less efficient than 
regulated firms in period t.  If ( t-k - t) >0, then this disadvantage for deregulated firms increased 
over time.   The fourth term captures the effect of the change in the residual cost distribution over 
time.   
66  
 Our cost efficiency conclusions therefore depend on the relative values of dt+k, rt+k, and rt.  
If, over the study period, the residual cost difference increases ( rt+k < rt) for regulated firms, the 
efficiency gap in favor of deregulated electric utilities will increase as long as dt+k < rt+k.   This 
means that as long as the average deregulated electric utility is more cost efficient than the average 
regulated utility, the fourth term implies that a rise in inefficiency of regulated utilities as compared 
to deregulated utilities increases the cost differential.  If deregulated electric utilities remain in the 
same position in the regulated utilities‟ distribution, a rise in residual inefficiency of regulated 
utilities will increase the cost gap between the two groups.  Following Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce, 
we refer to the third and fourth terms as the Gap and the Unobserved Price terms.
24
  
 A profit decomposition can be done using the same procedures adopted for the cost 
minimization problem.  However, because profit maximization is not the primary goal for many 
utilities (for example cooperatives), we only use the cost decomposition for the analysis of all 
utilities.  
 
4.4.  Competition, Production Efficiency and Non-Parametric Methods 
Theory predicts that competition in the markets drives firms to search for better 
technologies to improve production efficiency and enhance profits.  On the contrary, in order to 
improve profits, a monopolist simply raises the prices of its products. Since competition promotes 
production efficiency, competition yields superior outcomes compared to a monopoly market.  In 
an industry where economies of scale are prevalent, the existence of a natural monopoly is more 
justified.  For competition to be effective, it has to break the natural monopoly through entry of 
new players.  For competition to prevail, it must bring about benefits greater than monopoly costs 
                     
24
 Vides Andrade used the same decomposition in her analysis of wage inequalities in El Salvador (see 
references). 
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to the society.  We investigate the relationships among competition, profitability, production 
efficiency, and scale economies using a combination of parametric and non-parametric methods. 
Knight (1933), Debreu (1951), Koopmans (1951), and Farrell (1957) laid the foundation 
for current approaches to measuring production efficiency (or inefficiency) by developing a 
system of equations known as distance functions. Shephard‟s (1953) duality theorem established 
the link between production and costs while Farrell‟s work enabled theoretical estimation of 
productive efficiency scores.  Cost function approaches to the evaluation of firm performance are 
particularly relevant in a regulatory environment that constrains output or price.  
Three methods of estimation have been developed: linear programming, deterministic 
frontiers, and stochastic frontiers.  First, there is the data envelopment analysis (DEA) method 
which stems, historically, from the Debreu-Farrell efficiency concept.  Charnes et al. (1978), 
Banker (1984), Banker et al. (1984), and Färe et al. (1985) were the first authors to develop DEA 
studies.  DEA evaluates global efficiencies of production systems, as revealed through micro-
economic (generally cross-sectional) data.  Many other studies such as Barr et al. (1993) 
investigated the possibility of combining DEA approaches to parametric models, by introducing 
into such models DEA efficiencies as exogenous variables. Others such as Sueyoshi (1999b) 
investigated the possibility of combining DEA with stochastic approaches. 
Only a few past studies of the electric industry investigated technical changes using 
parametric techniques.  Most cost analyses focused on scale economies.  
The problem with previous studies that relied on a traditional econometric estimate of a 
production function is that the estimated function traced out the least cost locus for varying 
output, the „average‟ output for varying input levels, or minimum cost given output levels.  
Hence, the average production function represents maximum output levels given fixed input 
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levels.  Underlying this methodological approach is the assumption that all firms are operating 
efficiently.
25
   
Another line of empirical work takes a slightly different route using stochastic cost or 
production frontiers. The model assumes that inefficiency of the firm is embedded in the error 
term of the traditional econometric regression (i.e. a composed error).  The structure of the error 
term and the validity of the assumption about its distribution influence the measured efficiency of 
the firm. 
A methodological alternative to the regression to the mean analysis of past utility cost 
analysis was presented by Charnes et al. (1978), who coined the term data envelopment analysis, 
and introduced a mathematical programming framework into Farrell (1957). DEA uses a linear 
programming method to search for the optimal combinations of outputs and inputs.  In cost 
applications, DEA seeks the minimum cost associated with the highest level of outputs.  The 
method optimizes on each individual observation with the objective of calculating a discrete 
piecewise frontier in contrast to the focus on averages and estimation of parameters with 
statistical approaches.  DEA is similar to the parametric frontier analysis in the sense that it uses 
best practice observations to trace out a least-cost operating locus.  Its main difference, however, 
is that as a deterministic method, it makes no adjustments for random noise, and can be sensitive 
to outlier observations.
26
 
In DEA analysis, some attention must be given to assumptions regarding cost returns. 
Although Charnes et al. (1994) considered only constant returns to scale (CRS), other studies 
have included a variety of approaches such as variable returns to scale (VRS), and even non-
increasing returns to scale (NIRS).  Our analysis assumes variable returns to scale given the 
                     
25
 Under certain conditions a fitted (average) function can permit a ranking of observations by technical 
efficiency. Nevertheless, it cannot provide any quantitative information on technical inefficiency for any 
observation in the sample (Schmidt and Lovell, 1979). 
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increasingly competitive nature of the power industry and the host of prior studies that have 
undermined the natural monopoly assumption. From a practical perspective, the use of variable 
returns to scale permits the estimation of efficiency scores that are not confounded by scale 
effects. 
In Figure 1, we illustrate the differences between the traditional parametric approach and 
the DEA in measuring efficiency.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Comparison of average function and DEA frontiers. 
 
While most parametric approaches using linear functions seek to optimize a single plane 
(AB) through the data, the DEA approach takes an alternative route by optimizing on the 
individual observation.
27
  The goal of DEA is to estimate a discrete piecewise frontier (an 
envelope) as determined by the given data set of Pareto-efficient firms.  We have presented an 
                                                             
26
 Since the true level of efficiency or inefficiency is not known, it is not possible to ascertain which of the 
assumptions underlying the stochastic frontier or the DEA dominates the other. 
27
 Most empirical parametric approaches assumed linear functions.  However, under non-linearity 
optimization is over multiple planes. 
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illustration of this frontier in Figure 3.  For our example, we assumed a one-input, one-output 
firm, although the analysis can be easily extended to multiple-output, multiple-input situations. 
Depending on the particular assumption about returns to scale, a frontier that envelops the 
data may be given by the CRS projection (OC), the VRS projection (JK), or non- increasing 
returns (NIRS) projection (OL).
28
  Thus, in the parametric average function it is assumed that 
each individual firm takes on the score of the „average‟  
performance unit or firm.  In contrast, the DEA focus is on each individual firm‟s score in 
relation to the best performer such that each firm lies on or below the extreme frontier. Each firm 
not on the relevant frontier (OC, JK, or OL) is scaled against a convex combination of the firm or 
unit of observation on the frontier closest to it.  All firms located below the relevant frontier are 
thus technically inefficient and hence, cannot be minimizing cost since they will be, by definition, 
using inputs excessively given the prices of those inputs. 
There are two versions of DEA efficiency measures, the CCR measure and the BCC 
measure; see Charnes et al. (1978) and Banker et al. (1984).  The CCR measure is calculated with 
the constant returns to scale (CRS) assumption whereas the BCC method allows for variable 
returns to scale (VRS).  Both methods are applied to examine electricity supply industry 
performance. 
Following Lien and Peng (2001), consider n decision making units (DMUs), j=1,…,n. 
The units are homogenous with the same types of inputs and outputs. Assume there are m inputs 
and k outputs. Let xj and yj denote, respectively, the input and output vectors for the j-th DMU. 
Thus, xj is a (mx1) column vector and yj is a (kx1) column vector. Moreover, 
),,,( 21 nxxxx  is the m X n input matrix and ),,,( 21 nyyyy  is the k X n output matrix. 
                     
28
 This illustration combines three different frontiers and the traditional „average‟ function (AB) into one 
graph so readers can easily grasp the differences. Each of the three frontiers, OC, JK, or OL is only relevant 
for the return-to-scale it represents, and hence, the data points they envelope. 
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The CCR model assigns weights to each input and output, and then assesses the 
efficiency of a given DMU by the ratio of the aggregate weighted output to the aggregate 
weighted input. The weights assigned must be nonnegative. Also, they must restrict each DMU 
from receiving a ratio (of the weighted output to the weighted input) that is greater than one. 
Mathematically, when evaluating the efficiency of the decision-making unit “o”, we solve the 
following problem: 
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where u is the (kX1) vector of output weights and v is the (mX1) vector of input weights. “T” 
denotes the matrix transpose operator. Thus, u and v are chosen to maximize the efficiency 
measure of the DMU “o” subject to the constraints that the efficiency levels of all units must be 
less than or equal to one. 
The above problem has an infinite number of solutions. To generate a unique solution, 
the following constraint is imposed: 1o
T yu . The maximization problem then becomes: 
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The duality problem to (16) can be written as follows: 
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where λ is a (nX1) column vector and o is a scalar. In other words, we search for all linear 
combinations of input vectors in current practices that can be provided by 
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the input vector of the “o” unit. We then compute the maximal proportional output vector that can 
be produced by these linear combinations. Let o
*
 denote the solution to (8). Obviously o
*
1. If 
o
*
=1 , then the decision-making unit “o” is (CCR) technically efficient. Otherwise, o
*
>1 and “o” 
is (CCR) inefficient.  Later we also denote o
*
 by  Eccr, the efficiency score measured by the CCR 
method. 
Underlying the CCR method is the assumption of constant returns to scale. This 
assumption is not supportable in imperfectly competitive markets. The BCC model modifies the 
CCR method by allowing variable returns to scale (VRS). This is done by simply adding the 
convexity constraint e
T
=1 into Equation (8), where e is an (nX1) column vector of ones. Let o
**
 
be the solution to the new problem, also denoted as Ebcc . Clearly, Ebcc  Eccr . Note that the BCC 
method measures purely technical efficiency whereas the CCR method measures both technical 
efficiency and scale efficiency.  We derive a measure for scale efficiency Escale = Eccr / Ebcc. In 
this study, all three of the above efficiency measures are compared across regulated and 
deregulated electric utilities, ownership, degree of competition, size, and region. 
The DEA measure of technical inefficiency does not allow observation noise.  However, 
analysts know that noise can come from many sources including measurement error and should 
be separated from the inefficiency scores.  Many studies combined DEA and regression analysis 
to generate a stochastic frontier from which noise can be filtered. Rhodes and Southwick (1986) 
adopted a Tobit analysis by eliminating the inefficient units (based on the DEA measures) and 
estimating a frontier from efficient units only. Banker et al. (1992) applied the maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE) method to the efficient units to determine the frontier.  Cooper and 
Gallegos (1991) adjusted the input vectors for inefficient units based on the deterministic frontier 
calculated from the DEA method.  They ran an ordinary least square (OLS) regression to estimate 
the parameters of the frontier.  Sengupta (1989, 1991) developed a series of stochastic DEA 
frontiers allowing for various functional forms and distribution functions for the disturbances.  
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Instead of OLS, Charnes et al. (1991) adopted the robust Least Absolute Value (LAV) method to 
estimate the frontier.  In fact, Ray (1992) pointed out that, when all the units are projected into the 
frontier and later used in an OLS procedure, the disturbance terms exhibit heteroscedasticity and 
are no longer independently and identically distributed. Both factors advise against the use of the 
OLS method. 
Our study uses DEAP Version 2.1 developed by Tim Coelli to measure technical, 
allocative and cost efficiencies of US electricity firms.  We also perform DEA-like linear 
programs and estimate a Malmquist Total Factor Productivity (“TFP”) index to measure 
productivity change and productivity differences between deregulated and regulated US 
electricity firms.
29
   
 
4.5. Shareholder Wealth, Firm Risk and Stock Returns 
The CAPM is the most common asset pricing model to determine the expected return of a 
company‟s stock.30  However, other approaches have been used to analyze the impact of 
regulatory changes or policy on shareholders‟ expected return. Other models include the APT, the 
Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) model and the Fama-French (FF) three-factor model.  Unlike the 
DCF which does not incorporate risk as a determinant of the expected stock return, the CAPM, 
APT and FF models differ in how they define risk.  While the CAPM defines a stock‟s risk as its 
sensitivity to the stock market, the FF model defines a stock‟s risk as its sensitivity to the stock 
market, a portfolio based on firm size, and a portfolio based on book-to-market ratios.  
In its general formula, the CAPM can be expressed as follows: 
                     
29
 Hanoch and Rothschild (1972, page 273, footnote 15) noted that the use of some data in linear 
programming (such as the DEA) may be dangerous as serious and unexplainable violations of quasi-
concavity and monotonicity abound.   
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fmfs rRErRE )()(       (9) 
Where, E(Rs ) is the expected return for company s; rf  is the expected return of the riskless asset; 
βs is the company s stock‟s sensitivity to the market; and, Rm is the expected of the market. 
The CAPM is used to calculate a stock return in excess of the risk-free asset rate plus an 
additional market-based return to compensate for the systematic risk of the stock.  However, the 
CAPM does not fully account for the higher returns of small company stocks (Morningstar, 
2007)
31
 nor does it consider a firm‟s book-to-market ratio.  
The FF three-factor model was introduced in Fama and French‟s 1992 paper and they 
concluded that their tests did not support the most basic prediction of the CAPM.  They 
concluded that equity returns are inversely related to the size of a company and positively related 
to the book-to-market ratio.   
Barber et al. (1997, p. 370) used all firms with available data on the monthly return files 
created by the CRSP
32
 and analyzed statistical tests used in event studies to detect long-run 
abnormal stock returns and concluded that models using a reference portfolio such as a market 
index are misspecified.  They found that “matching sample firms to control firms of similar size 
and book-to-market ratios yield well-specified test statistics in virtually all sampling situations” 
considered.   Kumar et al. (2000) used a multistage model to explain the stock returns of a 
representative set of U.S. companies randomly drawn from 21 industries and found that stock 
returns are related to economic factors such as the cost and supply of money or the industry 
                                                             
30
 The CAPM is attributed to William Sharpe(1964) and Lintner (1965). Their work drew on Harry 
Markowitz‟s portfolio theory.  Sharpe, Markowitz and Merton Miller received the 1990 Nobel Prize in 
Economics. 
31
 This book is a continuation of an annual book previously published by Ibbotson.  
32
 This is comprised of all firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX) and the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ).  
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membership not previously associated with the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) or the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).   
Jayaraman et al (2002, p. 1548) used a single-factor CAPM and the Fama and French 
(1992) three-factor model to evaluate the impact of mutual fund mergers on shareholder wealth 
and found evidence that shareholders of the target fund realize significant improvements in 
performance after the merger, but that shareholders of the acquiring fund experience significant 
deterioration in performance.  
Chu and Lim (1998) used regression analysis to link stock performance and profit and 
cost efficiencies of banks in Singapore and found a significant relationship between profit 
efficiencies and bank share prices, but no such relationship with respect to cost efficiencies.  
More recently, Zhong et al. (2008) used event methodology and multivariate regression analysis 
and found that deregulation of the telecommunications industry in 1996 had significant positive 
effects on stock returns for broadcasting firms, with significant stock return gains for firms 
focusing on broadcasting business and small television groups.  
Johnston (1984) used a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model to estimate the share 
price response of utility portfolios.  He argued that in the presence of contemporaneous 
correlation the SUR methodology generates more efficient estimates. Following Johnston (1984), 
Akhigbe and Whyte (2001) used the model given in (19) below to analyze the impact of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 on bank stock 
returns and risk:  
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where ptR  is the return on electric utility p‟s stock on day t,  p is  the intercept term,  
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mp measures market/systematic risk for firm or group of firms p, mtR is the return on the CRSP 
equally-weighted market portfolio on day t,  ip  measures economy-wide risk for firm or group 
of firms p, itR  is the daily change in the market interest rate,   pk  measures the sensitivity of the 
firm‟s stocks to event k, Dkt is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the kth event date and 0 otherwise, 
and pt  is the disturbance term on the stock on day t. The regressions used in their SUR 
estimations were based on the CAPM in which the daily change in the market interest rate 
replaced the risk-free interest rate and an additional variable, a dummy, was introduced to 
represent the sensitivity of the company‟s stock to an event.  They found that the FDICIA 
positively affected bank stock returns and resulted in a significant reduction in bank risk.  
Studies on the stock markets, the CAPM and the APT suggest that stock prices 
incorporate all relevant publicly available and known information.   Cost efficiency scores are 
obtained from accounting information on total cost and capital, labor and other input prices which 
are public information.    In this chapter, we link the original CAPM of Sharpe (1964) and the 
modern theory of the three-factor model developed by Fama and French (1992) to the technical 
efficiencies of electric utilities.  Specifically, we insert technical efficiencies and total factor 
productivity scores in the CAPM to investigate the impact of technical efficiencies and 
deregulation of the U.S. electricity industry on stock returns of electric utilities.  By definition, 
the return from a stock is determined by the accrual of income from dividends and capital gains 
due to changes in its market price.  During periods of economic growth, it is expected that higher 
incomes, lower interest rates, lower inflation rates, higher outputs, and other market indicators 
will cause the returns from a stock to be high.  Each of these factors is a candidate in explaining 
expected returns.  Theory suggests that there is a link between interest rates and stock returns. 
Indeed, stocks historically perform better under falling interest rates than under rising interest 
rates, suggesting that the link is between high and falling interest rates and stock returns.   
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Following Akhigbe and Whyte (2001), we use the yield on the long-term (20 years) U.S. 
Treasury bond as a proxy for the unanticipated changes in the interest rate index. Following 
Brown and Warner (1980, 1985), Hughes et al. (1986), Jarrell and Peltzman (1985), Binder and 
Summer (1985), Johnson et al. (1991, 1998), and Akhigbe and Whyte (2001), an equally-
weighted market portfolio index is used as a proxy for the market rate of return in the estimated 
equation.   Our model is estimated for all firms in the sample of IOUs for which stock return 
information is available for the period from 1997 to 2003.  The firms are grouped into 
deregulated and regulated firms.     
We expanded the capital market measures of risk obtained using the two-index model which has 
been utilized extensively in other areas of research (Flannery and James, 1984; Aharony et al., 
1986, 1988; Barber et al., 1997; Akhigbe and Whyte, 2001) by including information on technical 
efficiency, deregulation, and firm size and book-to-market value: 
)11()( pttptptmtmpptpt HMLhSMBsRfRRfR  
    
where Rpt is the annual stock return on the common stock of utility p, Rft if the risk-free 
government backed 20-year bonds, Rmt is the annual market return or the return on an equally-
weighted index, SMB (Small Minus Big) is “the average return on three small portfolios minus 
the average return on three big portfolios, controlling for the same weighted average book-to-
market equity in the two portfolios,  
  
SMB =  1/3 (Small Value + Small Neutral + Small Growth) 
 - 1/3 (Big Value + Big Neutral + Big Growth).  
  
  
and HML (High Minus Low) is the average return on two value portfolios minus the average 
return on two growth portfolios, 
  
  
HML = 1/2 (Small Value + Big Value) 
 - 1/2 (Small Growth + Big Growth).”  
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The regression also included additional variables TECHCH (technological change) and 
TFPCH (total factor productivity change) obtained in the Malmquist TFP Index analysis.  In this 
study, we tested whether shareholders benefit from electricity deregulation.  We hypothesized 
that shareholders would not invest in a firm which does not take advantage of the new 
technological advances that are likely to increase profits and dividends.  Thus, technological 
changes and total factor productivity are expected to be important factors in the determination of 
stock returns and profitability in utility companies.   
The modified CAPM equation (11) above is used to investigate the existence of any 
statistical relationship between technical efficiency scores and stock returns and to determine if 
deregulated IOUs performed better in the marketplace than regulated IOUs.  The following 
hypotheses were tested for the sample of investor-owned electric utilities included in this section: 
H1: Firms in states with restructuring laws experienced stronger wealth effects than firms in 
states without restructuring laws; 
H2:  Firms in deregulated states experienced higher systematic risk than regulated firms in the 
post- major deregulation events. 
 A positive intercept in (11) indicates that the sample firms performed better than 
expected, controlling for market, firm size, book-to-market value, and technological change 
factors in returns. The coefficient on the market return variable is interpreted as the systematic 
risk faced by the utilities.  A higher value of βm means that the sample utilities experienced 
greater market volatility of returns.   A positive and significant coefficient on the size variable 
means that small size company are associated with higher stock return and a positive and 
significant coefficient on the book-to-market variable means that stock return is positively related 
to the ratio of a company‟s book value relative to its market value of equity.  We test the two 
main hypotheses through a SUR estimation of our sample of IOUs, grouped between regulated 
and deregulated IOUs. A positive and statistically significant coefficient of the intercept means 
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that the group of IOUs outperformed the market after controlling for the market, size, book-to-
market, and technical and productivity changes (H1).  Finally, a statistically significant beta (β) 
greater than one means that the group of IOUs is more risky than the market. We test H2 by 
comparing the beta coefficients of the groups of regulated and deregulated IOUs.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
Most studies have analyzed the most dominant segment of the industry, namely the IOUs. 
Even though they account for only 7.6 percent of the electric utilities in the country, they account 
for more than 75 percent of all revenues from sales of electricity to all consumers.  This study is 
interested not only in IOUS, but also in all other types of electric utilities.   
The data are drawn from major databases maintained by the FERC and the Energy 
Administration Agency (EIA) of the United States Department of Energy.  Data on IOUs and 
COOPs are obtained from FERC Form 1, “Annual Report of Major Electric Utilities, Licensees, 
and Others.” Data on POUs (municipal, state and federal electric utilities) are obtained from EIA 
forms (EIA-860, EIA-861 and EIA-412).  FERC Form 1 is a comprehensive financial and 
operating report submitted for Electric Rate regulation and financial audits. FERC Form 1 
compiles all utility data as reported in the annual report by any electric utility having (1) one 
million Megawatt hours or more; (2) 100 megawatt hours of annual sales for resale; (3) 500 
megawatt hours of annual power exchange delivered; or (4) 500 megawatt hours of annual 
wheeling
33
 for others (deliveries plus losses).
34
 
Form EIA-861, “Annual Electric Power Industry Report,” is “an electric utility data file 
that includes such information as peak load, generation, electric purchases, sales, revenues, 
customer counts and demand-side management programs, green pricing and net metering 
                     
33 Wheeling service is defined as the use of the transmission facilities of one system to transmit power for 
another system. Wheeling can apply to either wholesale or retail service. 
34
 See http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/eforms.asp#1 
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programs, and distributed generation capacity.”35  Form EIA-412 collects accounting, plant 
statistics, and transmission data from various electric industry entities in the United States.  Each 
municipality, political subdivision, State, and Federal entity engaged in the generation, 
transmission, or distribution of electricity, which had at least 150,000 megawatthours of sales to 
ultimate consumers and/or at least 150,000 megawatthours of sales for resale for each of the 2 
previous years has to fill out this form.
36
  Form EIA-860 collects data on the status of existing 
electric generating plants and associated equipment in the United States, and those scheduled for 
initial commercial operation within 5 years of the filing of this report.  Form EIA-860 is 
completed for all electric generating plants, which have or will have a nameplate rating of 1 
megawatt (1000 kW) or more, and are operating or plan to be operating within 5 years of the year 
of this form.
37
   
The US electric power industry is a $300-billion industry whose products are vital to the 
US economy.  According to Edison Electric Institute (“EEI), “electricity is the lifeblood of the 
U.S. economy. It powers our homes, offices, and industries; provides communications, 
entertainment, and medical services; powers computers, technology, and the Internet; and runs 
various forms of transportation. Not only is electricity the cleanest, most flexible, and most 
controllable form of energy, its versatility 
                     
35
 See http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/eia861.html 
36
The accounting data (Schedules 1 through 8) are completed by The plant statistics data (Schedule 9) are 
completed by each municipality, political subdivision, State, Federal, and unregulated entity owning plants 
with a nameplate of 10 megawatts or larger.  The transmission data (Schedules 10 and 11) are completed by 
each municipality, political subdivision, State, Federal, and generation and transmission cooperative 
owning transmission lines having a nominal voltage of 132 kilovolts or greater. Note: The EIA-412 
Survey was suspended at the end of 2003 due to budget constraints.  Since then no data was collected, 
processed or summarized. The Financial Statistics of Major U.S. Publicly Owned Electric 
Utilities publication was discontinued in the year 2000; however, summary data are available in the 
Electric Power Annual. 
37
 See http://www.eia.doe.gov/oss/forms.html#eia-860  
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is unparalleled.”38 As of 2006, the industry is comprised of 1,874 Government-owned municipal 
systems, 1,688 non-utility generators, 870 cooperatives, 203 investor-owned electric companies, 
143 energy service providers, 133, public power systems, 31 state-owned projects, and 9 federal 
utilities.
39
   
Our study evaluates the performance of all electric utilities in the United States for the 
period of 1996 to 2003.  The sample includes the majority of privately held Investor-Owned 
utilities (“IOUs”), and the majority of publicly-owned electric utilities (federal electric utilities, 
cooperative electric utilities, municipal electric utilities, and state-owned electric utilities).  
Among the state-owned electric utilities were utilities owned by state political subdivisions. The 
final sample consisted of 433 POUs and 139 IOUs and COOPs.  Because many utilities went 
through mergers, acquisitions and other reorganizations, and many others did not have data for 
most years, our study eliminated utilities with consistent missing data and for which data on total 
sales, net generation and total costs were incomplete.  DEA methodology utilized in this study 
requires balanced data as all firms must be observed in all time periods. 
The period of study coincides with the advent of electric deregulation or limited 
competition in the electric industry, which most often started with retail choice and gradually 
included competition in the power procurement of generation.  California led the way with 
deregulation debate starting at the end of 1996, although it was the state that suffered the most 
negative economic and political backlashes from the introduction of competition in the electric 
industry.  This led to a suspension of electric deregulation in California at the beginning of 2003.  
However, due to a strong development of the major independent transmission system operators 
(“ISOs”) and regional transmission organizations (“RTOs”), other states continue to develop 
forms of electric competition. 
                     
38 Edison Electric Institute. 2006 Financial Review, May 2007 (EEI 2007) 
39
 Id. 
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A sample of firms during the period beginning with January 1996 and ending with 
December 2003 was collected.  One of the data forms from the EIA, Form EIA-412, was no 
longer published after the end of 2003, and it would be too difficult to collect the same 
information from other sources. 
Besides the data collected from EIA forms EIA-412, EIA-861, EIA-860, and FERC-1, 
financial data on the market, industry and IOUs‟ returns were obtained from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
Only those electric utilities for which complete primary data were compiled are included 
in this study.  The following is a list of empirical variables included in our models. 
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Table 3: Identification of Variables and Source of Data 
 
Variable names Identification of variables Source of the 
variable 
TOTCOST 
 
CAPCOST  
 
DISTR 
 
DISTRES 
DISTCOM 
DISTIND 
DISTNONRES 
GENER 
PURCHUTI 
 
TOTASSETS 
FUELCOST 
PCAPITAL 
PLABOR 
 
PFUEL 
 
CUSTOMERS 
STEAM 
NUCLEAR 
HYDRO 
SALESHARE 
SUPPLYSHARE 
 
COMPETE 
FEGEN 
Total cost is the sum of operation, maintenance, 
depreciation, and capital costs ($) 
Net electric utility plant multiplied by the price of 
capital for electric utilities
40
($)  
Total megawatt-hours sold by each utility to final 
customers and to the resale market (MWH) 
Distribution sales to residential customers (MWH) 
Distribution sales to commercial customers (MWH)  
Distribution sales to industrial customers (MWH) 
DISTR minus DISTRES (MWH) 
Net generation output  (MWH) 
Quantity of power purchased (MWH) 
 
Total electric utility assets ($) 
Total generation fuel costs used ($) 
Weighted average price of capital (“WACC”) (%) 
Total  salaries and wages divided by total disposition 
of electricity ($/MWH) 
Weighted average of steam, nuclear, and other fuel  
costs over total generation ($/MWH) 
Total number of utility customers 
Percent of steam generation over total generation 
Percent of nuclear generation over total generation 
Percent of hydro generation over total generation 
Utility proportion of state total sales 
Utility proportion of state total power supply 
 
Deregulation/competition (0,1) 
If GENER>0, then FEGEN=1 
FERC-1, EIA-412 
 
FERC-1, EIA-412 
 
EIA-861 
 
EIA-861, FERC-1 
 
FERC-1, EIA-412, 
EIA-861 
EIA-861 
EIA-860, EIA-412 
 
FERC-1, EIA-412 
 
FERC-1, EIA-412 
 
FERC-1, EIA-412 
 
FERC-1, EIA-
412,EIA-861 
FERC-1, EIA-412 
FERC-1, EIA-412 
FERC-1, EIA-412 
 
 
Daily and monthly stock returns were obtained from the CRSP (University of Chicago 
Center for Research in Security Prices) database for the study period.  Total assets, operating 
income, operating expenses for electric utilities were compiled from FERC and EIA forms 
described above, and from the annual Compustat. Quarterly data for these variables were also 
available from the quarterly Compustat.  For each utility, total costs are the sum of general 
operation and maintenance expenses (O&M), depreciation, and capital costs associated with the 
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generation, transmission, and distribution of electric power and with the purchase of power that 
utilities need to offset the shortage of their output in order to meet the demand.   
For input costs, electricity can be generated by steam power, nuclear power, hydraulic 
power, and other technology such as internal combustion or combined cycle using natural gas 
turbines and many others. Steam fuel cost per kwh generated by steam and nuclear fuel cost per 
kwh generated by nuclear power are obtained by dividing for each fuel total costs by the amount 
of power generated by that fuel.    
For labor costs, actual payroll data are available from FERC Form 1, EIA-412, and 
DOE/EIA reports. Labor cost equals the total amount of labor cost divided by the number of 
employees.  
The cost of capital is primarily the cost of long-term debt.  Following Kwoka (1996), the 
cost of capital for IOUs is calculated as a weighted average cost of common stock, preferred 
stock, and long-term debt.  
Ownership variables are included in the study as time invariant variables [state, federal, 
municipal, IOUs, cooperative].  In addition, the size of the firm, the degree of competition, the 
diversification of activities, taxes and other payments, the region, and other market characteristics 
are included in the study. 
The following tables present the descriptive statistics for the sample of firms included in 
this study. 
 
                                                             
40
 http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/; Cost of Capital by Sector. 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of the Sample of POUs 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Year 
N 
T 
Federal 
Municipal 
State 
Totdisp 
Nuclear 
Steam 
Totcosts 
Avgcost 
Totsales 
Netgener 
Purchuti 
Totcons 
Compete 
Saleshare 
Supplyshare 
Fegen 
Year 
Number of yearly observations 
Time periods 
Federal electric utilities 
Municipal electric utilities 
State owned electric utilities 
Total disposition(/1,000,000) 
Nuclear generation 
Steam generation 
Total utility costs(/1,000,000) 
Average cost 
Total electricity sales(/1,000,000) 
Net generation(/1,000,000) 
Purchased power(/1,000,000) 
Total number of customers(/1,000) 
Deregulated (=1, 0 otherwise) 
Share of state electricity sales 
Share of state electricity supply 
Generation function (0 or 1)   
1999.5 
216.46 
4.50 
0.009 
0.88 
0.08 
1.28 
0.014 
0.13 
97.83 
73.39 
1.66 
1.29 
0.80 
33.66 
0.13 
0.025 
0.018 
0.43 
2.29 
125.06 
2.29 
0.096 
0.324 
0.26 
7.68 
0.10 
0.33 
399.45 
794.99 
7.58 
9.16 
1.74 
95.06 
0.34 
0.14 
0.13 
0.49 
1996 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4.13 
7.48 
0 
-0.01 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2003 
433 
8 
1 
1 
1 
155.00 
1 
1 
7347.03 
46672.75 
151.03 
155.48 
26.16 
1535.27 
1 
3.74 
2.27 
1 
 
Table 5: Summary Statistics of the Sample of POUs in Deregulated States 
 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Year 
N 
T 
Federal 
Municipal 
State 
Totdisp 
Nuclear 
Steam 
Totcosts 
Avgcost 
Totsales 
Netgener 
Purchuti 
Totcons 
Compete 
Saleshare 
Supplyshare 
Fegen 
Year 
Number of yearly observations 
Time periods 
Federal electric utilities 
Municipal electric utilities 
State owned electric utilities 
Total disposition(/1,000,000) 
Nuclear generation 
Steam generation 
Total utility costs(/1,000,000) 
Average cost 
Total electricity sales(/1,000,000) 
Net generation(/1,000,000) 
Purchased power(/1,000,000) 
Total number of customers(/1,000) 
Deregulated (=1, 0 otherwise) 
Share of state electricity sales 
Share of state electricity supply 
Generation function (0 or 1)   
2001.09 
235.63 
6.09 
0 
0.92 
0.075 
0.84 
0.024 
0.071 
139.11 
77.62 
1.67 
1.04 
1.12 
55.92 
1 
0.014 
0.007 
0.57 
1.53 
128.15 
1.53 
0 
0.28 
0.26 
4.12 
0.13 
0.24 
393.04 
27.46 
4.84 
4.14 
2.87 
176.25 
0 
0.05 
0.033 
0.50 
1998 
2 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
6.62 
7.48 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
2003 
429 
8 
0 
1 
1 
48.80 
1 
1 
2971.34 
289.37 
48.47 
35.51 
26.16 
1459.15 
1 
0.56 
0.28 
1 
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Table 6: Summary Statistics of the Sample of POUs in Regulated States 
 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Year 
N 
T 
Federal 
Municipal 
State 
Totdisp 
Nuclear 
Steam 
Totcosts 
Avgcost 
Totsales 
Netgener 
Purchuti 
Totcons 
Compete 
Saleshare 
Supplyshare 
Fegen 
Year 
Number of yearly observations 
Time periods 
Federal electric utilities 
Municipal electric utilities 
State owned electric utilities 
Total disposition(/1,000,000) 
Nuclear generation 
Steam generation 
Total utility costs(/1,000,000) 
Average cost 
Total electricity sales(/1,000,000) 
Net generation(/1,000,000) 
Purchased power(/1,000,000) 
Total number of customers(/1,000) 
Deregulated (=1, 0 otherwise) 
Share of state electricity sales 
Share of state electricity supply 
Generation function (0 or 1)   
1999.26 
213.53 
4.26 
0.011 
0.88 
0.076 
1.35 
0.013 
0.14 
91.52 
72.74 
1.65 
1.33 
0.75 
30.26 
0 
0.027 
0.018 
0.404 
2.29 
124.35 
2.29 
0.103 
0.33 
0.26 
8.09 
0.09 
0.34 
400.11 
853.52 
7.91 
9.70 
1.49 
74.78 
0 
0.15 
0.14 
0.49 
1996 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4.13 
7.56 
0.034 
-0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-0 
0 
2003 
433 
8 
1 
1 
1 
155.00 
1 
1 
7347.03 
46672.75 
151.03 
155.48 
18.35 
1535.27 
0 
3.74 
2.27 
1 
 
 
 
Table 7: Summary Statistics of the Sample of IOUs and COOPs 
 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Year 
N 
T 
Totdisp 
Nuclear 
Steam 
Totcosts 
Avgcost 
Totsales 
Netgener 
Purchuti 
Totcons 
Compete 
Saleshare 
Supplyshare 
Fegen 
Year 
Number of yearly observations 
Time periods 
Total disposition(/1,000,000) 
Nuclear generation 
Steam generation 
Total utility costs(/1,000,000) 
Average cost 
Total electricity sales(/1,000,000) 
Net generation(/1,000,000) 
Purchased power(/1,000,000) 
Total number of customers(/1,000) 
Deregulated (=1, 0 otherwise) 
Share of state electricity sales 
Share of state electricity supply 
Generation function (0 or 1)   
1999.5 
70 
4.5 
21.08 
0.13 
0.54 
952.64 
52.91 
17.69 
11.86 
6.04 
488.77 
0.25 
0.25 
0.15 
0.87 
 
2.29 
40.14 
2.29 
77.52 
0.24 
0.41 
1322.23 
25.73 
22.99 
16.48 
10.80 
755.01 
0.43 
0.30 
0.20 
0.33 
1996 
1 
1 
0.01 
0 
0 
0.97 
0.06 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2003 
139 
8 
184.70 
1.00 
1.01 
12644.41 
169.70 
182.19 
88.41 
159.05 
4889.12 
1 
2.17 
1.42 
1 
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Table 8: Summary Statistics of the Sample of IOUs and COOPs in Deregulated States 
 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Year 
N 
T 
Totdisp 
Nuclear 
Steam 
Totcosts 
Avgcost 
Totsales 
Netgener 
Purchuti 
Totcons 
Compete 
Saleshare 
Supplyshare 
Fegen 
Year 
Number of yearly observations 
Time periods 
Total disposition(/1,000,000) 
Nuclear generation 
Steam generation 
Total utility costs(/1,000,000) 
Average cost 
Total electricity sales(/1,000,000) 
Net generation(/1,000,000) 
Purchased power(/1,000,000) 
Total number of customers(/1,000) 
Deregulated (=1, 0 otherwise) 
Share of state electricity sales 
Share of state electricity supply 
Generation function (0 or 1)   
2001.16 
63.06 
6.16 
15.86 
0.18 
0.38 
1061.64 
67.00 
16.90 
7.68 
8.23 
555.30 
1 
0.20 
0.07 
0.79 
1.50 
39.53 
1.50 
21.29 
0.31 
0.42 
1660.38 
30.79 
24.97 
12.15 
13.27 
935.58 
0 
0.28 
0.10 
0.41 
1998 
1 
3 
0.12 
0 
0 
4.81 
12.87 
0.12 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
2003 
138 
8 
165.61 
1 
1 
12644.41 
169.70 
179.08 
53.10 
119.10 
4759.42 
1 
1.69 
0.47 
1 
 
 
Table 9: Summary Statistics of the Sample of IOUs and COOPs in Regulated States 
 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Year 
N 
T 
Totdisp 
Nuclear 
Steam 
Totcosts 
Avgcost 
Totsales 
Netgener 
Purchuti 
Totcons 
Compete 
Saleshare 
Supplyshare 
Fegen 
Year 
Number of yearly observations 
Time periods 
Total disposition(/1,000,000) 
Nuclear generation 
Steam generation 
Total utility costs(/1,000,000) 
Average cost 
Total electricity sales(/1,000,000) 
Net generation(/1,000,000) 
Purchased power(/1,000,000) 
Total number of customers(/1,000) 
Deregulated (=1, 0 otherwise) 
Share of state electricity sales 
Share of state electricity supply 
Generation function (0 or 1)   
1998.96 
72.28 
3.95 
22.79 
0.12 
0.60 
916.82 
53.60 
17.95 
13.23 
5.32 
466.92 
0 
0.27 
0.17 
0.90 
2.25 
40.10 
2.25 
88.47 
0.21 
0.39 
1189.38 
22.90 
22.31 
17.47 
9.76 
684.64 
0 
0.31 
0.22 
0.30 
1996 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0.97 
0.06 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2003 
139 
8 
1804.70 
1 
1.01 
7468.03 
155.77 
182.19 
88.41 
159.05 
4889.12 
0 
2.17 
1.42 
1 
 
 
 Privately-owned utilities averaged eleven (11) times more total electricity sales than 
POUs, averaged nine (9) times more net generation, and averaged fourteen (14) times more total 
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number of consumers than POUs.   While twenty-five (25) percent of privately-owned utilities 
were in deregulated states, only thirteen (13) percent of POUs operated in deregulated states.  
Privately-owned utilities had substantially higher market shares in sales and generation 
(respectively 25% and 15% on average) more than POUs (respectively 2.5% and 1.8%).  Finally, 
more privately-owned utilities owned nuclear and steam power generation plants (respectively 
13% and 54%) than POUs (1.4% and 13%). 
 Thus, the size difference among privately and publicly owned electric utilities is an 
important element to consider during the empirical analysis.  COOPs regulated by the Rural 
Utilities Service are not included in this sample.  We were not able to collect the needed data for 
most of the study period as such data was collected. Only seven (7) COOPs which meet the 
FERC requirements to file FERC Form 1 were included in the sample of privately owned utilities.  
The CRSP provides information on the history of companies traded on the 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stock exchanges.  Our data retained only the IOUs whose stock return 
could be linked to its name history and to its utility subsidiaries.  Companies whose stocks were 
delisted during the study period from the stock exchanges were also not included in our sample. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
6.1. Data envelopment analysis (DEA) of cost efficiency 
 
6.1.a. DEA Model 
In order to assess the differences in cost efficiencies that are explained by firm 
ownership, we perform an input-oriented DEA analysis of IOUs and publicly-owned electric 
utilities. We chose an input-oriented DEA analysis because the data include electricity generation 
which is highly dependent on management decisions over which inputs to use first in the power 
generation process. Electric utilities have different sources of competing resources (steam, 
hydroelectric, nuclear, and others) such that the fixed input constraint needed to maximize output 
is not an issue.  
We apply the DEA input-oriented variable returns (“VRS”) to scale model under the 
assumption that many electric utilities are still vertically integrated and most of them enjoy 
economies of scale in power generation and distribution.  The model follows from Färe et al. 
(1985) and Coelli, Rao and Battese (1998). 
The envelopment form of a cost efficiency-oriented VRS model is specified as: 
Minimize θ,λ θ,       (12) 
 Subject to ,0Yyit  
,0Xxit  
0
1'1N
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where θ is the input technical efficiency measure with 0≤ θ≤1. A score of θ=1 means that the 
DMU is on the frontier.  
The cost-minimizing vector of input quantities for the i-th time period is obtained from: 
,0
,11
,0
,0
,,
'
*
*'*
N
Xx
Yytosubject
xwxMin
it
it
ititit
      (13) 
where wit is a vector of input prices for firm i at time t, and xit* is the cost-minimizing vector of 
input quantities given input prices wit and output levels yit for DMU i in period t. Given this cost 
minimization problem, the total cost efficiency (CE) or economic efficiency of DMU i is 
calculated as: CE =  wit'xit*/ wit'xit . 
The economic or cost efficiency (CE) is defined as the ratio of the minimum cost to 
observed cost.  Allocative efficiency is calculated as the ratio of CE over technical efficiency 
(TE): AE = CE / TE where TE is the θ obtained from the solution of the envelopment problem 
above.   
 
6.1.b. DEA Empirical Results 
The estimates of technical, allocative and cost efficiencies are obtained using DEAP 
Version 2.1. developed by Tim Coelli (1996) and are given in Table 10 below.  The cost 
efficiency DEA analysis uses total distribution sales and net power generation as the output 
variables and total assets, labor and the price of labor (wages) and capital as the inputs.  Although 
fuel costs vary across the country, data were not available for all the years in the study following 
a modification in the reporting form EIA-412 starting in 2001.    
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Table 10: Summary of efficiency scores for private and publicly-owned electric utilities,  
1996-2003. 
MEAN DEA COST EFFICIENCY RESULTS 
 
Technical 
Efficiency
(TE) 
Allocative 
Efficiency 
(AE) 
Cost 
Efficiency 
(CE) 
Sample 
Size 
N (%) 
Max TE 
N (%) 
Max AE 
N (%) 
Max CE N above Mean (%) 
        TE AE CE 
PRIVATE 
DMUs           
Generation 0.353 0.839 0.308 125 9 (7.2%) 10(8.0%) 7 (5.6%) 40.0 53.6 34.4 
Electric 
Utility 0.311 0.737 0.251 139 9 (6.5%) 7 (5.0%) 7 (5.0%) 36.0 54.7 30.9 
           
PUBLIC 
DMUs           
Generation 0.331 0.483 0.150 193 8 (4.1%) 5 (2.6%) 4 (2.1%) 39.9 40.9 28.0 
Electric 
Utility 0.273 0.691 0.182 305 8 (2.6%) 8 (2.6%) 4 (1.3%) 37.4 45.6 33.1 
           
The Kruskal-Wallis Test for DEA efficiency scores        
Ho: There is no difference in efficiency 
between private DMUs and public 
DMUs         
 P Value 0.5127         
 Critical Value    0.05- 0.10         
 Decision Accept         
 
 
The data used include total costs as a function of total utility assets, number of full-time 
and part-time employees, the price of capital and total wages paid by the electric utility.  The 
mean values of TE, AE and CE for private utilities are respectively 0.353, 0.839 and 0.308 using 
the generation cost specification and 0.311, 0.737 and 0.251 using the distribution cost 
specification.  These results suggest that the IOUs in the sample could increase efficiency levels 
by reducing the mean cost by 70 and 75 percent respectively.   
The mean values of TE, AE and CE for public utilities are respectively 0.331, 0.483 and 
0.15 using the generation cost specification and 0.273, 0.691 and 0.182 using distribution cost 
specification.  These results suggest that the publicly-owned utilities in the sample could increase 
efficiency levels by reducing the mean cost by 85 and 82 percent respectively.   
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The results show that only a small number of firms are cost efficient due to the existence 
of technical and allocative inefficiencies.  They also show that in general IOUs were more 
efficient than publicly owned electric utilities both in generation and as vertically integrated 
utilities.  
The Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to test for significant differences between the 
IOUs and the publicly-owned utilities.  The null hypothesis that the efficiency scores of the IOUs 
and publicly-owned utilities are not significantly different cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level 
of significance. 
Table 11 below presents a similar analysis performed comparing the efficiency of 
privately and publicly owned DMUs under a deregulated regime and over fully regulated DMUs.   
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Table 11: Mean DEA Cost Efficiency Comparison 
MEAN DEA COST EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS: DEREGULATED vs. 
REGULATED DMUs 
  
Technical 
Efficiency 
Allocative 
Efficiency 
Cost 
Efficiency 
Sample 
Size 
         
PRIVATE DMUs         
Generation Only        
Deregulated 0.328 0.851 0.289 61 
Regulated 0.378 0.828 0.326 64 
% Improved -13.2% 2.8% -11.3%   
          
Electric utility         
Deregulated 0.322 0.758 0.265 67 
Regulated 0.301 0.717 0.238 72 
% Improved 7.0% 5.7% 11.3%   
          
PUBLIC DMUs         
Generation Only        
Deregulated 0.337 0.458 0.15 76 
Regulated 0.327 0.5 0.151 117 
% Improved 3.1% -8.4% -0.7%   
         
Electric Utility        
Deregulated 0.232 0.678 0.148 100 
Regulated 0.292 0.697 0.199 205 
% Improved -20.5% -2.7% -25.6%   
          
The Kruskal-Wallis Test for DEA efficiency scores:  Ho: There is no difference in 
efficiency scores between privately and publicly owned generation plants.  
P-Value = 0.8273 
Decision: Accept Ho 
 
Ho: There is no difference in efficiency scores between privately and publicly 
owned vertically integrated electric utilities. 
P-Value = 0.2752 
Decision: Accept Ho. 
 
 
 The results in Table 11 show that, in general, private and public generation plant 
efficiency was worse in deregulated states than in regulated states, but that privately owned 
deregulated power generation plants had higher allocative and cost efficiency scores than publicly 
owned power generation plants.  Privately owned electric utilities (IOUs and COOPs) in 
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deregulated states achieved greater technical, allocative and cost efficiencies than publicly owned 
electric utilities, improving respectively by 7%, 5.7% and 11.3% over the study period from 1998 
to 2003.  Publicly owned electric utilities operating in deregulated states achieved technical, 
allocative and cost efficiencies lower than similar utilities in regulated states, respectively by 
20.5%, 2.7% and 25.6%
41
. 
 A Kruskal-Wallis test statistic was performed to test for significant differences in 
efficiencies between the deregulated IOUs and deregulated POUs, for both generation and 
vertically integrated utilities.  The test fails to give sufficient evidence against the null hypothesis 
for both generation and vertically integrated utilities; so we cannot conclude that there are 
differences in efficiency scores between privately owned generation plants and publicly owned 
generation plants and between vertically integrated IOUs and POUs.  
 
6.1. c. DEA Total Factor Productivity  
 Using DEAP 2.1, we calculated the Malmquist Total Factor Productivity (“TFP”) index 
to measure total productivity change and to decompose this productivity change into technical 
change and technical efficiency change. This analysis was developed by Färe and Grosskopf 
(1994).  Five indices were developed: technical efficiency change (relative to a CRS technology) 
(EFFCH); technological change (TECHCH); pure technical efficiency change (i.e., relative to a 
VRS technology) (PECH); scale efficiency change (SECH); and total factor productivity 
(TFPCH) change.  
 The decomposition of the Malmquist Index can be explained as follows.  The overall 
efficiency is the product of technical efficiency and input allocative efficiency.  Technical 
                     
41
 It is worth noting that many state public utilities commissions do not have regulatory oversight over 
publicly owned electric utilities, which are regulated by the municipal authority who answers directly to the 
ratepayers. However, an implicit assumption was made for this study that “unregulated electric utilities in 
regulated states tend to adjust their behavior to improve efficiency in order to keep their captive 
customers.” 
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efficiency can also be decomposed into the product of scale efficiency and pure technical 
efficiency.  Fukuyama et al. (1999) explains that scale inefficiency happens whenever a DMU is 
not operating at constant returns to scale, while pure technical inefficiency occurs from a lack of 
managerial oversight of the production process.   
The Malmquist TFP decomposition separates pure technological change from pure 
technical change and pure scale change.  The following equalities hold: 
TECHCHSECHPECHTECHCHEFFCHTFP
SECHPECHEFFCH
***
*
 
We performed an output-oriented Malmquist Index analysis; an index greater than one 
represents progress, and an index less than one represents regression.  Output-oriented TFP 
measurements were more appropriate because we assumed that electric utilities operate in 
competitive markets (Barros, p. 68). The TFP analysis uses total distribution sales and net power 
generation as the output variables and total assets, total salaries and wages and purchased power 
as inputs. When the TFP is greater than unity, total factor productivity increased in the period for 
the utility. 
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Table 12: Malmquist Efficiency Measures using Total Utility Sales Data 
 
Malmquist Efficiency Measures Geometric Means (Total Sales)   
Public 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Mean 
Variable N=382 N=382 N=382 N=382 N=382  N=382 N=382 N=382 
              
TFP 0.978 1.001 1.000 0.968 0.853 0.974 0.982 0.964 
EFFCH 0.995 1.044 0.900 1.024 1.447 0.977 1.016 1.047 
    PECH 1.002 1.046 0.921 1.033 1.388 0.979 0.994 1.043 
    SECH 0.993 0.998 0.978 0.991 1.042 0.998 1.023 1.003 
TECHCH 0.983 0.959 1.110 0.945 0.590 0.997 0.966 0.921 
          
                
Private 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Mean 
Variable N=143 N=143 N=143 N=143 N=143 N=143 N=143 N=143 
              
TFP 1.024 0.998 1.050 0.999 1.026 0.964 0.964 1.003 
EFFCH 1.029 1.292 0.817 1.029 1.215 0.943 0.759 0.996 
    PECH 0.990 0.939 1.106 0.982 0.869 0.811 0.779 0.995 
    SECH 1.039 1.376 0.736     1.048 1.398 1.162 0.975 0.919 
TECHCH 0.995 0.772 1.286 0.971 0.845 1.022 1.269 1.083 
T-Test for equality of mean TFP, equal variances: Pr. > |t| = 0.1180 
 
 Table 12 shows that the mean Malmquist score is 1.003 for IOUs and 0.964 for POUs; on 
average, the total productivity decreased by 2% for IOUs and decreased by 1.4% for POUs.  A t-
test statistic to test for equality of the means TFP of IOUs and POUs provides sufficient evidence 
against the null hypothesis, so we conclude that the mean TFP for IOUs is significantly different 
from the mean TFP for POUs.  However, detailed data show that the total productivity of IOUs 
and of POUs regressed over the period from 1997 to 2003 even though in some years (such as 
1998 and 1999 for the POUs and 1997, 1999 and 2001 for the IOUs) total factor productivity 
increased.  During the same time period, POUs improved their EFFCH by 5.2% from 0.995 to 
1.047 while IOUs lost 3.21 percent in EFFCH.  The main factors in the opposing productivity 
changes seem to be that municipal, federal and state utilities gained ground in pure technical 
efficiency change (by 4.1%), and scale efficiency change remained flat over the period for POUs 
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(only 1% improvement) but decreased by 8.0% for IOUs on average.  Table 13) below shows a 
similar analysis using power generation data.  
 
Table 13: Malmquist Efficiency Measures using Generation Data 
 
Malmquist Efficiency Measures Geometric Means (Generation)   
Public 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Mean 
Variable N=191 N=191 N=191 N=191 N=191 N=191 N=191 N=191 
              
TFP 0.932 1.120 1.034 0.946 0.825 0.949 0.931 0.959 
EFFCH 0.913 1.286 1.436 1.260 0.956 0.915 0.525 1.008 
    PECH 1.045 1.236 1.265 1.297 0.900 0.956 0.525 0.994 
    SECH 0.950 1.040 1.135 0.972 1.063 0.957 0.997 1.015 
TECHCH 0.939 0.871 0.720 0.751 0.863 1.037 1.773 0.951 
              
                
Private 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Mean 
Variable N=106 N=106 N=106 N=106 N=106 N=106 N=106 N=106 
              
TFP 1.022 1.008 0.999 0.950 0.937 0.968 0.957 0.977 
EFFCH 1.038 1.340 0.764 0.989 1.120 0.914 1.090 1.023 
    PECH 1.025 0.995 1.034 1.008 0.959 0.907 1.000 0.989 
    SECH 1.013 1.346 0.739 0.981 1.168 1.008 1.090 1.035 
TECHCH 0.985 0.752 1.307 0.960 0.836 1.059 0.878 0.955 
T-Test for equality of mean TFP, unequal variances: Pr. > |t| = 0.6992 
 
 
 This analysis of the Malmquist Index using total net generation as the output variable 
shows that for the POUs, all indices are on average equal to unity; on average, POUs realized a 
2.9% improvement in total factor productivity from 1997 to 2003.  Total factor productivity of 
IOUs decreased by 4.6% due to a combined reduction in technological change by 3.0% (from 
0.985 to 0.955) and in pure technical efficiency change by 3.6% (from 1.025 to 0.989). A t-test 
statistic to test for equality of the means TFP of IOUs and POUs provides sufficient evidence 
against the null hypothesis, so we conclude that the mean TFP for generation plants owned by 
IOUs is significantly different from the mean TFP for generation plants owned by POUs. Thus, 
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POUs achieved an improvement in TFP in generation statistically significant compared to IOUs 
whose TFP in generation regressed over the study period.  
 In summary, some of the results of the DEA Malmquist Index analysis indicate that 
publicly owned electric utilities outperformed IOUs, but others provide evidence that IOUs 
performed better than POUs. 
 The following graphs illustrate the fact that the large majority of electric utilities 
gravitated around a TFP of one, which means that during the period of study, most of the firms 
did not improve their total productivity in distribution and in generation. 
The TFP index for privately and publicly owned electric utilities when comparing total sales 
showed no discernable differences except that IOUs and cooperatives exhibited increasing 
technological change starting in 2001. 
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Figure 4: Malmquist TFP Index of Integrated POUs 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Malmquist TFP Index of Integrated IOUs/COOPs 
 
 
 
 For power generation plants, TFP did not improve in general, but most indices declined 
over time. The following figures show that the index of technological change increased 
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substantially for publicly owned generation plants. The indices were constant for IOUs and 
COOPs during the same period. 
Figure 6:Malmquist TFP Index of POUs – Generation Only 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Malmquist TFP Index of IOUs and COOPs – Generation Only 
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 It is worth noting the difference in productivity indices change between deregulated and 
regulated electric utilities. The following table indicates that TFP improved for deregulated 
privately owned electric utilities (3.0%) more than it did for publicly owned electric utilities 
(0.4%), but that generation TFP improved for municipal, state and federal electric utilities (1.3%) 
while it declined for IOUs and large cooperative electric utilities (-2.6%). Based on these results, 
we find slight evidence that deregulation improved TFP of privately owned electric utilities. 
 
Table 14: Mean DEA TFP analysis 
MEAN DEA TFP ANALYSIS: DEREGULATED vs. REGULATED DMUs 
  effch techch pech Sech tfpch Sample 
            
PRIVATE DMUs             
Generation           
Deregulated 1.006 0.955 0.957 1.051 0.961 41 
Regulated 1.034 0.954 1.01 1.024 0.987 65 
% Improved -2.7% 0.1% -5.2% 2.6% -2.6%   
t-test             
Electric utility             
Deregulated 1.01 1.009 0.92 1.098 1.019 68 
Regulated 0.983 1.006 0.919 1.07 0.989 75 
% Improved 2.7% 0.3% 0.1% 2.6% 3.0%   
              
PUBLIC DMUs             
Generation           
Deregulated 1.016 0.951 1.004 1.011 0.966 71 
Regulated 1.004 0.951 0.987 1.017 0.954 120 
% Improved 1.2% 0.0% 1.7% -0.6% 1.3%   
            
Electric Utility           
Deregulated 1.06 0.912 1.057 1.003 0.967 101 
Regulated 1.042 0.924 1.039 1.003 0.963 281 
% Improved 1.7% -1.3% 1.7% 0.0% 0.4%   
              
 
 
 A Kruskal-Wallis test statistic was performed to test for significant differences in 
Malmquist TFP index scores between the deregulated IOUs and deregulated POUs, for both 
generation and vertically integrated utilities.  The test fails to give sufficient evidence against the 
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null hypothesis for both generation and vertically integrated utilities; so we cannot conclude that 
there are differences in efficiency changes between deregulated privately owned generation plants 
and deregulated publicly owned generation plants and between vertically integrated IOUs and 
POUs.  
 
6.2. Stochastic frontier analysis 
 Coelli (1997, p.5) expressed his concerns that the two-stage estimation procedure used by 
other economists who estimated stochastic frontier functions and predicted firm-level efficiencies 
“is unlikely to provide estimates which are as efficient as those that could be obtained using a 
single-stage estimation procedure.”  Coelli proposed a stochastic frontier model in which the 
inefficiency effects (Ui) are an explicit function of a vector of firm-specific variables and a 
random error.  This model was proposed in Battese and Coelli (1995). 
 The technical inefficiency effects are defined by: Uit = zitδ + Wit where zit is a (1 x M) 
vector of explanatory variables associated with the technical inefficiency effects; δ is an (M x 1) 
vector of unknown parameters to be estimated; and Wit are unobservable random variables, 
defined by the truncation of the normal distribution with zero mean and variance ζ2 such that the 
point of truncation is - zitδ, i.e., Wit ≥ - zitδ. (See Battese and Coelli, 1995) 
 The electric industry is a complex system in which the functions of generation, 
transmission and distribution of power are entwined and are rarely distinctly separate. 
Historically, the majority of IOUs have been vertically integrated utilities generating their own 
power and transmitting and distributing their generation and purchased power to their ultimate 
final consumers.  The introduction of competition or deregulation in the electric industry sought 
to break the links among the three functions such that an independent provider, often called a 
power marketer, interacts with generators and consumers of power.   
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 In order to accurately model the production function of the electric industry, we start with 
a multiproduct cost function which embodies the complex relationships between ownership, 
efficiency and profitability of the firms in the sample. The cost function must reflect not only the 
differences in ownership, but also the differences in the products and the many inputs.   
 We use a quadratic cost function instead of a translog cost function because the quadratic 
function better handles the zero values of various variables included in the study.
42
 
 For each utility, total costs are the total of general operation and maintenance expenses 
(O&M), depreciation, and capital costs associated with the generation, transmission, distribution 
of electric power, and with the purchase of power that utilities need to offset the shortage of their 
output in order to meet the demand.  An interaction variable (DIST.GENER) is added to capture 
possible economies of vertical integration, and SALESHARE and SUPPLYSHARE are added to 
explain the inefficiencies and capture market shares and the competitive advantages associated 
with large electric utilities compared to small cooperative, municipal or state-owned utilities. The 
standard quadratic cost function is as follows: 
C(GEN, TRANSM, DISTR) = α0 + α11  DISTR + α12 DISTRSQ + α21 GENER + α22 
GENERSQ +   α3 DIST.GENER + α4 PURCHUTI + α5 NUCLEAR + α6 STEAM + α7 
CUSTOMERS + ε         (14) 
 
 The dependent variable is an average utility cost estimated as the total costs as defined 
above divided by the total power disposition.
43
  Estimated average cost is the appropriate variable 
because electric utilities are expected to be in long run competitive equilibrium which requires the 
equality of price, marginal and average cost of production in order to assure equilibrium for the 
individual firm and the industry.  
                     
42
 John E. Kwoka, Jr., “The comparative advantage of public ownership: evidence from United States 
electric utilities,” Canadian Journal of Economics, May 2005 (627).  
43
 Total disposition of power is the sum of sales to ultimate consumers, sales for resale, energy furnished 
without charge, energy used by the company, and total energy losses. 
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 We include time-invariant variables to capture the impact of competition (COMPETE) 
and generation costs (FEGEN).  Other cost variables include the interaction variables CAP.DIST, 
CAP.GEN and FUEL.GEN.   
 We expect both distribution and generation outputs to have positive signs, but the sign of 
the interaction DIST.GENER is ambiguous at best.  Positive signs on the output variables and 
their square terms (DIST, GENER, DISTRSQ, and GENERSQ) reflect the convexity of the cost 
function with respect to each output.   
 If joint power production and distribution bring about economies of scale, that will 
translate into lower costs and a negative sign.  We expect positive signs for the factor cost 
variables and the total number of customers. The variable NUCLEAR is expected to have a 
positive sign and the variable STEAM a negative sign to illustrate the least cost option of steam 
generation.  As explained above, the inefficiency effects (Uit) are an explicit function of a vector 
of firm-specific variables which include the time-invariant variables COMPETE, SALESHARE, 
SUPPLYSHARE, FEGEN and a random error. 
The model we use was developed by Battese and Coelli (1995) and designed for stochastic 
production frontier analysis.  The production function was expressed as: 
)( itititit UVxY   where i=1,..,N and t=1,,,,T   (15) 
where  Yit, Xit and β are respectively the production of firm i in period t, a kx1 vector of input 
quantities of firm i in period t, and a vector of unknown parameters; Vit are random errors which 
are assumed to be iid N(0,ζv
2
), and independent of the Uit.   Uit are non-negative random errors 
assumed to account for the cost inefficiency in production and iid│N(0,ζu
2)│. Uit=(Uiexp(-η(t-
T))) where η is a parameter to be estimated. 
 Following Coelli (1997), the model is modified for the analysis of a cost of production 
function by altering the error term specification from (Vit – Uit) to (Vit + Uit).   Uit define how far 
a DMU operates above the cost frontier, and, given that the model imposes allocative efficiency, 
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Uit is closely related to the cost of technical inefficiency. While in the estimation of a frontier 
production function the measures of technical efficiency take values between zero and one, they 
take a value between one and infinity in the case of a cost function.  The results of the stochastic 
frontier analysis are given in Tables 15 and 16.  Table 15 illustrates the results of a stochastic 
frontier analysis of the IOUs‟ average cost function, and Table 16 shows the results for the POUs.  
Both tables show the basic Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 with the same output and input 
variables and the same explanatory variables of Uit. 
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Table 15: Maximum-likelihood estimates of the stochastic cost frontier with inefficiency effects 
(IOUs and COOPs) 
Independent variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
CONSTANT 
 
DISTR 
 
DISTRSQ 
 
GENER 
 
GENERSQ 
 
DISTR.GENER 
 
PURCHUTI 
 
CONSUMERS 
 
NUCLEAR 
 
STEAM 
 
CAP.DISTR 
 
CAP.GENER 
 
FUEL.GENER 
 
Constant 
 
Year 
 
COMPETE 
 
SALESHARE 
 
SUPPLYSHARE 
 
FEGEN 
 
Variance Parameters 
σs
2 
 
γ 
 
Log Likelihood 
32.156 
(24.54) 
0.447 
(3.72) 
-0.004 
(-3.92) 
-0.643 
(-3.55) 
-0.0024 
(-0.59) 
0.0096 
(2.22) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.486 
(0.09) 
1.53 
(1.74) 
19.04 
(3.97) 
46.42 
(4.96) 
-214.39 
(-7.57) 
-11.56 
(-3.14) 
 
1220.35 
(268.17) 
0.896 
(136.53) 
-4969.35 
33.71 
(16.87) 
0.579 
(3.47) 
0.001 
(0.67) 
-1.018 
(-4.83) 
0.001 
0.27 
-0.001 
(-0.12) 
-0.90 
(-7.95) 
0.02 
(11.85) 
11.49 
(4.50) 
-1.51 
(-0.82) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.32 
(0.69) 
2.21 
(2.62) 
7.01 
(1.78) 
40.99 
(12.06) 
-189.19 
(-13.49) 
-11.89 
(-2.95) 
 
904.97 
(214.42) 
0.88 
(64.88) 
-4859.08 
 
36.23 
(18.50) 
0.75 
(4.52) 
0.002 
(1.79) 
-1.64 
(-7.15) 
0.006 
(1.49) 
-0.007 
(-1.51) 
-0.92 
(-8.50) 
0.002 
(0.51) 
8.20 
(3.26) 
-1.89 
(-0.99) 
0.066 
(3.56) 
0.024 
(2.43) 
0.019 
(4.20) 
8.96 
(1.53) 
1.02 
(1.22) 
6.63 
(1.63) 
45.23 
(6.98) 
-179.56 
(-6.64) 
-17.09 
(-3.98) 
 
850.20 
(105.73) 
0.87 
(47.31) 
-4851.23 
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Table 16: Maximum-likelihood estimates of the stochastic cost frontier with inefficiency effects 
(POUs) 
Independent variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
CONSTANT 
 
DISTR 
 
DISTRSQ 
 
GENER 
 
GENERSQ 
 
DISTR.GENER 
 
PURCHUTI 
 
CONSUMERS 
 
NUCLEAR 
 
STEAM 
 
CAP.DISTR 
 
CAP.GENER 
 
FUEL.GENER 
 
Constant 
 
Year 
 
COMPETE 
 
SALESHARE 
 
SUPPLYSHARE 
 
FEGEN 
 
Variance Parameters 
σs
2 
 
γ 
 
Log Likelihood  
-798.29 
(-1236.66) 
-1.051 
(-1.83) 
0.29 
(2.82) 
-0.60 
(-0.67) 
0.07 
(3.78) 
-0.32 
(-2.54) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.025 
(-0.025) 
-0.12 
(-0.13) 
-0.003 
(-0.003) 
-0.002 
(-0.002) 
-0.002 
(-0.002) 
-0.013 
(-0.013) 
 
1396164.6 
(1396164.6) 
1.0 
(9788013.6) 
-26825.48 
 
-795.15 
(-578.88) 
-1.88 
(-1.73) 
-0.021 
(-0.033) 
-0.194 
(-0.19) 
0.031 
0.28 
0.029 
(0.04) 
-1.70 
(-1.58) 
0.603 
(2.23) 
4.73 
(4.72) 
-15.46 
(-15.24) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.06 
(-0.06) 
-0.28 
(-0.20) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
-0.005 
(-0.005) 
-0.004 
(-0.004) 
-0.036 
(-0.035) 
 
1396069.1 
(1396069.0) 
1.0 
(3393.1) 
-26792.27 
 
26.80 
(43.19) 
-6.41 
(-9.37) 
0.060 
(3.18) 
-3.56 
(-9.91) 
0.05 
(10.14) 
-0.016 
(-0.77) 
-1.57 
(-3.08) 
0.201 
(4.99) 
16.95 
(16.35) 
-0.386 
(-0.316) 
-0.025 
(-0.123) 
-0.324 
(-9.92) 
0.078 
(5.23) 
-51.5 
(-42.66) 
-1209.81 
(-1617.79) 
-4.40 
(-4.39) 
-2.42 
(-2.42) 
-1.83 
(-1.83) 
-23.83 
(-23.04) 
 
1395952.7 
(1395952.4) 
1.0 
386012.59 
-20815.16 
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  For both the IOUs and POUs, Model 3 in Table 15 and Table 16 is the preferred model.  
The results for both IOUs and POUs indicate that more power generation (GENER) is associated 
with lower total costs, which is consistent with economies of scale in generation enjoyed by 
electric utilities. The coefficient for the square term GENSQ in both regressions is positive, but 
small and only significant for POUs.  This means that the average cost function is convex with 
respect to generation, implying that the cost function exhibits product-specific diseconomies of 
scale for POUs.  The coefficient for DISTRSQ in both regressions is also positive and significant, 
implying diseconomies of scale for IOUs, COOPs and POUs, with the POUs experiencing higher 
diseconomies of scale than privately owned electric utilities. Total sales variable (DISTR) is 
negative and significant for POUs, but positive and significant for IOUs, implying that POUs 
experience economies of size in total sales while privately owned electric utilities become less 
cost efficient with higher total sales. The results also indicate that NUCLEAR is associated with 
higher costs while STEAM generation is the least cost option for all electric utilities.  Not 
surprisingly, purchased power (PURCHUTI) lowers total costs of electric utilities.  The total 
number of consumers has mixed results; POUs reduce their total costs when they serve a larger 
customer base while IOUs and COOPs do not.  The coefficient on DISTGEN is negative, but not 
significant in both regressions. 
 The explanatory variables of the inefficiency effects have the opposite signs for privately 
and publicly owned electric utilities, except for SUPPLYSHARE and FEGEN; generation and 
higher market share in generation are related to higher efficiency.  Deregulation (COMPETE), 
higher market shares in distribution sales, and the time trend (year) are negatively related to the 
inefficiency effects for publicly owned electric firms.  For POUs, a negative coefficient of the 
variable COMPETE supports the hypothesis that deregulation improves efficiency of POUs.  
Further, these results show that POUs are more efficient in distribution and generation, and that 
cost efficiency improves over time. For IOUs and COOPs, the results show that COMPETE, 
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SALESHARE and YEAR are positively related to the costs of technical inefficiencies, implying 
that these firms became less cost efficient with deregulation and are less efficient in distribution 
and over time.  IOUs and COOPs were found to be more cost efficient in power generation and 
with increased share in the generation relative to their state‟s electricity supply. 
 An analysis of the efficiency scores from the SFA shows that in general, the IOUs and 
COOPs are less cost efficient than POUs.  The results also show that deregulated IOUs and 
COOPs are less cost efficient than their regulated peers.  However, the SFA efficiency scores 
show that there are no efficiency gains or losses from deregulation for POUs.  Detailed analysis 
of the SFA cost efficiencies are presented below. 
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Figure 8: Stochastic Frontier Cost Efficiencies of IOUs and COOPs: 
1996 –2003 
 
 
 
 Figure 8 shows that COOPs were more cost efficient than IOUs and that their cost 
efficiency scores increased from 1996 to 1999 and from 2000 to 2003.  At the same time, the cost 
efficiency scores of IOUs increased at a slower pace during the study period. 
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Figure 9:  Stochastic Frontier Cost Efficiencies of POUs: 1996 – 2003 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 9 above shows that municipal utilities were more cost efficient than state owned 
electric utilities and that federally-owned electric utilities were the least cost efficient among 
POUs.  While the cost efficiency scores of the MUNIs and state or subdivision-owned electric 
utilities increased over the study period, the cost efficiency scores of federally-owned electric 
utilities remained almost constant. 
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Figure 10: Differences in Stochastic Frontier Cost Efficiencies Between IOUs/COOPs  
and POUs: 1996 - 2003. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3.  Results of the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce Decomposition 
  
 
6.3. a.  Regression Analysis  
 
 The results of the estimated average cost functions of IOUs and POUs for 1998, 2003 and 
the period from 1998 to 2003 are presented in Tables 17, 18 and 19.  The dependent variable is 
the utility‟s average cost.  The signs on most coefficients are as expected; however, some of the 
coefficients have unexpected signs but are not statistically significant.  In all regressions, the 
coefficients on power generation (GENER) are negative and significant, whether firms operate in 
deregulated or regulated states. Although not always significant, the coefficient on FEGEN is 
negative except for private and municipal regulated electric utilities as well as state and federal 
electric utilities. This means that owning a generation plant and more power generation are 
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associated with lower average costs. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we found that, in general, 
large scale power generation plants are more cost efficient than large scale IOUs and state-owned 
or federally-owned electricity firms.   
 The results are mixed for purchased power to supplement power generation; the 
coefficient is negative and significant for IOUs and COOPs which means that purchasing 
supplemental power lowers average costs. The coefficient is positive and significant for POUs in 
2003 and POUs in deregulated states from 1998 to 2003.  This implies that POUs purchasing 
supplemental power are high cost utilities.  The coefficient on number of consumers is generally 
positive and significant implying that average cost increases when the utilities add new 
consumers.  The expectation that nuclear power generation is more expensive than steam power 
generation is supported in our data, except for IOUs in non-competitive states and some state and 
federally-owned power generation plants.  The coefficient on steam power is positive and 
significant for deregulated IOUs and COOPs and all POUs (regulated or deregulated), which 
implies that these utilities do not consider steam power as a least cost option to nuclear power 
generation.  With few exceptions, the coefficient on market share in distribution
44
 is associated 
with increasing costs while the coefficient on market share in generation and power supply is 
associated with decreasing costs.  As expected, the interaction between fuel costs and generation 
(FUEL.GENER) increase the average cost of electric utilities with generation power plants.  The 
coefficients on the year variables are generally not significant.  It is worth noting that the 
coefficient on year 2001 is generally positive and often significant, implying that electric utilities 
increased their costs during that year.
45
   
 
                     
44
 SALESHARE is a proxy for market power in distribution, and SUPPLYSHARE is a proxy for market 
power in generation and supply of power. 
45
 The year 2001 is coincidentally the year during which terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New 
York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC occurred.  
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Table 17: Comparative Results of Regression Analysis: 1998 and 2003 
 
Independent 
variable 
Private  1998 
N = 139 
Private 2003 
N = 139 
Public 1998 
N = 430 
Public 2003 
 N=430 
CONSTANT 
 
DISTR 
 
DISTRSQ 
 
GENER 
 
GENERSQ 
 
DISTR.GENER 
 
PURCHUTI 
 
CONSUMERS 
 
NUCLEAR 
 
STEAM 
 
SALESHARE 
 
SUPPLYSHARE 
 
FEGEN 
 
CAP.DISTR 
 
CAP.GENER 
 
FUEL.GENER 
 
 
R-squared 
 
Adj R-squared 
62.97 
(12.68) 
0.48 
(0.47) 
0.011 
(0.39) 
-2.83 
(-2.51) 
0.018 
(0.42) 
-0.021 
(-0.30) 
-1.54 
(-2.40) 
0.017 
(1.36) 
22.03 
(2.36) 
-7.82 
(-1.33) 
23.57 
(1.92) 
-14.18 
(-0.67) 
-3.47 
(-0.54) 
0.03 
(0.51) 
0.02 
(0.60) 
0.05 
(1.84) 
 
0.41 
 
0.33 
76.20 
(14.45) 
2.45 
(1.87) 
-0.011 
(-1.24) 
-4.03 
(-2.71) 
-0.01 
(-0.36) 
0.022 
(0.85) 
-3.51 
(-2.90) 
-0.02 
(-1.28) 
7.47 
(0.77) 
-7.79 
(-1.15) 
19.42 
(1.58) 
-6.66 
(-0.35) 
-10.65 
(-1.56) 
0.26 
(3.12) 
-0.03 
(-0.76) 
0.03 
(2.55) 
 
0.46 
 
0.39 
 
56.54 
(47.11) 
1.84 
(0.44) 
0.10 
(0.71) 
-5.48 
(-1.21) 
-0.24 
(-1.47) 
0.17 
(0.59) 
-4.16 
(-1.02) 
0.08 
(1.50) 
23.78 
(3.72) 
4.08 
(1.57) 
-125.41 
(-2.34) 
164.76 
(2.35) 
-2.77 
(-1.36) 
-0.19 
(-0.70) 
0.04 
(0.59) 
0.05 
(0.74) 
 
0.14 
 
0.11 
 
68.09 
(47.64) 
-5.97 
(-2.40) 
0.04 
(0.34) 
-2.76 
(-3.48) 
0.03 
(2.25) 
-0.09 
(-0.95) 
2.66 
(2.60) 
0.07 
(1.08) 
25.43 
(3.17) 
6.49 
(2.01) 
1.95 
(0.03) 
-12.64 
(-0.73) 
-1.41 
(-0.56) 
0.23 
(0.76) 
0.02 
(0.21) 
0.19 
(3.13) 
 
0.13 
 
0.10 
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Table 18: Regression analysis of competitive electric utilities: 1998 to 2003 
Independent 
variable 
Private  N=275 Public N=456 Municipal  
N=418 
State & Federal 
N=38 
CONSTANT 
 
DISTR 
 
DISTRSQ 
 
GENER 
 
GENERSQ 
 
DISTR.GENER 
 
PURCHUTI 
 
CONSUMERS 
 
NUCLEAR 
 
STEAM 
 
SALESHARE 
 
SUPPLYSHARE 
 
FEGEN 
 
CAP.DISTR 
 
CAP.GENER 
 
FUEL.GENER 
 
YEAR99 
 
YEAR00 
 
YEAR01 
 
YEAR02 
 
YEAR03 
 
 
R-squared 
Adj R-squared 
78.23 
(13.98) 
0.35 
(1.00) 
0.0014 
(0.53) 
-5.05 
(-6.06) 
0.036 
(2.51) 
0.0113 
(0.96) 
-1.28 
(-6.19) 
0.013 
(1.62) 
26.69 
(5.33) 
8.23 
(1.70) 
11.78 
(1.56) 
-20.58 
(-0.67) 
-16.65 
(-4.15) 
0.09 
(2.48) 
-0.021 
(-0.77) 
0.11 
(5.26) 
-4.91 
(-0.77) 
-0.67 
(-0.11) 
2.15 
(0.37) 
-4.22 
(-0.74) 
-0.47 
(-0.08) 
 
0.59 
0.56 
76.52 
(16.23) 
-5.10 
(-2.76) 
-0.075 
(-0.89) 
-3.93 
(-1.32) 
-0.54 
(-0.32) 
0.32 
(1.86) 
3.30 
(3.01) 
0.02 
(0.27) 
23.06 
(3.22) 
13.05 
(3.56) 
174.48 
(1.19) 
-471.60 
(-1.39) 
-4.85 
(-1.60) 
0.16 
(0.54) 
0.053 
(0.40) 
0.12 
(2.13) 
-1.27 
(-0.22) 
-6.06 
(-0.16) 
8.28 
(1.61) 
-0.80 
(-0.16) 
0.21 
(0.04) 
 
0.17 
0.13 
 
79.21 
(15.90) 
-9.14 
(-2.39) 
0.41 
(2.08) 
-0.17 
(-0.02) 
1.10 
(3.50) 
-1.80 
(-3.34) 
-3.85 
(-1.57) 
0.17 
(1.53) 
17.01 
(2.37) 
13.01 
(3.40) 
4.54 
(0.03) 
-2660.81 
(-3.15) 
-3.43 
(-1.12) 
1.02 
(2.39) 
0.24 
(1.02) 
0.12 
(1.62) 
-0.85 
(-0.14) 
-6.35 
(-1.18) 
6.33 
(1.20) 
-2.81 
(-0.56) 
-1.88 
(-0.36) 
 
0.22 
0.18 
32.89 
(2.22) 
10.71 
(0.64) 
-0.34 
(-0.35) 
-4.80 
(-0.47) 
0.91 
(1.39) 
-0.19 
(-0.13) 
0.06 
(0.01) 
-0.19 
(-1.19) 
-71.47 
(-0.10) 
3.55 
(0.24) 
1141.35 
(1.15) 
-3096.64 
(-1.17) 
4.21 
(0.30) 
1.13 
(0.96) 
-0.29 
(-0.27) 
0.22 
(1.29) 
2.02 
(0.16) 
2.31 
(0.18) 
37.44 
(2.45) 
17.44 
(1.10) 
19.88 
(1.19) 
 
0.80 
0.57 
Table 19: Regression analysis of non-competitive electric utilities: 1998 to 2003 
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Independent 
variable 
Private  N=559 Public N=2124 Municipal  
N=1855 
State & Federal 
N=269 
CONSTANT 
 
DISTR 
 
DISTRSQ 
 
GENER 
 
GENERSQ 
 
DISTR.GENER 
 
PURCHUTI 
 
CONSUMERS 
 
NUCLEAR 
 
STEAM 
 
SALESHARE 
 
SUPPLYSHARE 
 
FEGEN 
 
CAP.DISTR 
 
CAP.GENER 
 
FUEL.GENER 
 
YEAR99 
 
YEAR00 
 
YEAR01 
 
YEAR02 
 
YEAR03 
 
 
R-squared 
Adj R-squared 
53.64 
(16.85) 
0.72 
(2.22) 
0.004 
(2.35) 
-2.23 
(-4.96) 
0.01 
(1.00) 
-0.011 
(-1.28) 
-1.50 
(-5.91) 
0.0013 
(0.18) 
-16.24 
(-3.10) 
-21.80 
(-7.09) 
18.60 
(3.14) 
-9.80 
(-1.25) 
15.44 
(4.40) 
0.09 
(2.31) 
0.05 
(2.82) 
0.03 
(3.71) 
1.45 
(0.56) 
2.80 
(1.04) 
6.89 
(2.36) 
1.24 
(0.42) 
3.56 
(1.19) 
 
0.30 
0.28 
52.53 
(64.17) 
-0.19 
(-0.72) 
0.014 
(1.12) 
-1.24 
(-5.47) 
0.013 
(4.45) 
-0.015 
(-0.99) 
-0.82 
(-2.20) 
0.06 
(2.52) 
15.02 
(4.66) 
2.52 
(2.16) 
1.27 
(0.23) 
-5.39 
(-1.03) 
-1.05 
(-1.16) 
-0.04 
(-0.37) 
-0.053 
(-3.25) 
0.03 
(1.51) 
0.63 
(0.59) 
1.70 
(1.55) 
10.02 
(9.05) 
9.98 
(8.79) 
14.38 
(12.83) 
 
0.20 
0.195 
 
53.06 
(62.54) 
-4.63 
(-2.98) 
-0.11 
(-1.70) 
-17.25 
(-10.44) 
-1.42 
(-6.56) 
1.26 
(5.54) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.28 
(8.82) 
8.43 
(2.76) 
-0.53 
(-0.44) 
-193.91 
(-4.01) 
253.07 
(3.29) 
1.30 
(1.37) 
0.08 
(0.68) 
0.79 
(10.00) 
0.32 
(8.21) 
0.69 
(0.67) 
1.37 
(1.29) 
8.60 
(7.98) 
8.45 
(7.63) 
11.80 
(10.72) 
 
0.26 
0.25 
44.08 
(17.40) 
0.60 
(1.80) 
0.02 
(1.34) 
-1.24 
(-3.46) 
0.013 
(3.45) 
-0.025 
(-1.50) 
0.024 
(0.03) 
0.045 
(0.92) 
14.13 
(0.60) 
7.65 
(2.02) 
1.71 
(0.29) 
-6.91 
(-1.06) 
-9.99 
(-4.43) 
-0.065 
(-0.29) 
-0.03 
(-1.67) 
0.03 
(1.06) 
0.25 
(0.08) 
1.78 
(0.56) 
15.44 
(4.68) 
19.65 
(5.83) 
24.22 
(7.33) 
 
0.44 
0.40 
 
118  
6.3.b. The Juhn-Murphy-Pierce Decomposition of Average Cost 
 Applying the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition, we estimate the proportion of the 
change in average costs over time due to changes in observable quantities, observable prices and 
changes in the distribution of unobservables (i.e., changes in unmeasured prices and quantities).  
The reference year is 1998, the year during which the first state, California, officially deregulated 
its electricity sector.  In order to analyze the impact of deregulation on electric utilities, the 
reference average cost was set as the average cost of deregulated privately or publically owned 
electric companies. 
 Table 20 shows the observable and unobservable components of changes in average costs 
by IOUs and POUs in 2003 compared to 1996 and 1998.  In general, average costs increased 
from 1996 and 1998 to 2003.  Changes in observable prices over time accounted for most of the 
changes in average cost difference in Panels A, C and D for utilities in the 25th, 50th, 75th and 
90th percentiles.  Changes in observable quantities and unobservable quantities and prices explain 
most of the changes in average cost differences in the percentile differentials (below and above 
the mean).  For example, changes in unobservable quantities and prices account for 85% (i.e. -
6.01/-7.03) of the total change in the percentile differentials in cost in Panel D while changes in 
observable quantities account for over 100 percent of the total change in the percentile 
differentials in cost in Panels A (i.e. -8.77/-6.13 or143%), B (i.e. -8.84/-6.57 or 134%) and C (i.e. 
-272.58/-7.58 or 3595%).  A change in quantities over time greater than 100% means that the 
change in quantities exceeds the change in average cost differences. Changes with opposite signs 
occurred over time for changes in prices and changes in unobservable quantities and prices which 
offset the changes in quantities.   
 Table 21 illustrates the change in observable quantities (total sales, net generation and the 
interaction between total sales and net generation) for IOUs and POUs in 2003 compared to 1996 
and 1998.   The changes in observable quantities over time (in Table 21) explain partially the total 
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change in observable quantities in Table 20.  For example, the sum of all the quantity effect of 
changes in average cost differences in Panel A equals -9.02 which more than explains the change 
in observable quantities in Table 20, Panel A of -8.77.  This means that other changes in 
observable quantities occurred which account for the difference of -0.25.  For all the percentiles 
in the table, except for net generation in Panel B, at the mean, the quantity effects in Panels A, B 
and D are similar in 1996, 1998 and 2003.  For example, Panel D shows that on average, the 
changes in total sales and net generation were small (totaling 0.74) in 2003 compared to 1998 and 
do not fully explain the change in total observable quantities of -1.52.   This finding substantiates 
the result explained above that change in observable input prices accounted for most of the 
changes in average costs across the electric industry.   
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Table 20: Observable and Unobservable Components of Changes in Average Costs of Electric 
Utilities: 1996 and 1998 Compared to 2003 
Differential Total Change Observable 
Quantities 
Observable 
Prices 
Unobservable 
Quantities and Prices  
Panel A: 1996 and 2003 (Private electric companies) 
25 -4.3 2.3 -8.59 1.99 
50 -8.64 -1.69 -8.04 1.09 
75 -10.73 -2.69 -8.58 0.54 
90 -12.76 -6.5 -6.54 0.28 
Average -9.11 -2.15 -7.94 0.98 
90-10 -9.04 -15.05 8 -2 
90-50 -4.12 -4.8 1.5 -0.81 
50-10 -4.92 -10.25 6.5 -1.18 
75-25 -6.43 -4.99 0.011 -1.44 
Average -6.13 -8.77 4.00 -1.36 
Panel B: 1998 and 2003 (Private electric companies) 
25 -1.606 2.1 -5.32 1.62 
50 -7.72 -5.29 -3.85 1.42 
75 -9.12 -7.57 -1.11 -0.44 
90 -10.54 -9.21 -1.87 0.54 
Average -7.25 -4.99 -3.04 0.79 
90-10 -9.39 -12.84 4.09 -0.64 
90-50 -2.82 -3.92 1.99 -0.88 
50-10 -6.57 -8.91 2.1 0.24 
75-25 -7.51 -9.67 4.21 -2.05 
Average -6.57 -8.84 3.10 -0.83 
Panel C: 1996 and 2003 (Public electric companies) 
25 -11.77 30.28 148.26 -190.31 
50 -12.84 -32.35 171.72 -152.21 
75 -20.35 -163.09 172.31 -29.58 
90 -19.61 -289.67 257.56 12.51 
Average -16.14 -113.71 187.46 -89.90 
90-10 -10.88 -448.48 219.36 218.24 
90-50 -6.76 -257.32 85.85 164.72 
50-10 -4.11 -191.16 133.52 53.53 
75-25 -8.58 -193.36 24.05 160.73 
Average -7.58 -272.58 115.70 149.31 
Panel D: 1998 and 2003 (Public electric companies) 
25 -12.43 0.56 -15.68 2.7 
50 -12.13 0.06 -14.29 2.11 
75 -20.26 -0.19 -15.23 -4.84 
90 -19.69 -0.21 -15.64 -3.84 
Average -16.13 0.06 -15.21 -0.97 
90-10 -10.14 -2.67 0.78 -8.25 
90-50 -7.56 -0.27 -1.35 -5.94 
50-10 -2.58 -2.4 2.13 -2.3 
75-25 -7.83 -0.75 0.46 -7.54 
Average -7.03 -1.52 0.51 -6.01 
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Table 21: Quantity Effect of Changes in Average Costs of Electric Utilities: 1996 and 1998 
Compared to 2003 
 
Differential Total Sales Net Generation Distr.Gen 
Panel A: 1996 and 2003 (Private electric companies) 
25 11.12 4.92 -5.03 
50 6 1.17 -3.56 
75 -0.61 1.14 -1.47 
90 -1.26 -0.37 0.34 
Average 3.81 1.72 -2.43 
90-10 -44.06 -29.93 62.04 
90-50 -7.26 -1.54 3.89 
50-10 -36.8 -28.38 58.14 
75-25 -11.72 -3.78 3.56 
Average -24.96 -15.91 31.91 
Panel B: 1998 and 2003 (Private electric companies) 
25 -0.5 0.36 -0.94 
50 -1.7 -4.02 -1.14 
75 -0.93 -2.61 -1.97 
90 6.66 -16.61 6.96 
Average 0.88 -5.72 0.73 
90-10 8.25 -20.56 5.72 
90-50 8.36 -12.59 8.09 
50-10 -0.11 -7.96 -2.37 
75-25 -0.43 -2.97 -1.03 
Average 4.02 -11.02 2.60 
Panel C: 1996 and 2003 (Public electric companies) 
25 6.8 -6.64 -0.45 
50 -8.84 -10.28 -1.52 
75 1.26 0.75 -4.13 
90 -9.54 -21.8 7.47 
Average -2.58 -9.49 0.34 
90-10 -33.13 -5.12 6.8 
90-50 -0.71 -11.53 8.99 
50-10 -32.42 6.4 -2.2 
75-25 -5.54 7.39 -3.68 
Average -17.95 -0.72 2.48 
Panel D: 1998 and 2003 (Public electric companies) 
25 -0.04 0.24 -0.08 
50 0.17 -0.59 0.16 
75 0.52 -0.41 0.11 
90 0.84 -0.18 0.72 
Average 0.37 -0.24 0.23 
90-10 0.63 0.37 0.42 
90-50 0.67 0.41 0.56 
50-10 -0.03 -0.04 -0.14 
75-25 0.56 -0.66 0.18 
Average 0.46 0.02 0.26 
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Panels A and B of Table 22 below show that for the period from 1998 to 2003, average 
costs in IOUs, COOPs and POUs operating in deregulated states increased more than their 
counterparts in regulated states.  This is true for all the firms in all percentiles and percentile 
differentials.  Panel C illustrates that average costs for municipal electric utilities in deregulated 
states increased more than average costs for deregulated IOUs and COOPs in those states in all 
the percentiles considered.  However, the same data show that average cost differences favored 
MUNIs over IOUs and COOPs when we consider the average cost differences between percentile 
differentials.  Panel D demonstrates that average costs increased more for IOUs and COOPs in 
deregulated states than federal, state, and subdivision owned electric utilities, except for only the 
twenty-fifth percentile and for the ninetieth-fiftieth percentile differential. 
 For all the panels in Table 22, changes in observable prices explain most of the changes 
in average costs of deregulated electric utilities, positively contributing to the total change in 
average cost for the four considered percentiles of 47% (or 7.82/16.50) in deregulated private 
utilities (Panel A), 87% (or 18.75/21.60) in deregulated public utilities (Panel B), 96% (or -9.99/-
10.43) in MUNIs in competitive states (Panel C), and reducing substantially total change in cost 
by -1468% (or -16.37/1.12).  This means that changes in average costs of MUNIs in deregulated 
states were greater than changes in average costs of IOUs and COOPs due primarily to change in 
observable prices (higher prices for deregulated MUNIs) combined with greater changes in 
observable quantities in favor of deregulated IOUs and COOPs (i.e. 13.92/1.12 or 1248% change 
in observable quantities).  For the 25
th
, 50
th
, 75
th
, and 90
th
 percentiles, unobservable quantities and 
prices account for a significant portion of the total change in average cost (9% in Panel A, 11% in 
Panel B, and 320% in Panel D); in Panel C the contribution of unobservable prices and quantities 
is negative and small.  However, even for this period, unobservable quantities and prices remain 
important factors in explaining the percentile cost differentials, accounting for 91% in Panel B, 
71% in Panel D, 21% in Panel A and -34% in Panel C.  
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 Table 23 illustrating the quantity effect of changes in average costs of electric utilities 
over time by ownership shows that the quantity effects of deregulation are minimal for POUs 
(Panel B) and significant for IOUs and COOPs (Panel A).   
 The results in Panel C, Table 22 support the hypothesis that electricity deregulation 
decreases average cost of privately owned electric utilities compared to POUs. This is not 
surprising given that deregulation often affects privately-owned electric utilities under the 
jurisdiction of a state regulatory commission.
46
 Thus, deregulation will only impact non-regulated 
electric utilities if electric competition brings in new competitors offering services which are 
good substitutes for the services offered by these utilities and utilities become more competitive 
and cost efficient.  Compared to MUNIs which have higher changes in average costs than IOUs 
and COOPs (see Panel C, Table 22 above) net generation contributed to decreasing average cost 
while total sales contributed to increasing average costs, with the net effect being a better cost 
efficiency for deregulated private firms. 
 In conclusion, the results of the average cost decomposition analysis show that, on 
average: 
(1) Electric companies operating in states with electricity deregulation are characterized by 
greater increases in average costs than their counterpart in regulated states, regardless of 
the type of ownership;  
(2) Changes in observable prices and unobservable quantities and prices account for most of 
the changes in the differences in average cost at all the percentiles and in the percentile 
differentials (below and above the mean);  
(3) Changes over time in observable quantities reduce (offset) the magnitude of the changes 
in the difference in average costs between firms in deregulated states and firms in 
regulated states; and  
                     
46
 Almost a quarter of all states regulate MUNIs and COOPs.   
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(4) Changes in the differences in cost of MUNIs in deregulated states exceed changes in the 
differences in costs of IOUs and COOPs, which is a disadvantage for deregulated MUNIs 
over time.  
 These results confirm the suspicion that deregulation occurred in those states where high 
electricity prices, and hence, high average electricity costs, existed before deregulation and may 
have been the leading force behind electricity restructuring (Kwoka, 2006).  Therefore, future 
research into the effects of deregulation of the electric utilities in the United States should include 
a correction of the selection bias embedded in the sample of deregulated electric utilities.  In 
addition, the results suggest that any state policy or management policy aimed at improving cost 
efficiency of electric utilities should focus on the price component of the policy; input prices such 
as fuel costs should be analyzed to determine the proper policy to reduce specific input prices and 
improve cost efficiency.  Finally, the results confirm the cost efficiency advantage of privately 
owned electric utilities in deregulated states over MUNIs in deregulated states.  Future research 
should focus on the analysis of the differences in deregulation policy approaches among 
deregulated states and other non-policy factors that affect electric utility costs.  
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Table 22: Observable and Unobservable Components of Changes in Average Costs of Electric 
Utilities by Ownership: 1998 to 2003 (compared to deregulated firms) 
Percentile and 
Differential 
Total Change Observable 
Quantities 
Observable 
Prices 
Unobservable Quantities and 
Prices  
Panel A: 1998 to 2003 (reference = deregulated private electric companies) 
25 1.18 8.1 -5.17 -1.75 
50 14.34 11.56 1.13 1.65 
75 22.86 4.62 15.5 2.74 
90 27.61 4.39 19.81 3.41 
Average 16.50 7.17 7.82 1.51 
90-10 29.33 -6.07 29.01 6.39 
90-50 13.27 -7.17 18.67 1.76 
50-10 16.07 1.1 10.33 4.63 
75-25 21.69 -3.48 20.68 4.49 
Average 20.09 -3.91 19.67 4.32 
Panel B: 1998 to 2003 (reference = deregulated public electric companies) 
25 12 1.55 17.11 -6.66 
50 19.64 0.03 18.93 0.69 
75 26.87 1.17 19.84 5.86 
90 27.89 -0.55 19.13 9.31 
Average 21.60 0.55 18.75 2.30 
90-10 21.41 -2.92 4.23 20.1 
90-50 8.25 -0.57 0.2 8.63 
50-10 13.16 -2.35 4.03 11.48 
75-25 14.87 -0.38 2.73 12.52 
Average 14.42 -1.56 2.80 13.18 
Panel C: 1998 to 2003 (deregulated private electric companies – MUNIs in competitive states) 
25 -18.88 -10.54 -11.2 2.86 
50 -13.35 -3.95 -10.81 1.4 
75 -9.04 2.06 -10.38 -0.73 
90 -0.43 10.13 -7.56 -3 
Average -10.43 -0.57 -9.99 0.13 
90-10 15.76 18.71 2.3 -5.25 
90-50 12.93 14.08 3.24 -4.4 
50-10 2.84 4.63 -0.94 -0.85 
75-25 9.83 12.61 0.83 -3.6 
Average 10.34 12.51 1.36 -3.53 
Panel D: 1998 and 2003 (deregulated IOUs and COOPs – Other Public non-MUNIs in competitive states) 
25 -7.54 9.11 -14.91 -1.73 
50 3.83 13.78 -12.19 2.24 
75 5.14 14.04 -13.96 5.05 
90 3.03 18.75 -24.42 8.7 
Average 1.12 13.92 -16.37 3.57 
90-10 13.92 -7.77 10.66 11.03 
90-50 -0.8 4.97 -12.23 6.46 
50-10 14.72 -12.75 22.89 4.57 
75-25 12.67 4.93 0.95 6.79 
Average 10.13 -2.66 5.57 7.21 
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Table 23: Quantity Effect of Changes in Average Costs of Electric Utilities Over Time by 
Ownership: 1998 to 2003 
 
Percentile and Differential Total Sales Net Generation Distr.Gen 
Panel A: 1998 to 2003 (reference = deregulated private electric companies) 
25 0.71 28.27 -4.72 
50 -0.12 23.44 -0.85 
75 -4.19 22.37 -0.12 
90 -6.07 13.17 0.25 
Average -2.42 21.81 -1.36 
90-10 -4.03 -8.96 3.74 
90-50 -5.95 -10.27 1.1 
50-10 1.92 1.31 2.65 
75-25 -4.9 -5.9 4.61 
Average -3.24 -5.96 3.03 
Panel B: 1998 to 2003 (reference = deregulated public electric companies) 
25 -2.21 -0.06 -0.39 
50 -1.58 -1 -0.15 
75 -0.21 0.28 -0.37 
90 1.54 0.44 -0.36 
Average -0.62 -0.09 -0.32 
90-10 0.65 -0.89 1.85 
90-50 3.12 1.44 -0.22 
50-10 -2.47 -2.32 2.06 
75-25 1.99 0.34 0.02 
Average 0.82 -0.36 0.93 
Panel C: 1998 to 2003 (deregulated IOUs and COOPs - MUNIs) 
25 6.04 -35.22 2 
50 6.91 -25.34 2.43 
75 5.77 -11.36 0.51 
90 8.56 -13.43 1.11 
Average 6.82 -21.34 1.51 
90-10 6.03 44.61 -15.68 
90-50 1.65 11.91 -1.33 
50-10 4.38 32.69 -14.35 
75-25 -0.28 23.86 -1.49 
Average 2.95 28.27 -8.21 
Panel D: 1998 to 2003 (deregulated IOUs and COOPs – Other Public non-MUNIs) 
25 3.59 7.2 -1.49 
50 3.32 -8.28 2.43 
75 -1.97 3.99 0.48 
90 5.04 -4.02 1.11 
Average 2.50 -0.28 0.63 
90-10 6.57 -13.95 -12.22 
90-50 1.72 4.26 -1.32 
50-10 4.85 -18.21 -10.9 
75-25 -5.56 -3.2 1.97 
Average 1.90 -7.78 -5.62 
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6.4.  Results of the Wealth Effect Analysis 
 In order to test the impact of deregulation on the returns on equity, we test a modified 
CAPM which includes technological changes and change in total factor productivity scores 
obtained from DEA Malmquist TFP Index analysis.   The effects of deregulation on shareholder 
wealth is examined using monthly common stock returns for IOUs from 1997 to 2003, a period 
during which most deregulatory changes took place.  The sample is constructed by matching 
electric utility subsidiary companies to their publicly traded corporate parent companies using 
information from FERC Form 1 and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
 Consistent with Johnston (1984) and Akhigbe et al. (2001), the Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) model is used.  We perform two regression analyses for deregulated and 
regulated IOUs.  Because it is expected that the residuals from these two models would be 
correlated since all of the values of the variables are collected on the same set of observations, the 
SUR analysis generate more efficient estimates of the coefficients and standard errors. 
 Table 24 Panel A and B below shows descriptive means and standard deviations of the 
sample of regulated and deregulated distribution and generation utilities in the sample. Data in 
Panel A shows that on average, deregulated IOUs (for all combined utility functions, generation, 
transmission and distribution) performed better than the total sample and regulated IOUs, with 
14.17% annual return compared to 13.05% for total sample and 11.89% return for regulated 
utilities.  There are no differences in stock performance and technological and TFP changes of 
generation power plants.  Overall, deregulated IOUs realized a better TFP scores than regulated 
IOUs.   Because some deregulated IOUs are affiliated with regulated IOUs in states which have 
not enacted deregulation laws, we created another category of IOUs, the hybrid IOUs which 
include IOUs such as American Electric Power Company (AEP) whose subsidiaries are found in 
deregulated states (Ohio, Texas and Virginia) and in regulated states (Indiana, Kentucky, 
Oklahoma, Tennessee, West Virginia).  Data in Panel B shows that deregulated IOUs attained 
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high average annual returns on their stocks, 15.76% for integrated IOUs and 13.52% for 
generation plants compared to 13.38% and 13.07% for regulated IOUs and 8.37% and 8.51% for 
hybrid IOUs.  Panel B also shows that technological changes were similar across the sample, but 
that deregulated and hybrid IOUs realized higher TFP change scores than regulated IOUs. 
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Table 24: Sample characteristics for all IOUs in the sample 
Panel A 
  COMPETE RETURN TECHCH TFPCH 
SAMPLE 
SIZE 
All IOUs - 
COMBINED 
FUNCTIONS 51.65% 13.05% 1.031 1.040 637 
DEREGULATED 
  
14.17% 1.033 1.077 329 
REGULATED 11.89% 1.029 1.001 308 
            
ALL IOUs- 
GENERATION 41.43% 11.87% 0.970 1.003 490 
DEREGULATED 
  
11.55% 0.971 1.011 203 
REGULATED 12.10% 0.970 0.999 287 
  
Market 
Return 
Long-term 
Risk Free 
Short-term 
Risk Free SMB HML 
9.03% 5.83% 3.88% 4.60% 6.17% 
 
Panel B 
  COMPETE RETURN TECHCH TFPCH 
SAMPLE 
SIZE 
All IOUs - 
COMBINED 
FUNCTIONS 51.65% 13.05% 1.031 1.040 637 
DEREGULATED 
  
15.76% 1.033 1.071 280 
REGULATED 13.38% 1.030 0.981 189 
HYBRID 8.37% 1.030 1.057 168 
            
ALL IOUs- 
GENERATION 41.43% 11.87% 0.970 1.004 490 
DEREGULATED   13.52% 0.972 0.991 133 
REGULATED   13.07% 0.971 1.000 217 
HYBRID   8.51% 0.968 1.022 140 
  
Market 
Return 
Long-term 
Risk Free 
Short-term 
Risk Free SMB HML 
9.03% 5.83% 3.88% 4.60% 6.17% 
130  
 Table 25 below shows the results of the SUR analysis. It also reports the results of an 
ordinary least square regression analysis for the samples of integrated electric utilities and 
generation power companies owned by private investors. 
 
Table 25: Wealth effects of deregulation of electric utilities.
47
 
Panel A: 
  Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
  Regression Analysis COMBINED GENERATION 
Variables COMBINED GENERATION Deregulated Regulated Deregulated Regulated 
Intercept -20.62 -5.47 -20.98 -16.64 -4.47 13.25 
  (-2.21)
**
 (-0.74) (-1.29) (-1.58) (-0.39) (1.07) 
Market 
Return 0.75 0.82 0.81 0.70 0.95 0.71 
  (10.48)
***
 (13.44)
***
 (6.44)
***
 (10.23)
***
 (9.27)
***
 (9.81)
***
 
SMB -0.25 -0.08 -0.36 -0.14 -0.07 -0.12 
  (-2.57)
***
 (-1.35) (-1.98)
**
 (-1.58) (-0.69) (-1.66)
*
 
HML 1.15 1.16 1.10 1.20 1.12 1.18 
  (17.02)
***
 (18.63)
***
 (9.43)
***
 (18.75)
***
 (10.55)
***
 (15.75)
***
 
TECHCH 18.76 3.75 20.42 16.18 -1.71 6.05 
  (2.10)
**
 (0.61) (1.26) (1.95)
**
 (-0.17) (0.83) 
TFPCH -0.17 -1.71 -0.06 -3.10 2.06 -22.04 
  (-0.06) (-0.44) (-0.02) (-0.58) (0.45) (-2.41)
**
 
              
R
2
 0.3278 0.4902 0.238 0.5447 0.4595 0.5438 
Adj-R
2
 0.3224 0.485 
  F-Value 61.53
***
 93.09
***
 
Sample 637 490 323 307 202 286 
 
* 
Significant at the 10% level.      
**
 Significant at the 5% level.      
***
 Significant at the 1% level.      
t-values in parenthesis      
 
                     
47
 The analysis used interest rates on 20-year government bonds as the risk-free interest rate. The results 
obtained using the short-term risk-free interest rate were similar that we decided not to report them. 
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Panel B 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
  COMBINED GENERATION 
Variables Deregulated Regulated Hybrid Deregulated Regulated Hybrid 
Intercept -17.25 -6.58 -34.48 6.56 28.55 -24.84 
  (-0.92) (-0.43) (-3.66) (0.40) (1.82)
**
 (-2.95)
**
 
Market 
Return 0.72 0.65 0.93 0.90 0.61 1.04 
  (4.88)
***
 (6.97)
***
 (15.09)
***
 (6.29)
***
 (7.05)
***
 (14.18)
***
 
SMB -0.38 -0.12 -0.19 -0.09 -0.17 -0.03 
  (-1.82)
**
 (-0.97) (-2.21)
**
 (-0.63) (-1.90)
*
 (-0.43) 
HML 0.99 1.1 1.48 0.89 1.07 1.51 
  (7.18)
***
 (12.49)
***
 (25.80)
***
 (6.03)
***
 (11.81)
***
 (20.44)
***
 
TECHCH 19.98 10.32 25.26 -10.76 4.20 14.62 
  (1.05) (0.92) (3.19)
***
 (-0.74) (0.47) (2.05)
**
 
TFPCH -0.70 -5.19 -0.24 3.33 -33.43 0.83 
  (-0.15) (-0.51) (-0.08) (0.50) (-2.82)
**
 (0.20) 
              
R
2
 0.1796 0.4736 0.8079 0.3512 0.4931 0.7983 
Sample 280 189 168 133 217 140 
    
* 
Significant at the 10% level.     
**
 Significant at the 5% level.     
***
 Significant at the 1% level.     
t-values in parenthesis      
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We concluded from the following from these results:  
(1) Regulated generation companies outperformed the market after controlling for the 
market, size, book-to-market, and technical and productivity changes.48  
(2) Deregulated  and hybrid electric utilities performed worse than the market and regulated 
electric utilities after controlling for the market, size, book-to-market, and technical and 
productivity changes.  This means that shareholders lost value of their investments in 
deregulated and hybrid electric utilities relative to the market and regulation.  
(3) Deregulated electric utilities faced higher systematic risks than their regulated peers, but 
lower risk than the market.  Given the market risk (β) of 1,  the coefficients on the 
expected market risk premium for deregulated integrated electric utilities and deregulated 
generation companies are respectively 0.81 and 0.95 compared to the  β of their regulated 
peer companies of 0.70 and 0.71.  This represents an increase in risk of deregulated 
electric utilities of 15.71% for integrated utilities and 33.80% for generation companies. 
Hybrid IOUs performed worse than regulated and deregulated IOUs, with a systematic 
risk higher than regulated IOUs by 43.08% (integrated IOUs) and 70.49% (generation 
companies).  
(4) Higher book-to-market IOUs realized significantly higher stock returns regardless of the 
regulatory regime.  
(5) Technological and total factor productivity changes were only significant for regulated 
and hybrid IOUs. 
(6) Finally, even though stock returns are inversely related to the size of electric utilities, our 
findings are mixed:  our results are not different for regulated and deregulated electric 
                     
48
 Although the sign of the coefficient for the intercept is positive for deregulated investor-owned 
generation firms, it is not statistically significant. 
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integrated or generation utilities. Therefore, they were not important determinant of the 
stock performance and of changes in shareholder wealth for deregulated IOUs. 
(7) In conclusion, the results reject hypothesis (H1) that firms in states with restructuring 
laws experience higher positive wealth effects than firms in states without restructuring 
laws and fail to reject hypothesis (H2) that firms in deregulated states experienced higher 
systematic risk than regulated firms in the post- major deregulation events. 
 
6.5.  Summary of Empirical Findings 
 The results of DEA show no significant difference in efficiency between privately owned 
utilities and POUs.  However, the results show the following: 
(1) Integrated IOUs and COOPs are more cost efficient than integrated POUs; 
(2) IOUs and COOPs have higher efficiency scores than POUs, both in generation and 
vertically integrated operations;  
(3) Integrated IOUs and COOPs in deregulated states have higher allocative and cost 
efficiency scores than integrated POUs in deregulated states; 
(4) Privately owned generation plants in deregulated states were less efficient than privately 
owned generation plants in regulated states;  
(5) Publicly owned generation plants in deregulated states were more technically efficient 
than publicly owned generation plants in regulated states; and  
(6) Integrated IOUs and COOPs in deregulated states generally improved technical, 
allocative and cost efficiencies respectively by 7%, 5.7% and 11.3% while the technical, 
allocative and cost efficiencies of integrated POUs in deregulated states regressed by 
20.5%, 2.7% and 25.6% during the same time period. 
 The results of the DEA Malmquist TFP analysis show that on average POUs realized a 
2.9% improvement in TFP in generation from 1997 to 2003 while the TFP decreased by 4.6% for 
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the generation plants owned by IOUS and COOPs during the same period.  However, looking at 
the combined operations of the utilities, TFP remained virtually unchanged.  The analysis also 
shows that on average TFP improved for deregulated IOUs and COOPs by 3% over regulated 
IOUs and COOPs, while there was no difference in TFP change between deregulated and 
regulated POUs.  Finally, generation power plants owned by IOUs and COOPs in deregulated 
states experienced a decrease in TFP change of 2.6% while power generation plants owned by 
POUs improved their TFP change by 1.3% in deregulated states.  These differences in TFP 
change are small and need to be confirmed by future studies.  It is possible that the differences are 
simply due to the speed and stage of deregulation as well as the fact that IOUs are in a transition 
stage from regulation to competition and need to adjust to a different business environment. 
 Assuming constant returns to scale, technical efficiency improved on average by 8.3% for 
privately owned electric utilities, but regressed by 7.9% for POUs.  However, in the generation 
function only, technical efficiency declined respectively by 4.5% for privately owned generation 
plants and 4.9% for publicly owned generation plants.  If variable returns to scale are assumed, 
technical efficiency improved by 4.3% for POUs and remained unchanged on average for IOUs 
and COOPs.  Looking at the generation function only, technical efficiency declined by 1.5% for 
IOUs and COOPs and by 0.6% for POUs.  
 The results of the SFA show the following for all IOUs, COOPs and POUs: 
(1) More power generation is associated with lower average costs;  
(2) More purchased power to supplement their own generation lowers average costs;  
(3) Serving more customers increases average costs;  
(4) Nuclear power generation increases average costs; and  
(5) Steam power generation is associated with lower average costs; and  
(6) While more distribution is associated with lower costs for POUs, it is associated with 
higher average costs for IOUs and COOPs.  
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 For POUs, a negative coefficient of the variable COMPETE supports the hypothesis that 
deregulation improves efficiency of POUs while a positive coefficient on COMPETE in the 
stochastic frontier analysis of IOUs and COOPs means that deregulation decreases efficiency of 
IOUs and COOPs. This result is consistent with our FTP change findings and DEA results for 
generation power plants, but contrary to our DEA results for vertically integrated electric utilities.  
The implication of these results is that more analysis of the effects of electricity deregulation 
should be conducted separating the generation, transmission, distribution and general expenses 
functions of the utilities.  Finally, our SFA results show that for all electric utilities, increasing 
supply market share (market power in generation) and having generation power plants increase 
efficiency.  The results also show that the existence of market power in distribution decreases 
efficiency of privately owned utilities but improves the efficiency of POUs.  This result implies 
that increasing the size of distribution POUs is associated with increased efficiency.  The 
efficiency results from our analysis are summarized in Table 26 below: 
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Table 26: Comparison of actual and expected outcomes from DEA and SFA analyses. 
  
IOUs and 
COOPs POUs Deregulation 
DEA 
Expected 
Efficiency IOUs > POUs 
Deregulated > 
Regulated 
Deregulated > 
Regulated Private > Public 
Generation 
Cost efficiency YES NO NO YES 
Technical 
efficiency YES NO YES NO 
Allocative 
efficiency YES YES NO YES 
Integrated 
Utility 
Cost efficiency YES YES NO YES 
Technical 
efficiency YES YES NO YES 
Allocative 
efficiency YES YES NO YES 
DEA-MPI 
Expected 
Efficiency IOUs > POUs 
Deregulated > 
Regulated 
Deregulated > 
Regulated Private > Public 
Generation 
EFFCH YES NO YES NO 
TECHCH YES YES NO YES 
PECH NO NO YES NO 
SECH YES YES NO YES 
TFPCH YES NO YES NO 
Integrated 
Utility 
EFFCH NO YES YES NO 
TECHCH YES YES NO YES 
PECH NO YES YES NO 
SECH NO YES NO YES 
TFPCH YES YES YES YES 
SFA 
Expected 
Efficiency IOUs > POUs 
Deregulated > 
Regulated 
Deregulated > 
Regulated Private > Public 
Generation Cost efficiency NO YES YES NO 
Integrated 
Utility Cost efficiency POUS > IOUs NO YES POUs > IOUs 
 
 
 The results of the cost decomposition analysis show that on average: 
(1) As expected, electric companies operating in states with electricity deregulation are 
characterized by greater increases in average costs than their counterpart in regulated 
states, regardless of the type of ownership; 
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(2) Changes in observable prices and unobservable quantities and prices account for most of 
the changes in the differences in average cost at all the percentiles and in the percentile 
differentials (below and above the mean); 
(3) Changes over time in observable quantities reduce (offset) the magnitude of the changes 
in the difference in average costs between firms in deregulated states and firms in 
regulated states; and 
(4) Changes in the differences in cost of MUNIs in deregulated states exceed changes in the 
differences in costs of IOUs and COOPs, which is a disadvantage for deregulated MUNIs 
over time.  This result is consistent with DEA results that IOUs and COOPs in 
deregulated states have higher allocative and cost efficiency scores than POUs in 
deregulated states. 
The results of the wealth and risk effects of deregulation of the U.S. electric utilities show 
that deregulated  and hybrid electric utilities performed worse than the market and regulated 
electric utilities after controlling for the market, size, book-to-market, and technical and 
productivity changes and faced higher systematic risks (by 15.71% for integrated utilities and 
33.80% for generation companies) than their regulated peers, but lower risk than the market; 
higher book-to-market IOUs realized significantly higher stock returns regardless of the 
regulatory regime; and technological and total factor productivity changes were only significant 
for regulated and hybrid IOUs.  In conclusion, the results reject hypothesis (H1) that firms in 
states with restructuring laws experience higher positive wealth effects than firms in states 
without restructuring laws and fail to reject hypothesis (H2) that firms in deregulated states 
experienced higher systematic risk than regulated firms.  Therefore, for deregulation to benefit 
electric utility customers and shareholders, deregulation legislation should include measures to 
lower systematic risk, increase cost efficiency, and improve financial performance.   
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
This study examined the effects of deregulation of the U.S. electric utilities on cost 
efficiencies, technological changes, stock performance and the impact of deregulation and 
ownership on the success or failure of deregulatory policies to produce intended results.   
Several studies have examined the effects of regulatory changes on the cost efficiency 
and stock performance of a firm.  However, an analysis of past studies of the electricity 
deregulation in the United States fails to provide sufficient, unequivocal evidence that 
deregulation generally increased the cost efficiency or the stock return of electric utilities in the 
United States.    
Many recent studies generally used data envelopment analysis (DEA) or the stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA) and found that in other countries, deregulation resulted in significant 
efficiency gains in the electricity industry, but the evidence is mixed in the United States with 
some studies finding that firms located in advanced deregulation states were less efficient in 
generation (Goto and Tsutsui, 2008).   A review of recent empirical research into electricity 
deregulation in the United States provides no evidence of gains in efficiency or benefits due to 
electricity deregulation.  Kwoka (2006), Blumsack et al. (2006) and Spinner (2006) reviewed 
these recent studies and concluded that they suffered from methodological deficiencies, which 
cast doubt on their results.  They concluded that more research into the benefits of electricity 
deregulation in the United States was needed.  Kwoka (2006) raised an important analytical issue 
which should be addressed by any serious study of the effect of deregulation of the U.S. electric 
utilities: the potential selection bias and endogeneity problem.  It is evident that almost all high-
cost/high-price states have enacted electric restructuring legislation with the exception of Alaska, 
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Hawaii and Vermont.   A few low-cost/low-price states like Arkansas, Oklahoma, Montana, 
Nevada, Oregon, Virginia and West Virginia enacted restructuring legislation but ultimately did 
not implement any form of restructuring.  The Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition of the change 
in average costs of regulated and deregulated electric utilities over time controls for selection 
effects in observable characteristics of firms, but we do not explicitly include a test for non-
random selection based on unobservables in the model that we estimate. The JMP methodology 
allowed us to decompose the change in average costs into changes in their characteristics over 
time, changes in price over time, and changes in unexplained differences over time.  Doing this 
analysis allowed us to determine the cost, price and quantity differentials between the regulated 
and deregulated firms.  Future research should include additional modeling of non-random 
sample selection. 
Past studies of the effects of deregulation on shareholder wealth relied primarily on event 
history analysis, focusing on short-term wealth effects rather than the long-term more permanent 
effects of deregulation. These studies failed to consider any size or book-to-market adjustments in 
their analyses. In addition, by focusing on major federal regulatory reforms, these studies failed to 
consider the differences in deregulatory policies and legislation across the country. Our study 
relies on state specific deregulatory policies and combines the market specific information on 
stock returns, technological efficiency data, size and book-to-to market data to determine the 
existence of long-term wealth effects from deregulation.  
The main findings in our analysis are the following: 
(1) Our DEA cost efficiency results suggest that IOUs, COOPs and POUs are in general cost 
inefficient and could increase efficiency levels by reducing their average costs in 
distribution and in generation.  Vertically integrated IOUs and COOPs in deregulated 
states achieved greater technical, allocative and cost efficiencies than their peers in 
regulated states.  Vertically integrated POUs in deregulated states achieved lower 
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technical, allocative and cost efficiencies than their peers in regulated states.  The results 
also show that private and public generation plant efficiency was worse in deregulated 
states than in regulated states, but that privately owned deregulated power generation 
plants had higher allocative and cost efficiency scores than publicly owned power 
generation plants 
(2) The results of the DEA Malmquist TFP show that on average, the total productivity 
decreased for IOUs and COOPs and for POUs.  The analysis also shows that TFP Index 
improved for deregulated privately owned electric utilities more than it did for 
deregulated POUs.  These results provide further evidence that deregulation improved the 
TFP index of privately owned electric utilities but did not affect the TFP index of POUs. 
(3) The results of the stochastic frontier analysis indicate that deregulation improved 
efficiency of POUs but that IOUs and COOPs became less efficient with deregulation.  
However, deregulated IOUs and COOPs were more cost efficient in power generation 
and with increased share in generation relative to their state‟s electricity supply.  
(4) The results of the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition of electric utilities‟ average cost 
confirms the cost efficiency advantage of privately owned electric utilities in deregulated 
states over POUs.   
(5) The results support the existence of selection bias and endogeneity problems and show 
that changes in observable prices and unobservable quantities and prices account for most 
of the changes in the differences in average costs at all levels of costs.   
(6) The results of the modified CAPM and Fama-French seemingly unrelated regressions 
analysis of the wealth and systematic risk long-term effects of deregulation of the U.S. 
electric utilities show deregulated and hybrid electric utilities realized lower stock returns 
relative to the market and to regulation and that deregulated electric utilities faced higher 
systematic risks than their regulated peers, but lower risk than the market.   
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(7) Technological and total factor productivity changes were not important determinants of 
the stock performance and of changes in shareholder wealth for deregulated IOUs.    
 The major finding of this study results from the JMP decomposition analysis:  changes in 
observable prices and unobservable quantities and prices account for most of the changes in the 
differences in average costs at all levels of costs.   The policy implication from this finding is that 
future deregulatory policy should require that rates reflect marginal costs of providing electric 
service so that consumers and suppliers can make economically efficient decisions (consumers 
need to maximize utility), suppliers can reduce capital costs over time and increase efficiency 
(and maximize profits).   Deregulatory policies built on marginal cost pricing will promote 
economically efficient decision-making by including differentiated pricing or dynamic pricing in 
order to closely align retail rates and wholesale rates; improve system reliability, encourage 
customers to hedge against high rates (by adopting demand response programs) and suppliers to 
hedge high costs (by diversifying their inputs). 
The policy implications of these results are that any state deregulatory policy aimed at 
improving the cost efficiency and reducing rates of electric utilities should focus on the input 
costs and output price components of the policy.  For example, input prices such as fuel costs, 
costs of environmental policy changes, production and maintenance costs and administrative 
costs should be center of any deregulatory policy.   
For that to happen, differentiated output prices should replace administratively set prices 
and regulators should not impede competitive market forces by maintaining a regulatory lag for 
the recovery of production costs. 
Because unobservable quantities and prices are an important factor in explaining the 
differences in average costs between regulated and deregulated electric utilities, future studies 
should focus on factors other than prices and quantities such as differences in deregulatory 
policies, process and speed of deregulatory policies, and differences in costs and prices before 
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implementation of any deregulation law or policy.  In addition, future studies should include a 
correction for the selection bias embedded in the sample of deregulated electric utilities. 
Future studies should concentrate on determining whether or not these findings hold true 
in the post-2003 time period and analyzing further the relationship between technical and 
productivity improvements on stock return performance.  Future studies should also determine 
what factors should any deregulatory policy include in order to reduce the higher systematic risks 
faced by deregulated IOUs.   
 In general, our results show that deregulation of the U.S. electric utilities resulted in 
cost, technical and allocative efficiency advantage and in improved total factor productivity of 
privately owned electric utilities in deregulated states over POUs.  However, looking only at the 
generation function, the results of the DEA and SFA provide contradictory evidence regarding the 
impact of deregulation on power generation efficiency.  The implication of these results is that 
electric utilities which integrate all the production functions could be more efficient as a whole 
following deregulation even though one or more functions are not more efficient.  Thus, future 
analysis of the effects of electricity deregulation should be conducted separating the generation, 
transmission, distribution and general expenses functions of the utilities.   
Future studies should include data on peak demand quantities and prices in the analysis of 
the impact of deregulation of the U.S. electric utilities.  It is possible that deregulated electric 
utilities face more incentives to make power available for peak demands in order to maximize 
profits when prices are at the highest levels.  Regulated electric utilities do not face the same 
incentives as prices are administratively set by regulators.  Since deregulated electric utilities are 
able to set differentiated prices (hourly prices, peak, off-peak, critical peak prices), they are better 
able to compensate for increased risk under deregulation and increase efficiencies. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A: Average Residential Electricity Price by State, 1996-2006                                                                                            
(Cents per kilowatthour) 2003 % 
Change 
2006 % 
Change State 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2006 
AK 11.36 11.44 11.5 11.16 11.45 12.12 12.05 11.98 14.83 5.50% 30.50% 
AL  6.63 6.74 6.94 7.03 7.05 7.01 7.12 7.39 8.75 11.50% 32.00% 
AR 7.77 7.8 7.51 7.43 7.45 7.72 7.25 7.24 8.85 -6.80% 13.90% 
AZ 8.95 8.82 8.68 8.53 8.44 8.3 8.27 8.35 9.4 -6.70% 5.00% 
CA 11.33 11.5 10.6 10.64 10.89 12.09 12.64 12.23 14.33 7.90% 26.50% 
CO 7.49 7.42 7.45 7.38 7.31 7.47 7.37 8.14 9.02 8.70% 20.40% 
CT 12.05 12.13 11.95 11.46 10.86 10.9 10.96 11.31 16.86 -6.10% 39.90% 
DC 7.77 7.87 8 8 8.03 7.79 7.98 7.84 9.88 0.90% 27.20% 
DE 8.97 9.22 9.13 9.17 8.54 8.61 8.7 8.59 11.85 -4.20% 32.10% 
FL 7.99 8.08 7.89 7.73 7.77 8.59 8.16 8.55 11.33 7.00% 41.80% 
GA 7.66 7.74 7.67 7.56 7.6 7.72 7.63 7.7 8.91 0.50% 16.30% 
HI 14.26 14.8 13.82 14.3 16.41 16.34 15.63 16.73 23.35 17.30% 63.70% 
IA 8.16 8.21 8.38 8.35 8.37 8.41 8.35 8.57 9.63 5.00% 18.00% 
ID 5.28 5.15 5.28 5.26 5.39 6.01 6.59 6.24 6.21 18.20% 17.60% 
IL 10.34 10.43 9.85 8.83 8.83 8.71 8.39 8.38 8.42 -19.00% -18.60% 
IN 6.77 6.94 7.01 6.96 6.87 6.92 6.91 7.04 8.22 4.00% 21.40% 
KS 7.86 7.71 7.65 7.64 7.65 7.66 7.67 7.71 8.25 -1.90% 5.00% 
KY 5.55 5.58 5.61 5.58 5.47 5.58 5.65 5.81 7.02 4.70% 26.50% 
LA 7.55 7.39 7.07 7.12 7.67 7.92 7.1 7.84 9.14 3.80% 21.10% 
MA 11.25 11.59 10.6 10.09 10.53 12.47 10.93 11.6 16.6 3.10% 47.60% 
MD 8.26 8.33 8.44 8.39 7.95 7.67 7.74 7.73 9.71 -6.40% 17.60% 
ME 12.58 12.75 13.02 13.07 12.49 13.13 12.74 12.37 13.8 -1.70% 9.70% 
MI 8.47 8.57 8.67 8.73 8.52 8.26 8.28 8.35 9.77 -1.40% 15.30% 
MN 7.13 7.23 7.33 7.41 7.52 7.61 7.49 7.65 8.7 7.30% 22.00% 
MO 7.08 7.09 7.08 7.12 7.04 7 7.06 6.96 7.44 -1.70% 5.10% 
MS 7.04 7.02 7.03 6.75 6.93 7.37 7.28 7.6 9.66 8.00% 37.20% 
MT 6.22 6.4 6.5 6.78 6.49 6.88 7.23 7.56 8.28 21.50% 33.10% 
NC 8.05 8.03 8.01 7.99 7.97 8.12 8.19 8.32 9.12 3.40% 13.30% 
ND 6.19 6.27 6.49 6.5 6.44 6.47 6.39 6.49 7.14 4.80% 15.30% 
NE 6.29 6.38 6.46 6.52 6.53 6.5 6.73 6.87 7.41 9.20% 17.80% 
NH 13.44 13.67 13.92 13.64 13.15 12.49 11.89 11.98 14.68 -10.90% 9.20% 
NJ 11.99 12.08 11.39 11.4 10.27 10.21 10.38 10.67 12.84 -11.00% 7.10% 
NM 8.93 8.92 8.85 8.62 8.36 8.74 8.5 8.69 9.06 -2.70% 1.50% 
NV 6.9 6.77 7 7.13 7.28 9.08 9.43 9.02 11.08 30.70% 60.60% 
NY 14.04 14.12 13.66 13.23 13.97 14.04 13.55 14.31 16.89 1.90% 20.30% 
OH 8.6 8.63 8.7 8.68 8.61 8.37 8.24 8.26 9.34 -4.00% 8.60% 
OK 6.71 6.63 6.57 6.6 7.03 7.27 6.73 7.47 8.55 11.30% 27.40% 
OR 5.69 5.56 5.82 5.75 5.88 6.29 7.12 7.06 7.48 24.10% 31.50% 
PA 9.73 9.9 9.93 8.86 9.53 9.68 9.74 9.59 10.35 -1.40% 6.40% 
RI 11.81 12.12 10.91 10.12 11.28 12.13 10.2 11.61 15.12 -1.70% 28.00% 
SC 7.5 7.51 7.5 7.55 7.58 7.69 7.72 8.01 9.03 6.80% 20.40% 
SD 7 7.08 7.27 7.42 7.42 7.42 7.4 7.47 7.83 6.70% 11.90% 
TN 5.88 6.03 6.32 6.34 6.33 6.32 6.41 6.55 7.75 11.40% 31.80% 
TX 7.77 7.82 7.65 7.55 7.96 8.86 8.05 9.16 12.86 17.90% 65.50% 
UT 6.96 6.89 6.84 6.27 6.29 6.72 6.79 6.9 7.59 -0.90% 9.10% 
VA 7.6 7.75 7.51 7.48 7.52 7.79 7.79 7.76 8.49 2.10% 11.70% 
VT 10.99 11.45 11.61 12.17 12.3 12.67 12.78 12.82 13.39 16.70% 21.80% 
WA 5.03 4.95 5.03 5.1 5.13 5.7 6.29 6.31 6.82 25.40% 35.60% 
WI 6.88 6.88 7.17 7.31 7.53 7.9 8.18 8.67 10.51 26.00% 52.80% 
WV 6.38 6.26 6.29 6.27 6.27 6.26 6.23 6.24 6.35 -2.20% -0.50% 
WY 6.13 6.22 6.28 6.34 6.5 6.77 6.97 7.04 7.75 14.80% 26.40% 
US-TOTAL 8.36 8.43 8.26 8.16 8.24 8.58 8.44 8.72 10.4 4.30% 24.40% 
Average Change Deregulated States   -2.30% 20.00% 
 Average Change Regulated States    9.00% 24.30% 
TTEST, 2-tails, unequal variance, Prob > |T| 0.00005 0.4061 
Source: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/esr/esr_tabs.html 
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Appendix B: Average Commercial Electricity Price by State, 1996-2006                                                                   
(Cents per kilowatthour) 2003 % 
Change 
2006 % 
Change State 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2006 
AK 9.58 9.51 9.48 9.2 9.77 10.29 10.13 10.49 11.93 9.50% 24.50% 
AL  6.49 6.34 6.54 6.54 6.58 6.53 6.63 6.85 8.18 5.50% 26.00% 
AR 6.74 6.78 5.9 5.82 5.93 6.19 5.68 5.54 6.96 -17.80% 3.30% 
AZ 7.97 7.83 7.76 7.51 7.34 7.37 7.28 7.09 8.02 -11.00% 0.60% 
CA 9.83 9.98 9.66 9.44 10.25 12.15 13.36 12.48 12.9 27.00% 31.20% 
CO 5.93 5.77 5.67 5.61 5.55 5.67 5.67 6.6 7.5 11.30% 26.50% 
CT 10.29 10.28 10.01 9.69 9.27 9.26 9.32 9.93 14.03 -3.50% 36.30% 
DC 7.4 7.43 7.43 7.47 7.55 7.45 7.32 7.35 11.17 -0.70% 50.90% 
DE 7 7.19 7.07 7.39 5.89 7 7.15 7.31 10.21 4.40% 45.90% 
FL 6.63 6.62 6.38 6.22 6.25 7.08 6.64 7.13 9.91 7.50% 49.50% 
GA 7.17 7.11 7.01 6.67 6.5 6.61 6.46 6.66 7.81 -7.10% 8.90% 
HI 12.99 13.26 12.31 12.74 14.81 14.81 14.11 15.02 21.42 15.60% 64.90% 
IA 6.53 6.61 6.67 6.45 6.57 6.69 6.56 6.24 7.29 -4.40% 11.60% 
ID 4.26 4.17 4.34 4.2 4.24 5.13 5.71 5.56 5.16 30.50% 21.10% 
IL 7.97 7.93 7.77 7.38 7.31 7.4 7.52 7.3 7.95 -8.40% -0.30% 
IN 5.94 6.04 6.08 6.05 5.93 5.29 5.98 6.12 7.21 3.00% 21.40% 
KS 6.67 6.47 6.34 6.25 6.25 6.2 6.28 6.42 6.96 -3.70% 4.30% 
KY 5.19 5.29 5.3 5.27 5.14 5.2 5.3 5.37 6.44 3.50% 24.10% 
LA 7.12 6.99 6.56 6.59 7.18 7.58 6.64 7.42 9.03 4.20% 26.80% 
MA 9.94 10.29 9.35 8.64 9.13 11.64 10.02 10.48 15.54 5.40% 56.30% 
MD 6.83 6.86 6.82 6.82 6.55 6.36 6.31 6.95 10.56 1.80% 54.60% 
ME 10.35 10.39 10.33 10.51 10.23 11.64 10.68 10.34 12.42 -0.10% 20.00% 
MI 7.94 7.84 7.81 7.85 7.9 7.54 7.79 7.55 8.51 -4.90% 7.20% 
MN 6.14 6.23 6.28 6.31 6.36 6.03 5.88 6.12 7.02 -0.30% 14.30% 
MO 6.04 6 5.99 5.96 5.83 5.89 5.88 5.78 6.08 -4.30% 0.70% 
MS 7.09 6.69 6.62 6.19 6.41 6.94 6.83 7.25 9.37 2.30% 32.20% 
MT 5.51 5.8 5.87 6.35 5.6 5.91 6.28 6.85 7.44 24.30% 35.00% 
NC 6.39 6.43 6.35 6.33 6.36 6.42 6.51 6.65 7.17 4.10% 12.20% 
ND 6.07 6.15 6.2 6.19 6.08 5.99 5.85 5.64 6.3 -7.10% 3.80% 
NE 5.49 5.46 5.45 5.44 5.42 5.48 5.62 5.81 6.19 5.80% 12.80% 
NH 11.32 11.35 11.64 11.18 10.81 10.53 10.06 10.3 14.07 -9.00% 24.30% 
NJ 10.32 10.35 10.09 9.73 9.14 9.09 8.9 9.11 11.62 -11.70% 12.60% 
NM 7.93 7.92 7.8 7.52 7.06 7.5 7.22 7.36 7.61 -7.20% -4.00% 
NV 6.61 6.31 6.5 6.66 6.74 8.45 9.06 8.79 10.12 33.00% 53.10% 
NY 12.08 12.13 11.63 10.11 12.65 12.87 12.33 12.93 15.51 7.00% 28.40% 
OH 7.71 7.67 7.67 7.67 7.61 8.46 7.81 7.55 8.44 -2.10% 9.50% 
OK 5.8 5.73 5.66 5.58 6.14 6.35 5.75 6.38 7.34 10.00% 26.60% 
OR 5.15 4.97 5 4.94 5.06 5.45 6.59 6.38 6.77 23.90% 31.50% 
PA 8.34 8.41 8.26 6.53 7.71 8.62 8.5 8.62 8.94 3.40% 7.20% 
RI 10.14 10.4 9.26 7.73 9.5 11.54 8.65 10.09 13.51 -0.50% 33.20% 
SC 6.38 6.33 6.24 6.3 6.35 6.45 6.48 6.81 7.6 6.70% 19.10% 
SD 6.57 6.63 6.62 6.7 6.64 6.55 6.24 6.04 6.47 -8.10% -1.50% 
TN 6.64 5.91 6.28 6.29 6.28 6.31 6.45 6.68 8 0.60% 20.50% 
TX 6.71 6.74 6.57 6.52 6.88 7.74 6.95 7.84 9.85 16.80% 46.80% 
UT 5.9 5.72 5.71 5.29 5.23 5.58 5.6 5.59 6.15 -5.30% 4.20% 
VA 5.91 5.97 5.61 5.55 5.65 5.85 5.87 5.74 6.21 -2.90% 5.10% 
VT 10.14 10.33 10.12 10.67 10.61 11.28 11.1 11.29 11.67 11.30% 15.10% 
WA 4.88 4.79 4.81 4.86 4.86 5.45 6.11 6.07 6.63 24.40% 35.90% 
WI 5.68 5.6 5.87 5.88 6.03 6.34 6.54 6.97 8.37 22.70% 47.40% 
WV 5.71 5.54 5.56 5.53 5.46 5.44 5.41 5.45 5.59 -4.60% -2.10% 
WY 5.08 5.27 5.25 5.28 5.29 5.41 5.71 5.74 6.28 13.00% 23.60% 
US-TOTAL 7.64 7.59 7.41 7.26 7.43 7.92 7.89 8.03 9.46 5.10% 23.80% 
Average Change Deregulated States   0.60% 26.10% 
 Average Change Regulated States    6.20% 21.00% 
TTEST, 2-tails, unequal variance, Prob > |T| 0.0822 0.3538 
Source: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/esr/esr_tabs.html 
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Appendix C: Average Industrial Electricity Price by State, 1996-2006                                                                                    
(Cents per kilowatthour) 
2003 % 
Change 
2006 % 
Change State 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2006 
AK 8.47 7.48 7.17 7.32 7.56 7.61 7.65 7.86 11.54 -7.20% 36.20% 
AL  3.9 3.71 3.89 3.82 3.87 3.79 3.82 3.98 4.9 2.10% 25.60% 
AR 4.47 4.45 4.16 4.12 4.2 4.43 4.01 4.04 5.24 -9.60% 17.20% 
AZ 5.19 5.05 5.12 5.04 5.27 5.24 5.2 5.37 5.69 3.50% 9.60% 
CA 6.97 6.95 6.59 6.27 7.14 9.23 9.81 9.59 10.09 37.60% 44.80% 
CO 4.35 4.28 4.34 4.38 4.25 4.48 4.52 5.1 5.88 17.20% 35.20% 
CT 7.86 7.76 7.7 7.42 7.32 7.62 7.68 7.99 11.71 1.70% 49.00% 
DC 4.36 4.42 4.38 4.59 4.74 4.81 4.95 5.57 17.43 27.80% 299.80% 
DE 4.68 4.82 4.65 4.71 3.73 4.81 4.85 5.15 7.67 10.00% 63.90% 
FL 5.11 5.04 4.81 4.77 4.84 5.18 5.23 5.41 7.71 5.90% 50.90% 
GA 4.29 4.13 4.23 4.15 4.1 4.28 3.95 4.02 5.38 -6.30% 25.40% 
HI 10.03 10.32 9.41 9.7 11.69 11.68 11.02 12.2 17.96 21.60% 79.10% 
IA 3.91 3.95 3.99 3.89 3.89 4.18 4.06 4.16 4.92 6.40% 25.80% 
ID 2.68 2.6 2.77 2.63 3.11 3.71 4.34 4.16 3.61 55.20% 34.70% 
IL 5.24 5.29 5.11 4.99 4.99 4.65 4.89 4.86 4.69 -7.30% -10.50% 
IN 3.93 3.91 3.95 3.89 3.81 4.11 3.95 3.92 4.95 -0.30% 26.00% 
KS 4.7 4.51 4.46 4.47 4.55 4.55 4.53 4.61 5.2 -1.90% 10.60% 
KY 2.92 2.8 2.91 2.99 3.01 3.04 3.09 3.21 4.05 9.90% 38.70% 
LA 4.32 4.39 4.15 4.25 5 5.58 4.42 5.57 6.87 28.90% 59.00% 
MA 8.43 8.78 8.18 7.53 8.2 9.37 8.34 8.93 13.04 5.90% 54.70% 
MD 4.15 4.21 4.14 4.26 4.14 4.37 4.01 4.89 8.14 17.80% 96.10% 
ME 6.26 6.36 6.61 6.42 6.89 7.15 7.05 6.35 8.83 1.40% 41.10% 
MI 5.08 4.97 5.03 5.03 5.09 5.08 5.02 4.96 6.05 -2.40% 19.10% 
MN 4.26 4.33 4.45 4.56 4.57 4.34 4.07 4.36 5.29 2.30% 24.20% 
MO 4.44 4.46 4.43 4.38 4.43 4.39 4.42 4.49 4.58 1.10% 3.20% 
MS 4.41 4.12 4.22 4.02 4.14 4.4 4.4 4.48 5.94 1.60% 34.70% 
MT 3.3 3.66 3.19 2.74 3.97 6.59 3.71 4.03 5.12 22.10% 55.20% 
NC 4.79 4.71 4.63 4.57 4.58 4.61 4.7 4.79 5.23 0.00% 9.20% 
ND 4.44 4.38 4.3 4.04 3.98 3.98 3.98 3.96 5 -10.80% 12.60% 
NE 3.68 3.61 3.6 3.57 3.61 3.76 3.89 4.18 4.56 13.60% 23.90% 
NH 9.16 9.06 9.42 9.19 9.17 9.11 9.09 9.75 11.62 6.40% 26.90% 
NJ 8.15 8.11 7.94 7.67 8.58 8.33 7.72 7.99 10.42 -2.00% 27.90% 
NM 4.35 4.42 4.47 4.24 4.69 5.45 4.48 4.95 5.57 13.80% 28.00% 
NV 4.9 4.48 4.57 4.77 4.98 6.56 7.25 7.3 8.03 49.00% 63.90% 
NY 5.62 5.2 4.95 4.74 5.37 5.56 5.18 7.14 9.39 27.00% 67.10% 
OH 4.21 4.16 4.3 4.33 4.37 4.27 4.87 4.79 5.61 13.80% 33.30% 
OK 3.78 3.63 3.65 3.6 4.09 4.29 3.81 4.59 5.46 21.40% 44.40% 
OR 3.41 3.23 3.5 3.48 3.56 4.21 4.72 4.63 4.85 35.80% 42.20% 
PA 5.93 5.89 5.63 4.71 5.63 5.76 5.83 5.8 6.63 -2.20% 11.80% 
RI 8.51 8.52 7.61 7.31 8.76 9.36 7.96 8.88 12.51 4.30% 47.00% 
SC 3.89 3.71 3.69 3.72 3.74 3.86 3.85 4 4.71 2.80% 21.10% 
SD 4.45 4.42 4.44 4.55 4.49 4.46 4.54 4.51 4.84 1.30% 8.80% 
TN 4.52 3.81 4.17 4.19 4.09 4.05 4.15 4.29 5.17 -5.10% 14.40% 
TX 4.03 4.05 3.94 3.97 4.42 5.27 4.66 5.27 7.82 30.80% 94.00% 
UT 3.7 3.49 3.45 3.36 3.35 3.53 3.84 3.79 4.21 2.40% 13.80% 
VA 3.99 4 3.82 3.84 3.9 4.16 4.13 4.23 4.69 6.00% 17.50% 
VT 7.58 7.44 7.27 7.35 7.31 7.89 7.9 8.05 8.33 6.20% 9.90% 
WA 2.85 2.59 2.64 2.65 3.3 4.75 4.88 4.76 4.44 67.00% 55.80% 
WI 3.66 3.72 3.86 3.89 4.04 4.36 4.43 4.71 5.85 28.70% 59.80% 
WV 3.91 3.71 3.78 3.8 3.76 3.74 3.81 3.81 3.71 -2.60% -5.10% 
WY 3.45 3.46 3.38 3.34 3.36 3.43 3.55 3.65 4.04 5.80% 17.10% 
US-TOTAL 4.6 4.53 4.48 4.43 4.64 5.05 4.88 5.11 6.16 11.10% 33.90% 
Average Change Deregulated States 10.00% 55.20% 
 Average Change Regulated States  11.50% 30.30% 
TTEST, 2-tails, unequal variance, Prob > |T| 0.7463 0.1422 
Source: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/esr/esr_tabs.html 
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Appendix D: Average United States Electricity Price by State, 1996-2006                                                                                    
(Cents per kilowatthour) 
2003 % 
Change 
2006 % 
Change State 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2006 
AK 10.24 10.07 9.97 9.78 10.08 10.54 10.46 10.5 12.84 2.50% 25.40% 
AL 5.35 5.33 5.56 5.54 5.61 5.6 5.71 5.88 7.07 9.90% 32.10% 
AR 6.15 6.15 5.78 5.68 5.77 6.05 5.61 5.57 6.99 -9.40% 13.70% 
AZ 7.54 7.38 7.33 7.23 7.25 7.27 7.21 7.34 8.24 -2.70% 9.30% 
CA 9.48 9.54 9.03 8.75 9.47 11.22 12.19 11.78 12.82 24.30% 35.20% 
CO 6.05 5.95 5.95 5.95 5.88 6.02 6 6.77 7.61 11.90% 25.80% 
CT 10.51 10.52 10.3 9.96 9.52 9.62 9.71 10.16 14.83 -3.30% 41.10% 
DC 7.35 7.39 7.41 7.45 7.52 7.4 7.34 7.4 11.08 0.70% 50.70% 
DE 6.88 7 6.88 7.1 6.08 6.8 6.91 6.96 10.13 1.20% 47.20% 
FL 7.18 7.19 7.01 6.85 6.91 7.67 7.31 7.72 10.45 7.50% 45.50% 
GA 6.43 6.37 6.4 6.24 6.21 6.39 6.24 6.32 7.63 -1.70% 18.70% 
HI 12.12 12.49 11.56 11.97 14.03 14.05 13.39 14.47 20.72 19.40% 71.00% 
IA 5.94 5.97 6.04 5.93 5.93 6.14 6.01 6.11 7.01 2.90% 18.00% 
ID 3.96 3.87 4.02 3.89 4.17 4.92 5.58 5.22 4.92 31.80% 24.20% 
IL 7.69 7.71 7.46 6.96 6.94 6.9 6.94 6.86 7.07 -10.80% -8.10% 
IN 5.23 5.29 5.34 5.29 5.18 5.3 5.34 5.37 6.46 2.70% 23.50% 
KS 6.52 6.31 6.28 6.22 6.27 6.24 6.31 6.35 6.89 -2.60% 5.70% 
KY 4.03 4.03 4.16 4.17 4.18 4.24 4.26 4.42 5.43 9.70% 34.70% 
LA 6.07 5.99 5.78 5.81 6.48 6.96 5.99 6.93 8.3 14.20% 36.70% 
MA 10.13 10.48 9.59 8.99 9.49 11.55 10.06 10.56 15.45 4.20% 52.50% 
MD 6.96 6.98 6.99 7.04 6.74 6.6 6.18 6.45 9.95 -7.30% 43.00% 
ME 9.46 9.51 9.75 9.77 9.69 10.55 10.35 9.79 11.8 3.50% 24.70% 
MI 7.1 7.04 7.09 7.12 7.11 6.97 7.09 6.85 8.14 -3.50% 14.60% 
MN 5.54 5.61 5.71 5.83 5.87 5.97 5.8 6.01 6.98 8.50% 26.00% 
MO 6.11 6.09 6.08 6.06 6.02 6.03 6.09 6.02 6.3 -1.50% 3.10% 
MS 6.01 5.91 5.98 5.65 5.85 6.26 6.24 6.46 8.33 7.50% 38.60% 
MT 4.72 5.2 4.8 4.77 5 6.48 5.7 6.14 6.91 30.10% 46.40% 
NC 6.53 6.48 6.45 6.44 6.48 6.58 6.74 6.86 7.53 5.10% 15.30% 
ND 5.65 5.65 5.7 5.49 5.44 5.48 5.45 5.47 6.21 -3.20% 9.90% 
NE 5.32 5.3 5.3 5.31 5.31 5.39 5.55 5.64 6.07 6.00% 14.10% 
NH 11.59 11.66 11.93 11.6 11.25 10.95 10.6 10.83 13.84 -6.60% 19.40% 
NJ 10.5 10.54 10.17 9.98 9.47 9.36 9.3 9.48 11.88 -9.70% 13.10% 
NM 6.76 6.8 6.78 6.57 6.58 7.16 6.73 7 7.37 3.60% 9.00% 
NV 5.95 5.6 5.76 5.93 6.17 7.86 8.42 8.29 9.63 39.30% 61.80% 
NY 11.13 11.13 10.71 9.95 11.38 11.55 11.16 12.44 15.27 11.80% 37.20% 
OH 6.3 6.25 6.38 6.4 6.41 6.62 6.77 6.73 7.71 6.80% 22.40% 
OK 5.56 5.42 5.43 5.37 5.88 6.1 5.59 6.35 7.3 14.20% 31.30% 
OR 4.77 4.61 4.9 4.83 4.89 5.44 6.32 6.18 6.53 29.60% 36.90% 
PA 7.96 7.99 7.86 6.71 7.65 8.01 8.06 8.02 8.68 0.80% 9.00% 
RI 10.48 10.7 9.58 8.62 10.18 11.45 9.2 10.47 13.98 -0.10% 33.40% 
SC 5.67 5.5 5.53 5.57 5.62 5.77 5.83 6.08 6.98 7.20% 23.10% 
SD 6.18 6.22 6.26 6.35 6.32 6.35 6.26 6.35 6.7 2.80% 8.40% 
TN 5.24 5.31 5.62 5.63 5.58 5.59 5.72 5.84 6.97 11.50% 33.00% 
TX 6.16 6.17 6.07 6.04 6.49 7.38 6.62 7.5 10.34 21.80% 67.90% 
UT 5.28 5.17 5.16 4.86 4.84 5.21 5.39 5.41 5.99 2.50% 13.40% 
VA 6.09 6.14 5.88 5.86 5.94 6.18 6.23 6.27 6.86 3.00% 12.60% 
VT 9.74 9.89 9.83 10.28 10.27 10.86 10.87 10.98 11.37 12.70% 16.70% 
WA 4.19 4.04 4.03 4.01 4.33 5.34 5.88 5.86 6.14 39.90% 46.50% 
WI 5.25 5.22 5.44 5.53 5.71 6.08 6.28 6.64 8.13 26.50% 54.90% 
WV 5.21 5.02 5.07 5.09 5.07 5.07 5.11 5.13 5.04 -1.50% -3.30% 
WY 4.31 4.33 4.31 4.3 4.34 4.46 4.68 4.76 5.27 10.40% 22.30% 
US-TOTAL 6.86 6.85 6.74 6.64 6.81 7.29 7.2 7.44 8.9 8.50% 29.70% 
Average Change Deregulated States   1.90% 29.20% 
Average Change Regulated States    10.60% 26.70% 
TTEST, 2-tails, unequal variance, Prob > |T| 0.0078 0.6578 
Source: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/esr/esr_tabs.html 
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Appendix E.  Summary of State Electric Restructuring Activities 
 
State Beginning Of 
Restructuring 
Restructuring Details Actual 
Status 
Comments 
AZ Since 1999 09/99:  The ACC approved a 
settlement agreement with Arizona 
Public Service for restructuring. The 
APS was required to open 20 percent 
of its retail territory to competition 
by October 1, 1999, and all of it by 
January 1, 2001. Residential rates 
were to be reduced 7.5 percent over 4 
years, with large users' rates cut 5 
percent over 3 years. 
On hold 
since 2004 
10/04:  Restructuring in 
Arizona was essentially 
placed on hold due to a 
variety of regulatory 
orders.  
CA Since 1998 04/98:  The CPUC issued the final 
order officially opening the electric 
industry market to competition as of 
March 31, 1998 for all consumers in 
investor-owned utilities' service 
territories. Control of 70 percent of 
the State's transmission lines was 
transferred to the California ISO. 
Suspended 
since 2002  
 
10/01:  The CPUC 
suspended retail choice in 
California. The CPUC 
estimated that about 5 
percent of the State's peak 
load of 46,000 MW was 
then under direct access 
contracts, mostly with large 
industrial customers.  
CT 7/1/2000 04/98:  House Bill 5005, An Act 
Concerning Electric Restructuring, 
was signed into law on April 29, 
1998. The bill would allow access to 
competitive suppliers for 35 percent 
of consumers by January 2000 and 
for all consumers by July 2000. 
Active 
The bill also required a 5.5- 
percent renewable portfolio 
standard, environmental 
protections, and a 10-
percent rate reduction 
beginning January 2000, 
and a rate cap at the 
December 31, 1996 level 
from July 1, 1998 until 
January 1, 2000. 
DC 01/01/2001 01/01:  The District of Columbia 
began allowing customers direct 
access to competitive electricity 
suppliers on January 1, 2001.  
Active The PSC established 
interim shopping credits 
ranging from 3.68 to 5.18 
cents/kWh. 
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Restructuring 
Restructuring Details Actual 
Status 
Comments 
DE 10/1999 03/99:  House Bill 10, “The Electric 
Utility Restructuring Act of 1999,” 
was enacted on March 31, 1999. The 
law's provisions included: a phase-in 
of retail competition beginning on 
October 1, 1999 for large customers 
in Conectiv's service territory and 
ending on April 1, 2001 
Active  04/99: The act was 
intended to bring 
competition to Delaware‟s 
electricity generation.  Rate 
caps were imposed for non-
residential consumers of 
Conectiv from October 
1999 through September 
2002; caps for residences 
were imposed between 
October 1999 through 
September 2002. 
IL 1999 12/97:  House Bill 362, “The Electric 
Service Customer Choice and Rate 
Relief Act of 1997,” was enacted. 
The bill proposed rate cuts for 
ComEd and Illinois Power effective 
August 1998. The law also proposed 
some commercial and industrial 
customers choice by October 1999, 
and all customers, including 
residential, choice for their 
generation supplier by May 2002. 
Active Under H.B. 362, residential 
customers were given a 
15% rate cut in August 
1998 and an additional 5% 
reduction in October 2001, 
the largest rate reductions 
in the country. Residential 
customers who stay with 
their utility after May 2002 
will have their rates frozen 
until 2005.  
MA 3/01/1998 
01/97:  The Department of 
Telecommunications and Energy‟s 
final decision stated that it would 
officially open the retail electricity 
market to competition by March 1, 
1998. 
Active 
11/97:  The law required 
retail access by March 
1998, rate cuts of 10 
percent by March 1998 and 
another 5 percent 18 
months later, encourages 
divestiture of generation 
assets, and allowed full 
recovery of stranded costs 
over a 10-year transition 
period. 
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ME 2000 
12/96:  The PUC issued a plan 
requiring utility functional 
unbundling, divestiture of generation 
assets by March 2000, and retail 
competition by 2000. 
Active  
MD 7/01/2000 04/99:  With House Bill 703 (HB 
703) and Senate Bill (SB 300), 
“Maryland Customer Choice and 
Competition Act,” restructuring 
legislation was enacted. The 
legislation included at least a 3 
percent rate reduction for residential 
consumers, and a 3-year phase-in for 
competition beginning in July 2000 
and becoming complete by July 
2002. 
Active  
MI 5/01/2000 
01/98:  The PSC adopted a phase-in 
schedule allowing 2.5 percent of 
Consumer‟s Energy and Detroit 
Edison customers retail access as 
early as March 1998, adding another 
2.5 percent on June 1998, January 
1999, January 2000, and January 
2001 and all consumers by 2002. 
Active 06/00:  Public Act 141 of 
2000 and companion 
Public Act 142 were signed 
into law on June 3, 2000. 
The comprehensive 
restructuring legislation 
proposed that all 
consumers have retail 
choice by January 2002.  
NH 1998; 2001 05/96:  House Bill 1392 was enacted, 
requiring the PUC to implement 
retail choice for all customers of 
electric utilities under its jurisdiction 
by January 1, 1998 or at the earliest 
date which the Commission 
determined to be in the public 
interest, but not later than July 1, 
1998.  
 
Active 01/01:  The New 
Hampshire Supreme Court 
upheld Public Service of 
New Hampshire's (PSNH) 
restructuring plan, clearing 
the way for competition to 
begin for the majority of 
consumers in New 
Hampshire. The PSNH 
planned to implement retail 
choice by April 2001. 
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NJ 11/1999 
12/99:  Due to procedural delays, 
New Jersey consumers did not start 
receiving power from their suppliers 
of choice until November 14, 1999. 
Legislation was passed in February 
1999, allowing retail choice for all 
consumers on August 1, 1999. 
 
Active 
04/97:  The BPU‟s final 
report for the Energy 
Master Plan accelerated the 
time line for retail 
competition to begin: 
phase-in should have begun 
with 10 percent by October 
1998, 35 percent by April 
1999, 50 percent by 
October 1999, 75 percent 
by April 2000, and all by 
July 2000. 
NY Since 1998 
05/96:  The PSC issued its opinion 
and order regarding competitive 
opportunities for electric service that 
restructured New York's electric 
power industry. The competitive 
retail market started in May 1998  
 
Active 05/98:  Orange and 
Rockland became the first 
utility in New York to offer 
retail choice through its 
Power Pick program as 
customers began to receive 
power from their suppliers 
of choice on May 1, 1998. 
OH Since 2001 
01/01:  Retail direct access to 
competitive electricity suppliers 
began on January 1, 2001, in the 
State. The first month saw about 
97,622 customers in First Energy 
territories switch suppliers. Standard 
Offer Rates ranged from 3.6 to 4.9 
cents/kWh in the three FirstEnergy 
subsidiary territories of Toledo 
Edison, Ohio Edison, and Cleveland 
Illuminating. 
Active 01/03:  The Ohio 
Consumers‟ Counsel 
(OCC) published its 2002 
End-of-Year Update on 
Ohio‟s Electric Market that 
reviewed the past two years 
of competition in Ohio, 
showing that “813,000 
residential consumers 
statewide – or about 20 
percent of those who were 
eligible to participate in 
electric choice-actually 
switched electric suppliers. 
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PA Since 1999 
12/96:  House Bill 1509, the 
Electricity Generation Customer 
Choice and Competition Act, was 
enacted. The law proposed a 
schedule for consumers to begin 
choosing among competitive 
generation suppliers, beginning with 
one third of the State's consumers, by 
January 1999, two thirds by January 
2000, and all consumers by January 
2001.  
Active 01/99:  Retail access was made 
available to two-thirds of the 
State's customers. 
RI 1998 
08/96:  House Bill 8124, allowed 
retail choice to be phased-in starting 
July 1997. In July 1997, Rhode 
Island became the first state to begin 
phase-in of statewide retail wheeling 
(for industrial customers). 
Residential consumers were 
scheduled to have retail access by 
July 1998. 
Active 
12/97:  The Rhode Island Public 
Utilities Commission (PUC) issued 
an order accepting interim rates 
and approving retail choice for all 
Rhode Island consumers on 
January 1, 1998. 
TX 1/01/2002 
06/99:  Restructuring legislation, 
Senate Bill 7, was enacted to 
restructure the Texas electric 
industry allowing retail competition. 
The bill requires retail competition to 
begin by January 2002. 
Active 
05/03: The Texas PUC has delayed 
retail choice in Northern Texas, 
which comes under the jurisdiction 
of the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) 
Regional Transmission 
Organization, until 2011. 
VA 1/01/2002 04/98:  Restructuring legislation, 
House Bill 1172, was signed into 
law. The law establishes a schedule 
for retail competition beginning 
January 2002 and completion by 
January 2004. 
Suspended 
February 
2008 
03/99:  Senate Bill 1269 was 
signed into law by the Governor. 
The bill includes: creation of a 
regional transmission entity by 
January 1, 2001; deregulation of 
generation by January 1, 2002; 
phase-in of consumer choice 
between January 1, 2002 and 
January 1, 2004; rates capped 
through July 2007 for those who 
remain with the incumbent utility. 
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